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Kurzzusammenfassung 
Die Entwicklung des automatisierten Fahrens (AD) vom teilautomatisierten Fahren (AD2-) 
hin zum hochautomatisierten (AD3+) ist nicht nur im Fokus der Personenkraftwagen (Pkw) 
– Industrie, sondern auch Schwerpunkt in der Nutzfahrzeug (Nfz) – Industrie, insbesondere 
bei der Entwicklung von Lastkraftwagen (Lkw). Während es für Pkw bereits eine Vielzahl 
an Forschungsarbeiten zu AD3+ gibt, besteht auf diesem Gebiet für Lkw besonders im Be-
reich der für AD3+ geeigneten Lenksystemen noch großer Forschungsbedarf, da die Anfor-
derungen an diese, besonders hinsichtlich der geforderten maximalen Lenkkräfte und 
Lenkleistungen, bei AD3+ Lkw um ein Vielfaches höher sind als bei AD3+ Pkw. 
Gegenstand dieser Dissertation ist daher, basierend auf den Rahmenanforderungen für Lkw-
Lenksysteme hinsichtlich Bauraum, Schnittstellen, Energieversorgung und Achslasten so-
wie auf den in dieser Arbeit ermittelten Betriebs- und Redundanzanforderungen durch eine 
deduktive Methodik und einem systematischen Durchgehen des Lösungsraumes ein Kon-
zept eines aktiven Lenksystems für AD3+ Lkw zu entwickeln. Eine redundante rein elekt-
romechanische Servolenkung fällt aufgrund der zu geringen zur Verfügung stehenden 
elektrischen Leistung und eine redundante hydraulische Servolenkung aus Effizienzgründen 
aus dem Lösungsraum heraus. Dieser beschränkt sich mit heutigen Aktoren auf kombinierte 
elektromechanisch-hydraulische Servolenkungen, sogenannte hybride Lenkungen, wofür 
mögliche unterschiedliche Funktionsstrukturen hergeleitet und basierend auf Anforderungen 
aus einer Sicherheitsanalyse bewertet werden. So wird der Lösungsraum eingegrenzt. 
Das erarbeitete Konzept, welches alle Anforderungen erfüllt, ist ein Redundantes Aktives 
Lenksystem (engl. redundant active steering system – RASS) mit einem elektromechani-
schen Subsystem und einem hydraulischen Subsystem, welches ein sowohl durch den Fahrer 
als auch durch ein elektrisches Signal regelbares hydraulisches Lenkungsventil besitzt. Das 
RASS stellt eine sogenannte „fail-degraded“ Funktionalität dar, deren Degradationsgrad 
durch die ermittelten Redundanzanforderungen bestimmt wurde. Das doppelt regelbare 
Lenkventil wird so konzipiert, dass eine Übersteuerbarkeit der Automatik durch den Fahrer 
zu jeder Zeit gewährleistet und eine innerhalb der Momenten- und Leistungsgrenzen des 
elektrischen Subsystems vollkommen freie Aufteilung des geforderten Lenkmomentes auf 
das elektrische und das hydraulische Teilsystem ermöglicht wird. Diese Funktionalität ist 
zur Effizienzsteigerung gegenüber herkömmlichen Lkw-Lenksystemen nutzbar. 
Für die verschiedenen Systemzustände des RASS wird eine Betriebsstrategie entwickelt, 
welche unter Berücksichtigung des Fahrerzustandes, der geforderten Lenkmomente sowie 
möglicher Systemausfälle, den Servolenkungszustand so steuert, dass sich die Effizienz des 
Lenksystems steigert, die Wechsel zwischen manuellen und automatisierten Fahren regelt 
und im Fehlerfall Rückfallstrategien bereitstellt. Als Ergebnis liegt ein neuartiges Lenkkon-
zept vor, welches alle Anforderungen heutiger Lkw erfüllt und für AD3+ geeignet ist. 
Summary 
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Summary 
The development of automated driving (AD) from partially automated driving (AD2-) to 
highly automated driving (AD3+) is not only in the focus of the passenger car industry, but 
also in the commercial vehicle (CV) industry, especially in the development of trucks. There 
is already a lot of research work on AD3+ for passenger cars. However, in this area there is 
still a great need for research for trucks, particularly in the area of steering systems suitable 
for AD3+, since the requirements of these, especially with regard to the maximum required 
steering forces and steering powers, are much higher for AD3+ trucks than for AD3+ pas-
senger cars. 
Therefore, the subject of this thesis is to develop a concept of an active steering system for 
AD3+ trucks by means of a deductive methodology and a systematic analysis of the solution 
space. The development is based on the frame requirements for truck steering systems with 
regard to assembly space, interfaces, energy supply and axle loads as well as on the opera-
tional and redundancy requirements determined in this thesis. On the basis of these require-
ments, a redundant electric power steering system is excluded from the solution space due 
to the insufficient electrical power available on board and a redundant hydraulic power steer-
ing system for efficiency reasons. With today's actuators, the solution space is limited to 
combinations of electric and hydraulic power steering, the so-called hybrid steering systems, 
for which the possible different functional structures are derived. These are evaluated on the 
basis of requirements from a safety analysis, whereby the solution space is limited. 
The developed concept, which meets all requirements, is a redundant active steering system 
(RASS) with an electric subsystem and a hydraulic subsystem, which is equipped with an 
active steering valve that can be controlled by the driver as well as by an electrical signal. 
The RASS provides a so-called "fail-degraded" functionality whose degree of degradation 
was determined by the determined redundancy requirements. The double controllable steer-
ing valve is designed in such a way that the driver is able to override the automatic system 
at any time and that the required steering torque can be distributed arbitrarily between the 
electric and the hydraulic subsystem within the torque and power limits of the electric sub-
system. This functionality is usable to increase efficiency compared to conventional truck 
steering systems. 
An operating strategy is developed for the various system states of the RASS which, taking 
into account the driver's state, the required steering torques and possible system faults, con-
trols the power steering state in such a way as to increase the efficiency of the steering sys-
tem, controls the transitions between manual and automated driving and provides fallback 
strategies in the event of a fault. The result is an innovative steering concept that meets all 
the requirements of today's trucks and is suitable for AD3+. 
 
   1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Driver assistance systems and automated driving (AD) gain more and more importance in 
the automotive development. This trend takes place not only in the development of passenger 
cars, but also in the development of commercial vehicles including trucks. 
Advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) are already available for trucks today. Exam-
ples of ADAS for trucks are Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Lane Keeping Support (LKS), 
Automated Emergency Braking (AEB) or side wind compensation. Whereas ACC only con-
trols the longitudinal movement of the vehicle, the other two support the driver in lateral 
guidance.1a,2 
Different partially automated driving systems have recently been demonstrated on public 
roads in prototypical trucks as well, such as exit-to-exit automation, traffic jam assist, Pla-
tooning or automated trailer backing.3 Examples for exit-to-exit automation are the Highway 
Pilot and the Interstate Pilot. Both systems are a combination of ACC and LKS, but intervene 
far more intensely, hence the longitudinal and the lateral guidance are performed by the 
automation system during monotonous driving on highways or during a traffic jam. How-
ever, the driver is responsible and has to be available to take over the control at all times if 
a critical traffic situation occurs, e.g. construction zones.4,5 An advancement of such systems 
is the so-called “platooning”, where two or more trucks connect each other to a convoy with 
a 15 m gap between the vehicles via data communication. This use case aims to reduce the 
required traffic space, increase safety and reduce fuel consumption.4 The Smart Truck Ma-
neuvering is exemplary for an automated trailer backing system. It enables the driver to ma-
neuver the truck with one or more trailers from outside with a remote tablet.1b The Freight-
liner Inspiration Truck, based on the Freightliner Cascadia, was the first partially automated 
                                                 
1 Gaedke, A. et al.: Driver assistance for trucks (2015), (a) p.221 | (b) p.225. 
2 Brunner, G.; Negele, K.: Electrification of the steering (2008), p.12. 
3 Engström, J. et al.: Deployment of Automated Trucking (2019), p.150. 
4 Ballarin, C.: The truck on its way to an autonomous means of transport (2016), p.40. 
5 Flämig, H.: Autonomous vehicles and autonomous driving in freight transport (2016), p.373. 
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driving truck that achieved a road approval in the US state of Nevada in 2015.6 Other proto-
types of automated driven trucks were developed and tested by companies like Otto7 or Em-
bark8. 
These demonstrated applications already show the positive effects of automated driving, 
which are the reduction of accidents, of emissions, of costs and of the driver’s stress as well 
as the improvement of traffic flow. Hence, the benefits of automated driving are significant 
for all stakeholders of trucking industry.9,10 Therefore, the development is going further to-
wards highly and fully automated trucks, which will increase the named benefits of auto-
mated driving even more and will release the driver from the driving task, so that he is able 
to fulfill other tasks, e.g. transport management.11,12 The project aFAS (German for Auto-
mated Unmanned Protective Vehicle for Highway Hard Shoulder Road Works) has proven 
the technical feasibility of a driverless and fully automated driven vehicle on public roads 
for the first time. The result was a prototypical truck, which was able to drive fully automated 
up to 10 km/h on the hard shoulder of the German highways. Compared to ADAS and par-
tially automated systems, the biggest distinction of highly and fully automated systems is 
the driver who is not available as a fallback level for the automated system. This increases 
especially the safety requirements for all necessary vehicle systems, which makes it neces-
sary to develop new appropriate systems.13 
The standard architecture of highly automated operated vehicles requires sensor technology 
for positioning, perception of the environment, sense of the vehicle’s and of the driver’s 
state, electronic control units (ECU) for data fusion and processing, and actuators for the 
realization of the intended driving maneuvers. The software interprets the sensor data and 
plans the trajectory which is controlled by the actuators to execute the correct maneuvers. 
The actuators include the actuators for longitudinal control such as brake, engine and gear-
box control, but also the actuator for the lateral control, which is the steering system.14 The 
electronic controllability of the different actuators is a mandatory property of the actuators 
for automated driving. Whereas the brakes as well as the engine and the gearbox are already 
electronically controllable in today’s heavy-duty trucks, their steering systems are still al-
most solely hydraulic power steering (HPS) systems, without electronic controllability. 
                                                 
6 Ballarin, C.: The truck on its way to an autonomous means of transport (2016), p.37. 
7 Freedman, D. H.: Self-Driving Trucks. 
8 Embark - Self-Driving Semi Trucks (2019). 
9 Flämig, H.: Autonomous vehicles and autonomous driving in freight transport (2016), pp. 373–374. 
10 Engström, J. et al.: Deployment of Automated Trucking (2019), p.150. 
11 Brockmann, S.; Schlott, S.: The long way to autonomous truck driving (2015), p.11. 
12 Kirschbaum, M.: Highly automated driving for commercial vehicles (2015), p.6. 
13 Stolte, T. et al.: Towards Automated Driving (2015), p.672. 
14 Cacilo, A. et al.: Highly automated driving on highways (2015), p.47. 
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Electric power steering (EPS) systems are ideally feasible for the use as automated steering 
systems, since the electric motor is easily controllable by the software of their ECU. How-
ever, due to the high demanded steering torque and steering power of heavy-duty trucks up 
to 6 kW, a EPS system on its own is not feasible with the design of current vehicle’s power 
supply. Therefore, one approach of automated steering systems for heavy-duty trucks is to 
add an additional electrically controllable actuator, like an electric motor, to the hydraulic 
steering system, which is able to overlay steering torque to the steering system independently 
of the driver via a torque overlay gear. Those systems are called Hybrid Steering Systems 
because of their two different sources of steering torque.15,16a 
An additional advantage of such hybrid steering systems is the potential to reduce the energy 
demand of the steering system. This is important especially for long haul trucks, since the 
fuel costs make up more than a quarter of overall costs of transportation. Only about 1 % of 
the applied power is used as mechanical steering power. The high losses are caused by the 
hydraulic power steering pump (PSP), which permanently produces an engine speed depend-
ent volume flow, which has to run through the open-center (OC) steering valve.16 Because 
solely electric steering is feasible during most of the occurring driving situations of trucks, 
the use of an additional EPS system combined with a PSP with a variable volume flow can 
make fuel savings up to 0.56 l/100km possible.17,16b 
1.2 Particularities of Trucks Compared to 
Passenger Cars 
Heavy-duty trucks significantly differ from passenger cars in several properties. For the de-
velopment of a steering system, especially for the determination of the requirements for the 
steering system, it is important to know these differences. From now on, the name truck is 
used in the present thesis as a synonym for so-called class 7 trucks or higher classes with a 
vehicle weight over 11.8 t18 respectively category N3 vehicles with a vehicle weight exceed-
ing 12 t19. In the following sections, differences of trucks and passenger cars in general ve-
hicle properties, e.g. chassis, dimensions and electrical and/or electronic (E/E)-systems, are 
discussed first. The different steering system of trucks is described in the second part. 
                                                 
15 Reimann, G. et al.: Steering Actuator Systems (2016), pp. 757–758. 
16 Wiesel, U. et al.: Hybrid steering system for reducing fuel consumption (2010), (a) pp. 63–64 | (b) p.68. 
17 Brunner, G.; Negele, K.: Electrification of the steering (2008), p.13. 
18 Hallenbeck, M. E. et al.: Vehicle Classification Rules (2014), p.13. 
19 European Union: Framework for the approval of motor vehicles (2007), p.62. 
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1.2.1 General Vehicle Properties 
The different properties of trucks compared to passenger cars lead to different requirements 
for the truck’s systems, such as for the steering system. The most obvious difference are the 
dimensions of a truck. The mass of a truck is up to 40 times the mass of a passenger car, they 
are up to four times longer and two times as wide as cars.20 
Although trucks often have more axles than passenger cars, the higher mass also leads to up 
to 15 times higher wheel and axle loads and thus to much higher tire contact forces. Together 
with the higher tire pressure of trucks, usually between 6 and 8 bar, and a wear-optimized 
tire design this leads to lower maximum friction values and to lower maximum deceleration 
of approximately 7-8 m/s² in consequence. The bigger height of trucks of up to 4 m and the 
resulting higher center of gravity of 1.2 to 2.5 m leads to an earlier roll over of trucks, which 
is why the maximum possible lateral acceleration of trucks is in the range of 4 to 6 m/s².21 
In addition to the differences concerning dimensions, there is also a big difference in the 
operating hours and the environmental conditions. The service life up to 1,500,000 km and 
up to 50,000 h of operation are three to five times higher compared to passenger cars, which 
leads to significantly higher requirements for the truck components. Among other things, 
typical truck chassis are therefore based on a ladder-type frame construction with rigid ax-
les.21 
The electrical power supply of trucks is a direct current (DC) voltage network with 24 V and 
a typical battery capacity is about 220 Ah for a truck with high electric energy demands. Due 
to the permanently increasing requirements to the power network, the introduction of a 48 V 
power network is discussed consistently. However, due to the widespread availability of the 
24 V components and devices, which not exists for 48 V, a near-term switch to 48 V seems 
not realistic.22 
All these differences in the general vehicle design and properties substantially effect the 
design of truck steering systems, as described in the following.  
                                                 
20 Shladover, S. E. et al.: Demonstration of automated heavy-duty vehicles (2006), 1.8. 
21 Hecker, F.: Brake-Based Stability Assistance Functions (2016), pp. 1023–1026. 
22 Hilgers, M.: Electrics and Mechatronics (2016), pp. 5–6. 
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1.2.2 Truck Steering System 
This section describes the differences and characteristics of current truck steering systems. 
This includes the steering axle kinematics, the steering geometry and the actual hydraulic 
steering system, which is responsible for the steering torque generation to assist the driver. 
Today’s trucks are mostly equipped with a servo hydraulic recirculating ball (RCB) steering, 
which transmits the input steering torque of the driver amplified by the hydraulic assistance 
via a related linkage to the wheels.23 A schematic sketch of a HPS for trucks is shown in 
Figure 1-1 and the corresponding structure is illustrated in Figure 1-2. The input of the steer-
ing system is the steering wheel (1), where the driver applies torque to the system. The steer-
ing column transmits this torque through the hydraulic valve (2) to the input shaft of the 
steering gear (3), which transforms it to the output torque at the pitman arm (4). The driver’s 
torque applied at the hydraulic valve controls the amount of hydraulic steering assistance. 
The internal combustion engine (ICE, 7) drives the Power Steering Pump (PSP, 8), which 
supplies the valve with hydraulic oil from the tank (9). The steering gear is a RCB gear with 
an integrated hydraulic piston, whereby it adds the hydraulic power to the mechanical power 
from the driver. A more detailed description follows. The pitman arm transforms the output 
torque of the steering gear to a steering force at the push rod (5), which transmits it to the 
steering arm. The steering arm is connected to the left steering knuckle. The steering power 
is transferred via the knuckle arms and the tie rod (6) to the right steering knuckle.24 The 
steering knuckles are connected to the axle beam of the rigid axle. 
 
Figure 1-1: Schematic sketch of a HPS for trucks 
                                                 
23 Hecker, F.: Brake-Based Stability Assistance Functions (2016), p.1023. 
24 For left-hand drive vehicles. 
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This steering kinematics in combination with a RCB steering gear are used in almost every 
vehicle with a rigid front axle. With this structure, it is possible to mount the steering gear 
to the frame and thus the steering system is able to follow the complex spatial movements 
of the rigid axle without much backlash on the steering system. Also, the connection to the 
steering wheel inside the truck’s cab, which has an additional suspension relative to the 
frame, is easier with this steering layout.25 
 
Figure 1-2: Exemplary truck steering system with steering kinematic and RCB steering gear26 
In the following thesis, the start of the torque or energy flow is the steering wheel and the 
end are the wheels. The order of components in this flow is considered, when talking about 
torque before or behind a special component.  
Figure 1-3 illustrates the functional structure of a HPS. The driver’s input torque (𝑀H) and 
input angle (𝛿H) at the steering wheel are transferred through the torsion bar (TB) to the 
steering gear (StG). The hydraulic force (𝐹h) is added to the driver’s torque within the steer-
ing gear as described hereafter. The output torque and angle of the steering gear at the pitman 
arm (𝑀P, 𝛿P) are transmitted to the steering torque and angle at the wheels (𝑀W, 𝛿W) by the 
steering linkage. The amount of hydraulic force is controlled by the torsion angle (𝜑d) of the 
torsion bar induced by the driver. The PSP driven by the truck’s ICE generates the hydraulic 
volume flow (𝑄h) and high pressure (𝑝high), which is applied on the hydraulic piston. The 
tank is the reservoir with a low hydraulic pressure (𝑝low). 
                                                 
25 Hullmann, J. et al.: Mechanical and Hydraulic Gears (2017), p.334. 
26 Following Hilgers, M.: Chassis and Axles (2016), p.26. 
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Figure 1-3: Functional structure of hydraulic power steering (HPS) system 
The hydraulic system is combined with the RCB gear in a so-called integrated module. A 
cutaway view of such a module is shown in Figure 1-4. The input shaft of the steering gear 
and the connected rotary slide valve are similar to those of a hydraulic rack-and-pinion steer-
ing, but are designed for much higher volumetric flows rates and higher hydraulic pressures, 
compliant with the higher required power of the RCB gear. The torsion bar inside the rotary 
slide valve connects the input shaft with the spindle of the RCB gear. The balls transform 
the rotation of the spindle to a lateral movement of the ball nut, which also functions as the 
piston of the hydraulic cylinder. The two chambers of the cylinder are connected to the cor-
responding ring grooves of the valve. A dovetailing transfers the translation of the ball nut 
to the output shaft of the steering gear, which is connected to the pitman arm outside of the 
gear housing. This steering gear design offers several benefits for the use in trucks. It is more 
robust than rack-and-pinion steering systems and very reliable and thus it obtains a long 
service life of about one million kilometers. Moreover, it has a better damping against ex-
ternal impacts and is more compact compared to a rack-and-pinion steering. However, the 
drawbacks of the RCB steering gear are the high weight, the high costs and the indirect 
steering feel.27 
                                                 
27 Hullmann, J. et al.: Mechanical and Hydraulic Gears (2017), pp. 333–334.  
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The core component of the truck’s HPS system concerning the control of the hydraulic power 
and the steering feel is the rotary slide valve. Other types of valve designs have been fully 
replaced by this valve.28a Its structure and its function are described in more detail below. 
Its mechanical function is to transmit the steering torque from the input shaft via the torsion 
bar to the valve’s output shaft, which is connected to the spindle of the RCB gear. The hy-
draulic functions of rotary slide valve are to connect the two chambers of the hydraulic cyl-
inder with the inlet from the PSP and the runback to the hydraulic tank as well as to control 
the hydraulic power according to the input torque from the driver at the steering wheel. The 
torsion bar fixes the input shaft and the output shaft axially, but allows a relative twist be-
tween them as a function of the input torque. Thereby, the amount and the direction of the 
hydraulic power assistance are controlled. The stiffness of the torsion bar mainly influences 
the ease and the feeling of the steering system.28b 
 
Figure 1-4: Cutaway view of RCB steering gear with integrated hydraulic piston28c 
Figure 1-5 shows the hydraulic diagram and a cutaway view of a rotary slide valve. The two 
main function parts of the valve are the input shaft and the valve sleeve. The valve sleeve is 
solid connected with the spindle of the RCB gear, but can be rotated relatively to the input 
shaft within certain limits. The hydraulic outputs of the valve sleeve at its outside are hy-
draulically connected with three grooves in the valve housing, which creates three chambers. 
The axial grooves inside of the valve sleeve are spaced over the circumference and imple-
mented at a certain distance from the sleeve’s end. They interact with the grooves of the 
input shaft and thus adopt the valve function. The hydraulic counterpart is the input shaft of 
                                                 
28 Hullmann, J. et al.: Mechanical and Hydraulic Gears (2017), (a) pp. 306–312 | (b) pp. 333–334 | (c) p. 332. 
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the valve. Besides by the torsion bar, it also transmits the input torque directly to the spindle 
if the valve is fully twisted and hits the mechanical end stop. There are axial grooves on the 
high-precision cylindrical outer diameter of the shaft with exact so-called control edges, 
which in combination with the grooves inside the valve sleeve influence the characteristics 
of the power assistance curve over the steering wheel torque. The runback from the hydraulic 
cylinder flows back through the hollow input shaft. The rotary slide valve hydraulically 
functions like a 4/3-way proportional valve with an open center (OC). OC means that even 
in the center position of the valve the PSP transports a continuous hydraulic volume flow 
through the valve. In neutral position the hydraulic resistance is least. An increasing twist of 
the valve causes an increasing resistance and an increasing dynamic pressure. Hence, the 
pressure inside of one cylinder chamber rises and causes a hydraulic steering assistance.29a 
 
Figure 1-5: Hydraulic diagram and cutaway view of a rotary slide valve29b 
For trucks, the hydraulic power is generated almost exclusively by a PSP driven by the en-
gine. Whereas the radial piston pump was used in trucks as well earlier, today the vane pump 
is the mostly built-in pump type. The PSP is designed to generate the maximum required 
steering power already at idling speed of the engine, because the maximum steering power 
is required during steering at standstill. This design causes high losses, e.g. during highway 
driving with high engine speeds and low required steering power. Hence, different new de-
signs of vane pumps are used today to decrease the hydraulic losses. Examples for such 
pumps are the vane pump with a bypass, which lowers the circulation pressure when the 
steering is passive, or the variable pump, which has a variable capacity and thus generates 
only as much volume flow as required for steering.29c 
The PSP is not in focus of this thesis. The existence of pumps with a variable hydraulic 
volume flow is required, but their detailed functionality is not relevant here. 
The description of the standard steering system in today’s trucks clarifies the functionality 
of the HPS, but also the lack of a possibility to control the steering system independently of 
the driver. The HPS is called a passive power steering system, which requires the driver’s 
steering wheel torque as input for the control of the steering valve. 
                                                 
29 Hullmann, J. et al.: Mechanical and Hydraulic Gears (2017), (a) pp. 306–312 | (b) p. 331 | (c) pp. 362–364. 
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1.3 Scope of the Thesis 
The initial subchapters present the motivation for automated trucks and their benefits for the 
different stakeholders. This thesis focuses on the target application of highly automated driv-
ing of trucks, which differs from partially automated driving primarily in the sense that the 
driver does not permanently observe the automated system and therefore is not available as 
an immediate fallback level. Partially automated driving is not considered here. 
The scope of this thesis includes the hardware of the steering system, its functional safety 
assessment and strategies for its operation. The hardware is considered starting from the 
steering wheel as the driver’s input, over the steering gear with all its actuators and its electric 
power supply, to the pitman arm as the interface to the truck’s steering kinematics. Since 
E/E-systems are being introduced into the truck’s steering system to be able to generate 
steering torque independently of the driver for the application of automated driving, func-
tional safety plays a decisive role in the development of the new steering concept. An in-
creased functionality of the steering system is required for highly automated driving as well. 
Thereby, the development of operation strategies for this application is also necessary within 
this thesis. 
Not in the scope of this thesis are the hydraulic power supply by the PSP, the steering kine-
matics of the truck and a detailed software development. Within this thesis, it is assumed 
that a PSP with a variable volume flow is available to supply the steering system with vari-
able hydraulic power. The steering kinematics are left out because the target steering system 
should be designed in such a way that it can be integrated into current trucks without the 
need for completely new steering kinematics. The operation strategies for the steering sys-
tem are only developed on a functional level. The detailed software implementation is not 
considered here. 
It is important to define what is assumed in this work to be the input signal of the steering 
system during automated driving. An output steering torque requirement of the overall steer-
ing system is used as input signal for the target steering system. Similar to manual driving, 
where the driver’s torque at the steering wheel serves as the input, the steering system is 
torque-controlled during automated driving as well. The steering angle control is the task of 
the controller for lateral guidance, but is not within the scope of this thesis. 
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2 Analysis of the State of the Art and the 
Scientific Research 
The current state of the art and the current state of scientific research concerning steering 
systems for highly automated driving, especially of trucks, is summarized in the following 
subchapters. In order to form a basis for the discussion of the requirements for highly auto-
mated driving, the different levels of driving automation and different fallback levels and 
redundancy strategies are explained at first. The second part gives a short overview of the 
functional safety standard, of the legal requirements concerning steering systems, especially 
for automated driving, and of different fallback levels and redundancy strategies. Descrip-
tions of different approaches for active steering systems for trucks, which present the current 
state of the art of truck steering systems, follow. 
2.1 Levels of Driving Automation 
In order to be able to develop and discuss requirements for a steering system for highly 
automated driving and to design such a steering system it is necessary to know several terms, 
definitions and levels regarding the driving automation. SAE J301630a addresses these topics 
and gives a taxonomy for driving automation. 
The term driving automation includes all levels, shown in Table 2-1, and is defined as “the 
performance of part or all of the dynamic driving tasks (DDT) on a sustained basis.”30b Sys-
tems that perform “the entire DDT on a sustained basis, regardless of whether it is limited to 
a specific operational design domain (ODD)”30b belong to the levels 3, 4 and 5 of driving 
automation and are summarized as highly automated and abbreviated with AD3+ in the fol-
lowing thesis. 
The DDT consists of the sustained lateral and/or longitudinal control of the vehicle as well 
as the objective and event detection and response (OEDR). The latter task is not in focus of 
this project, but the DDT fallback is important for the development of a steering system for 
AD3+. The fallback is defined as the “response by the user or by an automated driving sys-
tem (ADS) to either perform the DDT or achieve a minimal risk condition after occurrence 
of a DDT performance-relevant system failure(s) or upon ODD exit”30b. For level 1 and 2 
systems, summarized with AD2-, the driver is the fallback level and has to be available to 
take over the control immediately at any time. To be able to do this, the driver always has to 
supervise the system. For level 3 systems, the driver becomes the “fallback-ready user” when 
the ADS is engaged, hence the driver doesn’t have to supervise the ADS but has to be re-
ceptive to intervene if requested and in the case of evident system failures which compel him 
                                                 
30 Society of Automotive Engineers: J3016 Terms related to driving automation (2016), (a) - | (b) pp. 3–6. 
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to take over the DDT. In case of a fault of the automated steering system, this means that it 
still has to work automated for a short time until the driver intervenes. For levels 4 and 5, 
the driver does not have to be available anymore for the fallback task of the DDT. Hence, 
the automated system itself has to fulfill this task with integrated fallback levels, such as a 
steering redundancy. 
Table 2-1: Levels of driving automation31 
 
L
ev
el
 
Name Narrative definition 
DDT 
DDT 
fallback 
ODD 
 Sustained lateral 
and longitudinal ve-
hicle motion control 
OEDR 
 Driver performs part or all of the DDT 
 
0 
No Driving 
Automation 
Performance by driver of entire 
DDT, even when enhanced by 
active safety systems. 
Driver Driver Driver n/a 
A
D
2
- 
1 
Driver 
Assistance 
Sustained and ODD-specific ex-
ecution by a driving automation 
system of either lateral or longi-
tudinal vehicle motion control 
subtask of DDT (but not both 
simultaneously) with expecta-
tion that driver performs the re-
mainder of DDT. 
Driver and system Driver Driver Limited 
2 
Partial  
Driving 
Automation 
Sustained and ODD-specific ex-
ecution by a driving automation 
system of both lateral and longi-
tudinal vehicle motion control 
subtasks of DDT with expecta-
tion that driver completes 
OEDR subtask and supervises 
driving automation system. 
System Driver Driver Limited 
 ADS (“System”) performs the entire DDT (while engaged) 
A
D
3
+
 
3 
Conditional 
Driving 
Automation 
Sustained and ODD-specific 
performance by ADS of entire 
DDT with expectation that 
DDT fallback-ready user is re-
ceptive to ADS-issued requests 
to intervene, as well as to DDT 
performance-relevant system 
failures in other vehicle sys-
tems, and will respond appro-
priately. 
System System 
Fallback-
ready user 
(becomes 
the driver 
during 
fallback) 
Limited 
4 
High  
Driving 
Automation 
Sustained and ODD-specific 
performance by ADS of entire 
DDT and DDT fallback without 
any expectation that a user will 
respond to a request to inter-
vene. 
System System System Limited 
5 
Full  
Driving 
Automation 
Sustained and unconditional 
(i.e., not ODD-specific) perfor-
mance by ADS of entire DDT 
and DDT fallback without any 
expectation that a user will re-
spond to a request to intervene. 
System System System 
Un- 
limited 
 
                                                 
31 Society of Automotive Engineers: J3016 Terms related to driving automation (2016), p.17. 
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2.2 Functional Safety 
The development of a concept of a redundant active steering system for AD3+ of trucks is 
the key target of this thesis. As already discussed in the previous subchapters, the present 
standard HPS is not suitable for this use case, since it is not able to generate steering torque 
independently of the driver. Hence, additional electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems are 
necessary in addition. This emphasizes the functional safety according to the ISO 2626232 
as a key topic to consider during the development process. Since its latest version, the 
ISO 26262 has been adapted for E/E systems of vehicles with a maximum total weight of 
more than 3.5 t33, thus it can be used for the development of E/E systems in trucks today as 
well. 
This subchapter starts with an overview of the ISO 26262 and its definitions of the important 
terms, which are required for the understanding of this thesis. The focus concerning func-
tional safety is on the concept phase of the ISO 26262, since the scope of this thesis is limited 
to the development of a comprehensive concept of a steering system for AD3+ of trucks. 
Therefore, a short summary of this concept phase and its application to automated driving 
and to steering systems is given below. 
The new Public Available Specification (PAS) ISO/PAS 21448 on the safety of the intended 
functionality (SOTIF)34 is not considered within this thesis, because it only covers the cor-
rectness of the intended functionality, but not the functional safety of the system technolo-
gies, which include steering systems. 
2.2.1 ISO 26262 
The ISO 26262 is the international standard from the International Standardization Organi-
zation (ISO) about functional safety of E/E systems especially for use in the automobile 
industry. It was developed based on the IEC 61508 (International Electrotechnical Commis-
sion) because more and more safety-relevant E/E systems are implemented in modern vehi-
cles. The ISO 26262 provides guidelines for the development of such systems, without dic-
tating certain methods for the single development steps. Figure 2-1 gives an overview of the 
single development steps described in the ISO 26262. 
Because the key target of this thesis is to determine the requirements for a steering system 
for AD3+ of trucks and implement them into a concept of a redundant active steering system, 
only the following parts of the ISO 26262 are considered within this thesis: 
  
                                                 
32 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262 (2018). 
33 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-1 (2018), p.1. 
34 International Organization for Standardization: ISO/PAS 21448 SOTIF (2019). 
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 ISO 26262-3: Concept phase35 
 ISO 26262-4: Product development at the system level36 
 ISO 26262-5: Product development at the hardware level37 
 ISO 26262-6: Product development at the software level38 
The safety analysis in subchapter 5.2 presents the results from the application of the whole 
content described in the concept phase in ISO 26262-3. The used methodology for the con-
cept phase is described in section 2.2.1.2. The content of the other three parts is not depicted 
separately, but parts of ISO 26262-4 are applied in subchapter 5.3, parts of ISO 26262-5 in 
chapter 7 and parts of ISO 26262-6 in chapter 6. 
 
Figure 2-1: Overview of ISO 26262 methodology39  
                                                 
35 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-3 (2018). 
36 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-4 (2018). 
37 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-5 (2018). 
38 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-6 (2018). 
39 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-1 (2018), vii. 
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2.2.1.1 Definitions 
First, to understand the approach in this thesis concerning functional safety, the most im-
portant vocabulary from ISO 26262-1 are defined in Table 2-2. A more detailed list is at-
tached in appendix A.3.1. 
Table 2-2: Definition of important term of ISO 2626240 
Term Description 
Automotive 
safety integrity 
level (ASIL) 
“one of four levels to specify the item's or element's necessary ISO 26262 re-
quirements and safety measures to apply for avoiding an unreasonable resid-
ual risk, with D representing the most stringent and A the least stringent 
level”41 
Error “discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition, 
and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition” 
Failure “termination of an intended behavior of an element or an item due to a fault 
manifestation” 
Fault “abnormal condition that can cause an element or an item to fail” 
Functional safety “absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning be-
haviour of E/E systems” 
Functional safety 
concept 
“specification of the functional safety requirements, with associated infor-
mation, their allocation to elements within the architecture, and their interac-
tion necessary to achieve the safety goals” 
Functional safety  
requirement 
“specification of implementation-independent safety behaviour or implemen-
tation-independent safety measure including its safety-related attributes” 
Redundancy “existence of means in addition to the means that would be sufficient to per-
form a required function or to represent information” 
Safety goal “top-level safety requirement as a result of the hazard analysis and risk as-
sessment” 
2.2.1.2 Concept Phase 
The ISO 26262 provides a framework for the development of safety-relevant E/E-systems. 
The third phase of its process is the concept phase, which includes the following steps42: 
 Item definition 
 Hazard analysis and risk assessment 
 Functional safety concept 
                                                 
40 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-1 (2018). 
41 In addition to the four ASIL, QM (quality management) denotes no requirement to comply with ISO 26262 
42 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-3 (2018), p.1. 
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The item definition targets to provide comprehensive information about the item’s function-
ality, its dependencies on and interaction with its environment and its interfaces with other 
items, but also legal requirements and potential hazards, to get an appropriate understanding 
of the item and its behavior.43 
The final results of the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) are the safety goals, 
which are formulated to prevent or mitigate hazardous events and thus to avoid unreasonable 
risk. To devise the safety goals, hazardous events are identified in the HARA by analyzing 
and categorizing potential hazardous situations. The categorization is based on the so-called 
automotive safety integrity level (ASIL), which assesses the potential hazardous situations.43 
The last step of the concept phase is the development of the functional safety concept ac-
cording to the ISO 26262, with the objective to derive the functional safety requirements 
based on the functional safety goals from the previous step. Furthermore, the functional 
safety requirements are allocated to elements of the preliminary system architecture or to 
external safety measures. The developed functional safety concept contains fault detection 
and failure mitigation. This includes measures to transmit the vehicle into a safe state with 
fault tolerance mechanisms, fault detections and driver warnings.43 
The ISO 26262 provides the framework and methodology for the development of E/E sys-
tems of vehicles, but it leaves the applied methods open. The methodology used in this thesis 
for the concept phase as well as the steps of the ISO 26262 and the methods for the devel-
opment of the functional safety concept are described later during application in subchap-
ter 5.2. 
2.2.2 Fault Tolerance Levels and Redundancy Strategies 
AD2- systems rely on the driver as a fallback level in case of a malfunction of the automated 
system or if the system exceeds its limits. However, the driver is not available as an imme-
diate fallback level for AD3+. The automated system has to provide internal fallback levels 
instead. For the development and the discussion of a redundant active steering system, it is 
important to know the different levels of fault tolerance and possible redundancy strategies. 
One fault tolerance level is called fail-silent and is used in today’s EPS systems. As impli-
cated in its name, such a system keeps passive after one or more faults occur, i.e. it is shut 
off and thus does not influence other components in a wrong way. For the example of a fail-
silent EPS, this means that the electric motor does not lock the steering in case of a fault. 
Hence the driver is still able to steer the vehicle via the mechanical linkage. A so-called fail-
safe system immediately switches to a safe state as soon as one or more faults arise. If no 
energy is required for the switch, it is called passive fail-safe and it is called active fail-safe 
if energy is required. If a transition to a safe state is not possible immediately, a so-called 
                                                 
43 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-3 (2018), pp. 4–17. 
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fail-operational system is necessary, i.e. the system tolerates the fault and stays operational. 
Furthermore, it is distinguished if the system stays fully operational or if it stays operational 
with a degraded functionality. The latter is called fail-degraded.44a 
In order to achieve a fail-operational or fail-degraded functionality, the system requires re-
dundancies. There are mainly two different types of redundancy defined in the ISO 26262. 
The multiple identical implementation of a function is called homogeneous redundancy, 
whereas the implementation of the same function with different solutions is called diversity 
or diverse redundancy.45 An exemplary fail-operational EPS system with a homogeneous 
redundancy for AD3+ of passenger cars is shown in Figure 2-2. All components of the sys-
tem are available twice. The electric motor contains two independent windings for the im-
plementation of the fail-operational functionality. The two power stages ensure the electric 
power supply and the two central processing units (CPU) serve as a redundant control of the 
steering system. 
 
Figure 2-2: Structure of a fail-operational EPS46 
2.2.3 Functional Safety Concepts of Current Steering Systems 
Functional safety concepts of current steering systems suitable only for AD2- or even only 
for power steering are structured relatively simple. The reliability of sole mechanic and/or 
hydraulic steering systems, e.g. today’s standard truck HPS, is primarily ensured by an over-
sizing design. Because they contain no E/E systems, functional safety according to 
ISO 26262 is not an issue. In contrast, the functional safety of E/E systems of an EPS in-
cluding their hardware and software components is ensured using safety measures and re-
dundancies.44b  
Today’s EPS systems for passenger cars are designed in a way that faults can be largely 
excluded. However, a suitable safety concept has to be developed, which detects occurring 
                                                 
44 Isermann, R.: Fault tolerance in mechatronic systems (2016), (a) pp. 45–46 | (b) p. 43.. 
45 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-1 (2018), p.20. 
46 Robert Bosch GmbH: New steering systems for tomorrow's mobility (2017). 
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faults and minimizes the fault consequences by transmitting the system into a safe state in a 
sufficient time. Hence, safety goals for an EPS only for manual driving are:47 
 EPS has to detect faults that cause an undesirable actuator function and switch into a 
safe state. 
 EPS has to detect faults that cause a heavy-running steering system and switch into 
a safe state. 
 EPS has to prevent unintended reset of the power assistance. 
Therefore, the following requirements exemplary define the safe state of such an EPS sys-
tem:47 
 The EPS is shut off and does not generate steering assistance. 
 For leaving the safe state, the EPS has to be switched off and its ECU has to be 
successfully reset. 
 The electric actuator must not apply any torques to the steering system, above a 
safety-critical value. 
 The steerability of the vehicle by the driver via the mechanical linkage of the steering 
wheel and the wheels has to be maintained at any time according to ECE R7948. 
From these definitions of the safety goals and the safe state, the functional and furthermore 
the technical requirements of the EPS’s subsystems, such as the ECU, the steering actuator 
and the steering wheel torque sensor, are derived to prevent any violation of the safety goals. 
The previously mentioned driverless research vehicle aFAS has a so-called hybrid steering 
system, which is a combination of an EPS and a HPS. Thus it is able to steer the truck driv-
erlessly. Its steering system has a fail-safe architecture considering faults inside the steering 
systems, the power supply and the communication to other systems. It requires no redun-
dancy, because the vehicle’s safe state is an immediate stop, which is sufficient for velocities 
below 10 km/h. Thus, the safe state of the steering system is a passive steering system, which 
means a deactivated power steering function similar to the fail-silent state of the EPS.49 
Although systems for AD3+ have much higher complexity, the ISO 262626 is also used for 
their development. The importance of the concept phase increases because the functional 
safety concept has to change from fail-safe to fail-operational or fail-degraded and the defi-
nition of safety goals and the safe state according to the intended level of automation is more 
complex.50 The fail-operational or fail-degraded safety concept is required to transfer the 
vehicle into a safe state. The high requirements regarding availability of the actuators and 
                                                 
47 Gaedke, A. et al.: Electric Power Steering Systems (2017), pp. 448–453. 
48 United Nations: ECE R79 r4 (2018), p.30. 
49 Christian Rief: aFAS Steering System (2018), p.5. 
50 Martin, H. et al.: Functional Safety of ADS (2016), p.413. 
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their control are achieved by suitable redundancy concepts.51 The structure of the system has 
to be designed in a way that in case of a fault a minimum set of the system’s components 
stay operational and thus are available as a fallback level. The power supply of the steering 
system has to provide at least enough energy for the fallback level to reach the defined safe 
state. The required minimum set of steering components and the required minimum steering 
energy, also described as level of degradation, are not described in the current research yet.52 
Safety goals and functional safety concepts for the control of steering system suitable for 
AD3+ as well as for the communication between the ADS and the steering system are al-
ready developed exemplarily for the research vehicles “MOBILE” of TU Braunschweig53,54 
and “SpeedE” of RWTH Aachen.55 Both approaches have been developed specifically for 
those research vehicles with steer-by-wire (SbW) four-wheel steering systems and are not 
applicable to truck steering systems, which are in scope of this thesis. However, those re-
search results are used as input for the safety analysis in this thesis. 
2.3 Legal Requirements for Steering Systems 
This subchapter gives an overview of the legal requirements for steering systems, especially 
concerning automated driving. The two main legal requirements valid for steering systems 
for the automated driving of trucks are the “Vienna’s Convention on Road Traffic”56a and 
the “Uniform Provisions Concerning the Approval of Vehicles with Regard to Steering Sys-
tems”57 (ECE R79). Both documents contain many regulations, of which only those that are 
crucial for the steering system of automated trucks are described hereafter. 
The convention on road traffic dictates that “every motor vehicle shall be equipped with a 
strong steering mechanism which will allow the driver to change the direction of the vehicle, 
easily, quickly and surely”56b, whereas “every driver shall at all times be able to control his 
vehicle”56c.  
Since the original convention on road traffic originates from 1968 and was designed for 
manual driving only, some extensions were made considering automated driving, among 
other things. Hereby, an automated system is allowed to perform the vehicle’s driving task 
instead of the driver, who can do other activities meanwhile. However, this is only valid if 
                                                 
51 Becker, J. et al.: System architecture and safety requirements for AD (2017), p.275. 
52 Becker, J.; Helmle, M.: Architecture and System Safety Requirements for AD (2015), p.43. 
53 Stolte, T. et al.: Safety goals and functional safety requirements (2016). 
54 Stolte, T. et al.: On Functional Safety of Vehicle Actuation Systems (2016). 
55 Gillen, C.: Dissertation, Development of efficient safety concepts for steering systems (2015). 
56 United Nations: Convention on Road Traffic (1968), (a) - | (b) p.59 | (c) p.11. 
57 United Nations: ECE R79 r4 (2018). 
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the driver’s further activities do not prevent the driver from taking over the driving task when 
required. This condition makes it clear that only AD2- is enabled by the last extensions. For 
the introduction of AD3+, further extensions are necessary in the future.58 
The ECE R79 is the valid regulation for the steering systems for vehicles of the categories 
M, N and O, including the category N3, which is on behalf of this thesis. The ECE R79 was 
also adapted to enable ADAS functions and to support the development of automated driv-
ing. It differs between “Autonomous Steering Systems”, which are controlled from outside 
the vehicle, “automatically commanded steering functions” (ACSF), which are steering 
functions controlled automatically by the vehicle, “corrective steering functions” (CSF), 
which are functions that support the driver only for a limited duration, and the “emergency 
steering functions” (ESF), which intervene in case of an emergency to avoid a collision. The 
target steering system of this thesis belongs to ACSF, which do not require commands of the 
driver for controlling the vehicle. Those systems are not included in the current version of 
the ECE R79, but appropriate amendments are already provided. Definitions that are more 
detailed are listed in appendix A.1.1.59a 
This differentiation in the ECE R79 is based on the automated lateral guidance control of the 
vehicles, but not on the functionality of the actual steering system. In addition, it does not fit 
with the SAE levels of automation. Regardless of the categorization defined in the ECE R79, 
a suitable automated steering system requires the ability to generate steering torque inde-
pendently of the driver. In addition, the testing procedure dictated by the ECE R79 is focused 
on the lateral guidance functionality and not on the actual steering system’s functionality. It 
seems to be questionable if such requirements are placed in the correct regulation here. 
However, there are a few regulations that are addressed to the actual automated steering 
system. Similar to the Vienna’s convention on road traffic, the ECE R79 also requires that 
the driver is able to override the automated system at any time by deliberate intervention.59b 
For all categories of automated steering functionalities, it dictates a maximum required force 
at the steering wheel to override the system by the driver of 50 N59c, i.e. a steering wheel 
torque of 12.5 Nm at a truck steering wheel with 0.25 m radius. 
Furthermore, the ECE R79 requires the development and description of a safety concept for 
the automated steering system, which shall ensure a safe operation of the steering system 
even in case of a system fault. A fallback level inside the steering system, a separate back-
up system or the reduction of the available automated steering functionality are proposed for 
adequate safety measures to guarantee the safe operation.59d 
Important for truck steering systems are the regulations that all requirements should be met 
with a fully loaded truck and the steering effort at a steering wheel with 0.25 m radius shall 
not exceed 50 Nm for an intact steering system respectively 112.5 Nm for a steering system 
                                                 
58 United Nations: ECE WP.1/159 (2017), p.5. 
59 United Nations: ECE R79 r4 (2018), (a) pp. 5–7 | (b) p.4 | (c) p.14 | (d) pp. 42–45. 
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with a failure.60 The latter requires a special dual-circuit HPS for trucks with very high front 
axle loads, because otherwise in the event of a failure of the operation steering system, the 
driver would not be able to steer those vehicles exclusively mechanically.61 The target steer-
ing system has the claim to replace this dual-circuit system. 
2.4 Active Steering Systems 
This subchapter summarizes the current state of the art and of the scientific research con-
cerning active steering systems, especially for trucks. The term active describes systems in 
which the quantity of the output variable is controlled by an actuator and auxiliary power, 
such as an EPS. In contrast, passive systems are not able to control the transferred quantity 
with additional auxiliary energy, such as standard HPS. With standard passive HPS, the hy-
draulics assist the driver with auxiliary power, but the assistance rate is determined by the 
design of the steering valve and the PSP and is not controllable during operation. They are 
comparable to a fixed-ratio gear box.62,63 
In this thesis, active steering systems describe steering systems that are able to generate 
steering torque and thereby change the steering angle independently of the driver, but by 
means of electronic signals instead. Passive steering systems require the input torque of the 
driver as mechanical input signal to generate and to control the power steering torque. 
In the following sections, EPS systems like used in most of today’s passenger cars and a 
prototype EPS for commercial vehicles are described first. Two different types of active HPS 
for trucks are presented as well, which are the hydraulic power steering systems with active 
valves and the so-called hybrid steering systems. To complete this summary, steer-by-wire 
concepts are described as well. With all these active steering systems, the functionality con-
cerning the implementation of ADAS and automated driving is similar to today’s EPS of 
passenger cars, which means that the assistance torque is controllable independently of the 
driver’s input torque and steering torque is producible even without any input of the driver. 
  
                                                 
60 United Nations: ECE R79 r4 (2018), p.30. 
61 Hullmann, J. et al.: Mechanical and Hydraulic Gears (2017), p.335. 
62 Isermann, R.: Mechatronic Systems (2008), p.56. 
63 Brunner, S.; Harrer, M.: Steering Requirements (2017), p.59. 
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2.4.1 Electric Power Steering 
Electric power steering (EPS) systems are mainly used in today’s passenger cars with rack 
and pinion steering. The disadvantage of the lower power density compared to a HPS is 
negligible here, but the benefits of an EPS are the higher efficiency and the higher function-
ality compared to a HPS. The former is achieved by the power-on-demand feature of the 
EPS, which means that it is only activated when required, whereby its energy consumption 
is decreased. Since an EPS is an active steering system, it is able to generate torque inde-
pendently of the driver, which can be used for comfort or ADAS functions.64 
Figure 2-3 shows a schematic sketch of an EPS, to explain its structure. In contrast to the 
previously described HPS, the EPS does not use the driver’s input torque as a mechanical 
input signal. The input torque of the driver at the steering wheel (1) is measured by a sensor 
(10), which transfers this information to an electric control unit (ECU, 11). The ECU calcu-
lates the required assistance torque depending on the current driving state and on demands 
of ADAS or AD functions. Using the electric power stored in a battery (12), supplied by a 
generator (13) driven by the ICE (7), the ECU controls an electric motor (14), which overlays 
its torque to the driver’s torque at the shaft between the steering wheel and the steering gear 
(3) via a torque overlay gear (15). The kinematics from the steering gear to the steered wheels 
vary depending on the vehicle and are shown here exemplary for a truck. The electrical re-
cording and processing of the driver's torque and, above all, the electrical control of the 
steering actuator make the EPS an active system. However, ensuring its functional safety 
becomes a central issue as a result. 
 
Figure 2-3: Schematic sketch of an EPS for trucks 
There are different types of EPS steering systems on the market, which differ in the mounting 
position of the electric motor. Since there is no EPS for trucks yet, an exemplary functional 
                                                 
64 Gaedke, A. et al.: Electric Power Steering Systems (2017), pp. 403–404. 
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structure for a so-called rack-EPS for passenger cars is shown in Figure 2-4. One of the 
crucial components of an EPS is the steering wheel sensor (sensor), which senses the driver’s 
input torque and angle (𝑀H, 𝛿H) at the steering wheel. The electric control unit (ECU) pro-
cesses this information, connects it with the torque or angle requirements from the ADAS 
(𝑀ADAS, 𝛿ADAS) and transmits it to the power electronic (PE), where the signal is connected 
with electric energy from the battery (𝐸Batt). This energy is used to supply the electric motor 
(EM) to generate additional steering torque (𝑀e), which is added to the steering power of 
the driver by a torque overlay gear (gear). The steering torque and angle of the driver are 
converted into a steering force (𝐹H) and a translation (𝑦H) in the steering gear (StG). The 
result is the overall sum of steering forces (𝐹R) and rack translation (𝑦R). Those are trans-
formed to the steering torque and angle at the wheels (𝑀w, 𝛿w). 
 
Figure 2-4: Functional structure of electric power steering (EPS) system 
Standard EPS are already suitable for AD2-, since they are active steering systems and re-
quire no fail-operational system design. The driver is available as an immediate fallback 
level. Hence, the described fail-silent design is sufficient. 
The only one example of an EPS for commercial vehicles (CV) is ZF’s ReAX EPS, which 
is a prototype published in June 2018 and shown in Figure 2-5. According to ZF, all SAE 
Levels of Driving Automation can be realized with this system. A powerful EM with a max-
imum torque of 70 Nm in combination with a 48 V on-board vehicle power supply system 
generates all required steering torque without any hydraulics. This system can also be used 
for a steer-by-wire application. So far, this system is a very early prototype and only this 
little information is known about it. Its maximum output steering torque and power are not 
published yet. However, it is no suitable solution for the scope of this thesis, since it requires 
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a 48 V electric power supply and is not realizable with the available 24 V on-board net-
work.65 
AD3+ also requires an EPS to have a fail-operational system design. An approach for such 
a fail-operational EPS for passenger cars is already presented in Figure 2-2. Such a system 
structure allows AD3+ and offers high safety due to its redundant system design. In case of 
a fault, the second independent electronic circuit provides at least half of the steering assis-
tance and thus the functionality to guarantee a safe stop of the vehicle.66 
 
Figure 2-5: ZF ReAX EPS65 
  
                                                 
65 ZF Friedrichshafen AG: ZF Press Release (2018). 
66 Robert Bosch GmbH: New steering systems for tomorrow's mobility (2017), p.5. 
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2.4.2 Hydraulic Power Steering Systems with Active Valve 
A more powerful solution for an active steering system is a standard HPS, which becomes 
an active steering system by an integrated active valve. As shown in a schematic sketch of 
such systems in Figure 2-6, a sensor (10) is used to record the input torque of the driver at 
the steering wheel (1) similar to EPS. 
 
Figure 2-6: Schematic sketch of a HPS for trucks with active valve 
The ECU also uses electric energy from the battery (12) and the generator (13) to control the 
active valve (2) and thereby to control the hydraulic assistance torque. The hydraulic energy 
is supplied by a PSP (8) driven by an ICE (7), which pumps the hydraulic oil to the active 
valve and the hydraulic piston inside the steering gear (3). The kinematics are similar to 
those of a standard HPS of trucks. With this system, the driver is still able to control the 
valve by his input torque. The active valve serves as an additional actuator, which also con-
trols the quantity of the systems output torque independently of the driver. 
An exemplary function structure of such a steering system is illustrated in Figure 2-7. The 
hydraulic components are similar to those of a standard HPS except for the active valve (AV) 
and the variable power steering pump (vPSP), which is able to adjust its output volume flow. 
Similar to EPS systems, a sensor detects the driver’s input torque and angle (𝑀H, 𝛿H) at the 
steering wheel, an ECU processes and combines them with information from the ADAS and 
transmits them to the PE. The PE supplies the modulation actuator (MA), which is able to 
overlay an additional driver-independent rotation angle (𝜑VS) to the driver-induced valve 
torsion angle (𝜑VTB) via a gear. Thereby, the HPS is controllable independently of the driver 
by the modulation mechanism also called modulator, but still by the driver as well. 
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Figure 2-7: Functional structure of HPS system with active valve 
There are different ways to implement the overlay mechanism of the modulator, but all ex-
isting solutions are based on an adjustable valve sleeve.67,68 The sleeve is twisted inde-
pendently of the driver by an additional actuator, e.g. an electric motor or an electro-magnet, 
to control the steering torque of the HPS independently of the driver. Because the actuator 
is only responsible for the modulation of the hydraulics, but not for the actual generation of 
steering torque, a low actuator power of maximum 100 W is sufficient for that task. The 
steering power is still provided by the PSP similar to standard HPS. Hence, such systems are 
not able to shut-off the hydraulics and steer solely electrical, but by using a PSP with adjust-
able power demand an increase in efficiency is also possible.69 
One example for a hydraulic power steering system with an active valve is Knorr-Bremse’s 
“intelligent Hydraulic Steering Assist” (iHSA) with a recirculating ball (RCB) gear. The 
active valve module iHSA is shown on the left side of Figure 2-8 alone and in combination 
                                                 
67 Janz, B. et al.: Steering valve with planetary gear (2009). 
68 Birsching, J. E.: HPS with magnetic torque overlay (2014). 
69 Müller, J.-H.: Torque overlay for hydraulic steering (2010), p.558. 
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with a RCB gear on the right side. The actuator of the iHSA is a small electric motor for 
controlling the hydraulic valve.69 
Another example for an active valve for the combination with a hydraulic RCB gear is 
Wabco’s “Magnasteer”. It has the same functionality as the iHSA, but it uses an integrated 
electromagnetic valve actuator.70 
 
Figure 2-8: iHSA Module (left)71 and iHSA Module with hydraulic RCB Gear (right)72 
Both active valve systems are designed as a module, which is mounted at the top of the RCB 
and replaces the standard passive steering valve including the input shaft of the RCB. Com-
pared to passive valves, the active valve modules have bigger dimensions, whereas the height 
is crucial because the space above the RCB is limited in the truck. 
2.4.3 Hybrid Steering Systems 
Another solution of an active steering system for trucks is a so-called hybrid steering system. 
It is called hybrid because it uses two different energy sources to produce steering power 
and steering torque by combining an EPS system with a standard HPS system, as shown in 
the schematic sketch in Figure 2-9. The electric subsystem is similar to the described EPS 
and includes the sensor (10), the ECU (11), the battery (12), the generator (13), the electric 
motor (14) and the torque overlay gear (15). The hydraulic subsystem contains the passive 
valve (2), the steering gear (3) with an integrated hydraulic piston, the PSP (8) and the tank 
(9). The kinematics are standard truck steering kinematics. By connecting an EPS between 
the steering wheel and the HPS, the hybrid system receives the same functionality as an EPS. 
The latter overlays torque to the driver’s torque or replaces the input torque of the driver at 
the HPS during automated driving. 
                                                 
70 WABCO: Active Steering Technology (2018). 
71 Knorr-Bremse: iHSA Control Module (2018). 
72 Knorr-Bremse: Truck RCB Steering Gear with iHSA Control Module (2018). 
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Figure 2-9: Schematic sketch of a hybrid steering system for trucks 
An exemplary functional structure of a hybrid steering system is shown in Figure 2-10. The 
EPS is mounted between the steering wheel and the torsion bar (TB) of the hydraulic valve 
at the input shaft of the steering gear (StG). The functionality of the EPS is similar to a 
standalone EPS, same for the HPS. The position of the EPS in front of the valve allows it to 
control the valve in addition to the driver. This enables a hybrid steering system to actively 
generate steering torque not only electrically but also hydraulically. With the additional elec-
tric motor (EM) of the EPS, those systems are able to generate steering torque purely elec-
trically and combined electrically and hydraulically. The hydraulics are shut off when only 
low steering power is required, which the EPS is able to provide alone. Thereby, the power 
required by the hybrid steering system is significantly reduced by 75 % compared to standard 
HPS.73 
                                                 
73 Wiesel, U. et al.: Hybrid steering system for reducing fuel consumption (2010), p.68. 
1
15
2
7
9
6
12
11
14
8
10
5
3
4
13
 2.4 Active Steering Systems 
  29 
 
Figure 2-10: Functional structure of a hybrid steering system 
There are several approaches known to implement a hybrid steering system. A selection of 
these is described in the following. Two similar examples for hydraulic power steering with 
electric torque overlay are ZF’s “ReAX Gear Mounted” and Bosch’s “Servotwin”, shown in 
Figure 2-11. Both use an electric motor and a worm gear to overlay electrically generated 
torque to the input shaft of the passive hydraulic valve of the HPS. The Servotwin delivers 
over 8 kNm of hydraulic torque at the pitman arm and 65 Nm of electric torque at the input 
shaft of the passive valve.74 Both systems are available on the market. 
                                                 
74 Bosch Mobility Solutions: Automated and efficient for the future (2018), p.5. 
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Figure 2-11: Structure of the Servotwin75 
Other hybrid steering systems are Volvo’s “Dynamic Steering System”76, which is already 
established on the market and functions similar to the first two examples, or MAN’s 
“EcoSteering” as a result of a research project77a. The latter distinguishes itself from the other 
systems by the mounting position of the EPS. As shown in Figure 2-12, the electric motor 
and the overlay gear are attached at the lower end of the RCB’s input shaft. Thereby, the 
EPS is also able to generate steering torque electrically, but cannot actively control the HPS 
via the hydraulic valve. This limits the functionality of the system, but it simplifies its control 
as the EPS is controllable independently of the driver’s input torque and the hydraulic valve. 
 
Figure 2-12: Structure of MAN’s EcoSteering77b 
                                                 
75 Gaedke, A. et al.: Driver assistance for trucks (2015), p.217. 
76 Volvo Trucks Magazine: Benefits of Volvo Dynamic Steering (2017). 
77 Brunner, G.; Negele, K.: Electrification of the steering (2008), (a) - | (b) p.7. 
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2.4.4 Steer-by-Wire Systems 
Steer-by-wire (SbW) systems are innovative steering systems characterized by the mechan-
ical decoupling of the linkage between the steering wheel and the steered wheels. The struc-
ture is similar to those of an EPS, as shown in Figure 2-3, but without the mechanical linkage 
between the steering wheel and the steering gear. An additional actuator to generate feedback 
torque at the steering wheel is installed instead. 
An exemplary function structure is depicted in Figure 2-13. A sensor detects the driver’s 
intended steering torque and angle (𝑀H, 𝛿H) at the steering wheel. An ECU transmits these 
signals via the PE to the EM, which is connected to the wheels by a gear and the steering 
linkage and executes the driver’s intention at the steered wheels. An additional sensor detects 
the torque and angle at the output of the steering system at the pitman arm (𝑀P, 𝛿P) and 
transmits them to a so-called feedback actuator (FA) via the ECU to provide haptic response 
to the driver by a feedback torque (𝑀FB) and feedback angle (𝛿FB). 
 
Figure 2-13: Functional structure of a steer-by-wire (SbW) system 
The disadvantages of this type of steering systems are higher costs, weight and complexity 
compared to the previous presented steering systems, which are caused by the high redun-
dancy requirements of SbW systems. In case of a fault, a switch to a fail-silent mode is not 
sufficient because of the missing mechanical linkage between the steering wheel and the 
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steered wheels. Hence, as for AD3+, a fail-operational mode is required with multiple im-
plementations of all components. Thereby, it is guaranteed that the driver is able to control 
the steering even in the case of any fault.78 
A functional safety concept for a SbW system includes an operation strategy, fault manage-
ment with a degradation plan and a suitable warning plan for the driver. The sensors have to 
be three times redundant and the actuators at least twice.79a 
In contrast, the main benefits of a SbW are the ability to control the steering angle and steer-
ing torque at the wheels completely independent of the driver’s input at the steering wheel. 
In the other direction, the haptic feedback for the driver can be designed independently of 
the forces at the wheels as well. Thereby, a SbW is predestined for the implementation of 
ADAS and automated driving. Besides the functional benefits, a SbW also has some con-
structive advantages.79b 
Because current active steering systems have almost similar functionality, but much lower 
safety requirements, the development of SbW systems is not particularly focused on today 
and no SbW system is used in any production car or truck for public roads until now. How-
ever, with the increasing electrification of vehicles and the introduction of AD3+ vehicles, 
which also require fault-tolerant steering systems, it is possible to use technical synergies 
and thus to reduce costs. This could be a change for SbW systems to establish on the mar-
ket.79c,80 
2.5 Conclusion of the Analysis of the State of the 
Art and the Scientific Research 
The previous sections give an overview on the current state of the art and of the scientific 
research of highly automated driving (AD3+), especially of trucks, and its requirements to 
the steering system. The categorization and description of the different levels of driving au-
tomation according to the SAE J3016 defines that the driver is not available as a fallback for 
the dynamic driving task for AD3+ systems. Thus, the automated vehicle has to provide an 
internal fallback level. 
Furthermore, the importance of the functional safety for active steering systems for AD3+, 
especially the importance of the concept phase, is clarified here. To ensure a safe operation 
of an active steering system during any conditions, even in case of a steering system fault, 
adequate safety goals have to be defined and a functional safety concept that fulfills these 
                                                 
78 Winner, H. et al.: When does By-Wire arrive brakes and steering? (2004), p.63. 
79 Huang, P.-S.; Pruckner, A.: Steer by Wire (2017), (a) pp. 523–524 | (b) p.513 | (c) pp. 524–526. 
80 Harrer, M.; Pfeffer, P.: The Future of Steering Systems (2017), p.546. 
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safety goals has to be developed. This results in the need of a redundant active steering sys-
tem or a redundant active lateral guidance functionality for AD3+ that is fail-operational or 
at least fail-degraded by using a homogenous or diverse redundancy. To avoid a system 
failure by a systematic fault, a diverse redundancy is preferable. A simple homogenous re-
dundancy by implementing all components multiple times is also inefficient concerning 
costs and assembly space. By determining the minimum required degradation level of a fail-
degraded redundant active steering system, which is sufficient for AD3+, an efficient func-
tional safety concept is derivable. Current safety concepts for active steering systems are 
mostly only fail-silent, since they are only designed for AD2- and either the driver is avail-
able for immediate fallback or an immediate safe stop is possible at any time. The presented 
fail-operational EPS in Figure 2-2 is also not suitable for AD3+ of trucks due to its power 
limitations. 
Although the legal requirements are not valid for AD3+ yet, they already include the follow-
ing requirements, which are also reasonable for AD3+. The Vienna’s Convention on Road 
Traffic and the ECE R79 both dictate that the driver of an automated vehicle has to be able 
to override the automated steering function at any time with less than 12.5 Nm of steering 
wheel torque. In addition, they require the development of a safety concept for the steering 
system including a fallback level and enough energy reserve to transfer the vehicle to a safe 
state at any time. 
There are already several active steering systems available. A road map of steering systems 
for trucks is shown in Figure 2-14. Although the EPS has several benefits and there is also a 
prototype for an EPS for CV with 48 V on-board power supply, the high power and torque 
requirements for a truck and the prevalence of the 24 V on-board power supply still require 
the high power and torques of HPS systems.81,82 A SbW system has the same power issue as 
the EPS and in addition it requires big effort to guarantee the ability to override the auto-
mated system by the driver. 
However, standard HPS is not usable for ADAS or automated driving, because it is no active 
steering system.83 An electrification of the HPS is required to transform it to an active steer-
ing system. Therefore, the HPS with an active valve (AV) and the hybrid steering system are 
two different approaches for active steering systems for trucks. Both systems are sufficient 
for AD2-, but not for AD3+, since they are fail-silent systems and have no integrated steering 
redundancy. 
For AD3+, the development of a fail-operational or at least fail-degraded steering system is 
required. This can be a redundant active steering system (RASS) for trucks with a 24 V on-
                                                 
81 Wiesel, U. et al.: Hybrid steering system for reducing fuel consumption (2010), p.64. 
82 Müller, J.-H.: Torque overlay for hydraulic steering (2010), p.557. 
83 Brosig, S.; Lienkamp, M.: Driver Assistance System Functions (2017), p.532. 
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board power supply or a redundant EPS (EPS²) for trucks with a 48 V on-board power sup-
ply. Since the 24 V on-board net will remain the standard voltage system in trucks for at 
least the next decade84, this thesis focuses on the development of a RASS for AD3+ of trucks 
that draws its steering power from both the engine and the on-board net. 
Since there is no RASS for trucks known in the current state of the art (SoA), there are also 
no strategies for the operation of such a system, including system state transitions and 
fallback strategies, or a proper functional safety concept available. 
 
Figure 2-14: Roadmap of steering systems for trucks85 
                                                 
84 Expert discussion with development engineer from MAN Truck & Bus SE. 
85 Following Bosch Mobility Solutions: Automated and efficient for the future (2018), p.3. 
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3 Objectives and Methodology of the Thesis 
3.1 Objectives 
Considering the intended target application and the results from the analysis of the state of 
the art, the superior objective of this thesis is the development of a steering system for AD3+ 
of trucks. Since it is not available in the current state of art, a redundant automated lateral 
guidance system is required for AD3+, which includes an active steering system with an 
appropriate fallback system. The active steering system should be able to overlay torque to 
the driver’s torque and to generate steering torque without any driver input. A steering angle 
overlay or a steer-by-wire functionality is no target functionality of this thesis. In order to 
achieve this superior objective, it is necessary to meet the research need outlined below, 
which has not yet been resolved by the current state of research. 
First of all, there is a research need on the requirements of the steering fallback system, 
which is necessary due to the absence of the driver as an immediate fallback during AD3+. 
So far there is no investigation known that answers the question whether the steering system 
has to be fully fail operational or if a fail degraded system is sufficient. If it is clear which 
fallback requirements are demanded of the steering function, it is examined whether an ex-
ternal fallback system using the brakes is sufficient for this or whether a redundant steering 
system is necessary.  
With the determined fallback requirements and the definition of the redundancy require-
ments, the required functionalities and sufficient functional structures of the steering system 
have to be identified. 
The required increased functionality of the steering system demands the consideration of the 
functional safety, whereby there is an open issue of a functional safety concept of a steering 
system for AD3+ of trucks. For the further research progress, it is important to determine 
the functional safety requirements that have to be implemented in a proper highly automated 
steering system. 
Since there is no steering system for AD3+ of trucks in the current SoA, a proper system 
architecture has to be determined for the implementation of the defined functional safety 
requirements. Based on the already identified suitable functional structures, more detailed 
structures have to be developed which not only focus on the system’s functionality but also 
on the safety-related issues including the fallback requirements. 
The increased requirements of the functionality of the steering system also require the pro-
vision of an increased amount of system states. There is a research need to examine which 
states the steering system must provide in order to be suitable for AD3+. Not only the dif-
ferent system states play a decisive role, but also the transitions between them. This requires 
the development of special operation and state transition strategies. 
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The final step for the development of the new steering system concept is the determination 
of the design specifications of the crucial system components. The crucial components of 
the steering system responsible for the implementation of all the requirements identified in 
advance has to be defined first, before the design specifications of those components are 
determined.  
The desired result of this research is a comprehensive concept of a steering system for AD3+, 
which includes a safety concept as well as specifications of the crucial subsystems and com-
ponents. The derivation of functions that are already integrated in current truck steering sys-
tems and the derivation of the resulting specifications are expressly not part of this thesis. 
3.2 Overall Methodology and Structure 
Based on the defined scope of this thesis and the analysis of the current state of the art, the 
described objectives and the research methodology, illustrated in Figure 3-1, are derived. 
As described, the scope (subchapter 1.3) combined with the analysis of the current state of 
the art (chapter 2) disclose the research needs within this field. The objectives of this thesis 
(chapter 3) address the determined research needs. 
The applied deductive methodology aims at narrowing the solution space by analyzing all 
functional and safety-relevant aspects, which are described below. The focus in this thesis is 
not on the aspects that are also relevant for today’s standard HPS truck steering systems, but 
on the aspects that are necessary to consider due to the new functionalities of the new steer-
ing system for highly automated driving. 
The first step is to analyze the initial conditions of a steering system for highly automated 
trucks and results in the frame requirements for the system (subchapter 4.1). The investiga-
tion of the requirements for such a steering system determines on the one hand the opera-
tional requirements (subchapter 4.3) and on the other hand the fallback requirements (sub-
chapter 4.4). The operational requirements describe the overall required maximum steering 
torque and steering power of a truck steering system during correct operation. In contrast, 
the driving maneuvers that are relevant to reach a safe state in case of incorrect operation, 
e.g. due to a fault in the steering system, are evaluated to define the fallback requirements 
for the steering system suitable for highly automated driving. It is checked whether the 
fallback requirements can be met by differential braking, whereby brake steering would be-
come a sufficient steering redundancy. The redundancy concept suitable for highly auto-
mated driving of trucks is determined with the help of those results. 
Based on the established requirements for a steering system for highly automated trucks, 
different functional structures, which meet all the requirements, are set up and discussed 
(subchapter 5.1). A safety analysis investigates the functional safety of such a steering sys-
tem and results in several safety goals and functional safety requirements for the steering 
system (subchapter 5.2). In addition, the safety goals and the functional safety requirements 
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are used to develop overall system architectures (subchapter 5.3), which fulfill all previous 
determined requirements. 
 
Figure 3-1: Research methodology 
The increased functionality of the new steering system architecture is enabled by the steering 
system’s different operation states. The transitions between those states are analyzed and 
strategies for operational transitions (subchapters 6.2 & 6.3) and for fallback transitions (sub-
chapter 6.4) are developed. 
The implementation of the derived requirements in the system design is developed to deter-
mine the specifications of the system’s crucial components (chapter 7).  
The final concept for a redundant active steering system (RASS) is compared with the cur-
rent state of the art of truck steering systems and the innovations and advantages of the RASS 
are discussed (chapter 8).  
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4 Requirement Analysis 
The requirements of a steering system for AD3+ of trucks, which is in focus of this thesis, 
are determined in this chapter. The frame requirements define the primary requirements of 
a truck steering system. With the help of a simulation model of the steering system and 
several test drives, the steering torque and steering power demanded in different driving 
maneuvers during correct operation are determined. For the use of AD3+, not only the cor-
rect operation is relevant and therefore must be considered, but also the event of a fault of 
the steering system. Therefore, redundancy is necessary. The fallback requirements and re-
dundancy requirements are developed using the steering model and test drives as well. It is 
verified whether steering by differential braking is suitable as fallback steering. The overall 
determined requirements of the steering system for AD3+ of trucks are summarized at the 
end of this chapter. 
4.1 Frame Requirements 
The frame requirements describe the requirements that are independent of the type of steer-
ing system, but are determined by the vehicle class that the steering system is developed for, 
and by legal regulations. All relevant frame requirements are listed in Table 4-1. More frame 
requirements exist, such as requirements regarding life-time or environmental impacts, but 
those are not considered during the concept development, which is in focus of this thesis. 
The first frame requirement is the ability of the steering system to drive automatically ac-
cording to SAE level 3 of automation or higher (AD3+). 
The legal regulations define the maximum force that the driver has to apply at the steering 
wheel during correct as well as during incorrect operation of the steering system. Further-
more, they dictate that the driver has to be in control of the vehicle at any time and able to 
override an automated steering system with a limited effort. For ensuring the functional 
safety of a mechatronic steering system, the development process has to follow the 
ISO 26262. 
The type of mechanical interfaces of a truck’s steering system is similar in most of road-
legal trucks worldwide and is depicted in Figure 1-2. The steering wheel in combination with 
the steering column is the input of the steering gear, the pitman arm and a push rod connect 
the output of the steering gear with the steering kinematic of the steering axle. As already 
mentioned before, the on-board network of most of today’s trucks is a 24 V network. The 
target steering system of this thesis should have the same interfaces to enable its use in the 
majority of today’s trucks. 
The dimensions of the steering system are limited by the available assembly space inside the 
truck. Since the steering system is mounted underneath the cab, the space is mainly restricted 
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by the height and the width of the cab. To minimize the influences of the suspension on the 
steering, the mounting position is also limited.86 
Another important frame requirement is the weight of the vehicle, which is applied on the 
vehicle’s steering axle. This weight mainly influences the required steering torques, power 
and energy, as shown in the following steering model. 
Table 4-1: Frame requirements of automated truck steering system 
Requirement name Values, data Description 
Level of driving 
automation 
AD3+ Steering system suitable for SAE 
level of automation 3 and higher 
Maximum steering 
wheel force/torque87a 
200 N/50 Nm for correct opera-
tion, 450 N/112.5 Nm for 
incorrect operation 
Maximum force required by the 
driver at the steering wheel; 
Override ability88/ 
Maximum force/torque 
for overriding87b 
50 N/12.5 Nm Automated control of the steer-
ing is overrideable by the driver 
at any time with limited effort 
Functional safety ISO 26262 conforming Development of mechatronic 
steering system according to 
latest version of ISO 26262 
Output interface Pitman arm with push rod Interface between output of 
steering system and truck’s 
steering kinematic 
Electric power 
supply 
24 V DC Electric power supply by 
vehicle’s power network 
Dimensions89 550 x 400 x 550 mm³ 
(length x height x width) 
Dimensions of steering gearbox 
Maximum weight at 
steering axle load89 
8,500 kg Maximum static weight at 
steered axle 
  
                                                 
86 Brunner, G.; Negele, K.: Electrification of the steering (2008), p.4. 
87 United Nations: ECE R79 r4 (2018), (a) p.30 | (b) p.14. 
88 United Nations: Convention on Road Traffic (1968), p.11. 
89 Datafor MAN TGS 26:440 
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4.2 Steering Model 
The simulation model, which is used to determine the torque, power and energy requirements 
of the steering system, is developed in the following subchapter. The overall model structure 
and the model equations are described first, followed by the evaluation of the simulation 
model with the help of equivalent driving tests and the transfer of the simulation model to 
trucks with higher front axle loads. 
For the development of the simulation model as well as for the evaluation of the test drives, 
a horizontal coordinate system is used whose axes are oriented as shown in Figure 4-1. The 
origin of this coordinate system is the same as the origin of the vehicle-fixed coordinate 
system, its x- and y-axis are the projections of the x- and y-axes of the vehicle-fixed axes to 
the horizontal ground. The z-axis is perpendicular to the other two axes. 
 
Figure 4-1: Coordinate system90 
4.2.1 Model Structure 
The overall model structure of the simulation model of the truck’s steering system is illus-
trated in Figure 4-2. Besides the different specified parameters of the truck, several parame-
ters measured during defined driving maneuvers are used as input data for the simulation of 
the corresponding driving maneuvers. 
These parameters are the vehicle’s velocity (𝑣V), the torque at the steering wheel (𝑀H), the 
accelerations at the vehicle’s front axle (fa) (𝑎𝑥,fa, 𝑎𝑦,fa, 𝑎𝑧,fa) and the angle (𝛿P), the angular 
velocity (?̇?P) and the angular acceleration (?̈?P) at the vehicle’s pitman arm. These parameters 
are used to calculate the steering ratios (𝑖H2W, 𝑖H2P, 𝑖P2W), the steering angles (𝛿W, ?̇?W, ?̈?W) 
and the forces at the front axle (𝐹𝑥,fa, 𝐹𝑦,fa, 𝐹𝑧,fa) at the first step. 
                                                 
90 Hoepke, E.; Breuer, S.: Commercial Vehicle Technology (2016), p.38. 
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The second step of the simulation is the calculation of the different steering torques and the 
overall torque at the pitman arm (𝑀P). The pitman arm torque and the steering angle at the 
pitman arm are the target results of the simulation model, because the pitman arm is the 
mechanical interface between the steering system and the vehicle and they describe the over-
all output torque, power and energy of the steering system. Therefore, the torque, power and 
energy requirements of the steering system are referred to the pitman arm. The model’s first 
calculation step is described in section 4.2.2 and the second step in section 4.2.3. 
 
Figure 4-2: Simulation model structure 
4.2.2 Calculation of Steering Ratios and Forces at Front Wheels 
The calculation of the transmission ratios of the steering system belongs to the first step of 
the steering model. There are the ratio between the steering wheel and the front 
wheels (𝑖H2W), the ratio between the steering wheel and the pitman arm (𝑖H2P) and the ratio 
between the pitman arm and the front wheels (𝑖P2W). The steering ratios are defined in equa-
tions (4-1) to (4-5): 
 𝑖H2W =
𝛿H
𝛿W
 (4-1) 
 𝑖H2P =
𝛿H
𝛿P
 (4-2) 
 𝑖P2W =
𝛿P
𝛿W
 (4-3) 
The other part of the first calculation step determines the forces at the wheels of the front 
axle, which strongly influence the required torque, power and energy of the steering system. 
To be allowed to simplify the calculation of the dynamic forces at the front wheels, the con-
dition in equation (4-4) that the coupling mass (𝑚C) is zero, has to be fulfilled. The coupling 
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mass is defined by the vehicle mass (𝑚V), the vehicle’s yaw inertia (𝐽𝑧) and the distance 
from the vehicle’s center of gravity to the front axle (f) and to the rear axle (r).
91 
 𝑚C = 𝑚V −
𝐽𝑧
fr
= 0 (4-4) 
Since the considered vehicle92 fulfills this condition, the movement of the mass at the front 
axle (𝑚V,fa) is independent of the movement of the mass at the rear axle.
 93 This allows to 
calculate the forces at the wheels of the front axle (𝐹𝑥,fl/fr, 𝐹𝑦,fl/fr, 𝐹𝑧,fl/fr) by the vehicle’s 
mass at the front axle (𝑚V,fa) and the accelerations at the front axle in each direction 
(𝑎𝑥,fa, 𝑎𝑦,fa, 𝑎𝑧,fa). The following three equations are used to calculate the forces: 
 𝐹𝑥,fa = 𝐹𝑥,fl + 𝐹𝑥,fr = 𝑚V,fa ∙ 𝑎𝑥,fa (4-5) 
 𝐹𝑦,fa = 𝐹𝑦,fl + 𝐹𝑦,fr = 𝑚V,fa ∙ 𝑎𝑦,fa (4-6) 
 𝐹𝑧,fa = 𝐹𝑧,fl + 𝐹𝑧,fr = 𝑚V,FA ∙ 𝑎𝑧,fa (4-7) 
4.2.3 Steering Torque Calculation 
The second part of the steering system simulation model is the calculation of the different 
steering torques and of the overall torque at the pitman arm. A schematic illustration of the 
steering system with the applied torques and the different angles is shown in Figure 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-3: Angles and torques at steering system 
                                                 
91 Mitschke, M.; Wallentowitz, H.: Dynamics of motorvehicles (2014), p.298. 
92 Vehicle data see in appendix A.2.1. 
93 Mitschke, M.; Wallentowitz, H.: Dynamics of motorvehicles (2014), p.298. 
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Only the front left wheel is depicted here, but the torque at the wheel (𝑀W) is the sum of the 
torques at both front wheels and the steering angle at the front left and front right wheel are 
assumed to be equal (𝛿W). The values of the steering angle and torque at the steering wheel 
(𝛿H, 𝑀H), at the pitman arm (𝛿P, 𝑀P) and at the wheels (𝛿W, 𝑀W) are assumed to be positive 
as shown in Figure 4-3. The ratio between the steering wheel and the pitman arm (𝑖H2P) as 
well as the ratio between the pitman arm and the front wheels (𝑖P2W) are marked, too. 
With the help of Figure 4-3, equation (4-8) is set up, which describes the sum of steering 
torques at the pitman arm. The torque at the steering wheel (𝑀H) and the torque at the front 
wheels (𝑀W) are both applied to the pitman arm via a transmission ratio, whereas the inertia 
torque (𝑀J), the friction torque (𝑀F) and the damping torque (𝑀D) are modeled to be applied 
directly at the pitman arm. Apart from the steering wheel torque, all torques counteract the 
steering movement. 
 𝑀P = 𝑀𝐽 +𝑀F +𝑀D +
𝑀W
𝑖P2W
+𝑀H ∙ 𝑖H2P (4-8) 
Since the steering wheel torque (𝑀H) is an input of the simulation model, a calculation of 
this parameter is not required. 
The torque caused by the inertia of the steering system (𝑀𝐽) is calculated with equation (4-9) 
by the inertia of the overall steering system reduced to the pitman arm (𝐽eff,P) and the angular 
acceleration of the pitman arm (?̈?P). 
 𝑀𝐽 = −𝐽eff,P ∙ ?̈?P (4-9) 
The torque at the pitman arm induced due to the friction inside the steering system (𝑀F) is 
described with equation (4-10) assuming Coulomb friction only. It depends on an empirical 
friction constant (?̂?F) and the sign of the angular velocity of the pitman arm (?̇?P). 
 𝑀F = −?̂?F ∙ sgn(?̇?P) (4-10) 
The damping-induced torque (𝑀D) also depends on an empirical damping value (𝑑D) and on 
the angular velocity of the pitman arm (?̇?P). It is calculated by equation (4-11). 
 𝑀D = −𝑑D ∙ ?̇?P (4-11) 
The last parameter of equation (4-8) is the torque applied at the steered front wheels of the 
truck (𝑀W). It is the sum of the torques induced by differential braking (𝑀𝐹𝑥), the torque due 
to the lateral forces (𝑀𝐹𝑦), the lifting torque (𝑀𝐹𝑧) and the bore torque (𝑀Bore). Equation 
(4-12) describes this correlation.94 
 𝑀W = −𝑀𝐹𝑥 −𝑀𝐹𝑦 −𝑀𝐹𝑧 −𝑀Bore (4-12) 
                                                 
94 Reimpell, J.; Betzler, J. W.: Basics Chassis (2005), pp. 229–251. 
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All four parts of the torque at the front wheels (𝑀W) strongly depend on the geometry of the 
truck’s steered front axle. The geometric parameters, which are crucial for the calculation of 
the different torques, are described in Figure 4-4. The inclination of the wheel in the  
y-z-plane is called camber angle (𝛾), whereas the inclination of the kingpin in this plane is 
named kingpin angle (𝜎). The scrub radius (𝑟0) defines the distance in y-direction between 
the wheel contact patch and the point where the kingpin axis crosses the road surface. The 
distance between those two points in the x-direction is called the castor offset (𝑟τ) and the 
inclination of the kingpin in the x-z-plane is the castor angle (𝜏). 
 
Figure 4-4: Illustration of the crucial geometric parameters at the steered front axle95 
The steering toque induced by differential braking (𝑀𝐹𝑥) is described by equation (4-13) and 
relies on the difference between the braking force at the left (𝐹𝑥,fl) and at the right wheel 
(𝐹𝑥,fr), the scrub radius (𝑟0), the kingpin angle (𝜎) and the castor angle (𝜏).
96a 
 𝑀𝐹𝑥 = (𝐹𝑥,fl − 𝐹𝑥,fr) ∙ 𝑟0 ∙ cos 𝜎 ∙ cos 𝜏 (4-13) 
The sum of the lateral forces at the front left (𝐹𝑦,fl) and right wheel (𝐹𝑦,fl) causes a torque at 
the wheels (𝑀F𝑦), which is calculated by equation (4-14). The lever arm of the lateral forces 
depends on the tire’s tread length (Tread), the kingpin angle (𝜎) and the castor angle (𝜏).
96b 
 
𝑀𝐹𝑦 = (𝐹𝑦,fl + 𝐹𝑦,fr) ∙ (
Tread
6
+ 𝑟τ) ∙ cos 𝜎 ∙ cos 𝜏 (4-14) 
                                                 
95 Following Hilgers, M.: Chassis and Axles (2016), p.22. 
96 Reimpell, J.; Betzler, J. W.: Basics Chassis (2005), (a) p.236 | (b) p.246. 
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The lifting toque (𝑀𝐹𝑧) is caused by the wheel load at the front left (𝐹𝑧,fl) and right wheel 
(𝐹𝑧,fr), which counteract a deviation from the center position of the steering. It is calculated 
by equation (4-15). The kingpin angle (𝜎) and the castor angle (𝜏) influence how far the 
truck’s front axle is lifted due to the steering angle (𝛿W). The lever (F𝑧), where the counter-
force is applied, depends on the scrub radius (𝑟0), the dynamic wheel radius (𝑟dyn) and the 
kingpin angle (𝜎).97 
 𝑀𝐹𝑧 = (𝐹𝑧,fl + 𝐹𝑧,fr) sin 𝜎 ∙ cos 𝜏 ∙ sin 𝛿W ∙ 𝐹𝑧  (4-15) 
 𝐹𝑧 = [(𝑟0 + 𝑟dyn ∙ tan 𝜎) ∙ cos 𝜎] (4-16) 
Equation (4-17) describes the bore torque (𝑀Bore) at the wheels, which is caused by the 
friction between the tire and the road surface and the tire’s elasticity. Modeling the bore 
torque is more complex than for the other torques, because there is no steady function to 
describe it. Hence, several equations are demanded to model the bore torque. At standstill 
and at very low velocities, the bore torque acts like an in-line connection of a spring and a 
Coulomb friction element, as calculated with the lower equation of (4-17) and (4-19). As 
soon as the vehicle moves, the bore torque decreases significantly and depends on the tire’s 
tread width (𝑤Tread) and the longitudinal tire stiffness ((𝑑𝐹𝑥/𝑑𝜆𝑥)|𝜆𝑥=0) with the longitudi-
nal slip (𝜆𝑥) and is calculated by the upper equation of (4-17) and (4-18). The bore torque at 
standstill depends on the tire’s bore stiffness (𝑐Bore) and the bore angle (𝛿Bore), which itself 
describes the torsion angle of the tire tread compared to the wheel. The bore angle is calcu-
lated with equation (4-19) by integration of the wheel angular velocity (?̇?W), but it is limited 
to a maximum value (𝛿Bore,max). The integral is reset to zero if the bore torque defined by 
(4-17) is zero.98 
 𝑀Bore = {
𝑏 ∙
?̇?W
|𝑣V|
 if |𝑏 ∙
?̇?W
𝑣V
 | ≤ | 𝑐Bore ∙ 𝛿Bore|
𝑐Bore ∙ 𝛿Bore else
 (4-17) 
 𝑏 =
1
12
𝑤T ead
2 𝑑𝐹𝑥
𝑑𝜆𝑥
|
𝜆𝑥=0
 (4-18) 
 𝛿Bore = {
∫ ?̇?W 𝑑𝑡
𝑡
𝑡(𝑀Bore=0)
if |∫ ?̇?W 𝑑𝑡
𝑡
𝑡0
| ≤ 𝛿Bore,max
sgn ?̇?W |𝛿Bore,max|   else
 (4-19) 
The overall torque at the pitman arm is used to calculate the required steering energy (𝐸P) 
and power (𝑃P) in the same way for the measured data and for the simulated data. The steer-
ing energy (𝐸P) is calculated with equation (4-20) by integration of the steering torque at the 
                                                 
97 Reimpell, J.; Betzler, J. W.: Basics Chassis (2005), p.246. 
98 Hesse, B.: Dissartation, Interferences between driving dynamics and power network (2011), pp. 47–49. 
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pitman arm (𝑀P) over the steering angle at the pitman arm (𝛿P). The required steering power 
(𝑃P) is the time derivative of the steering energy (𝐸P), as described by equation (4-21). 
 𝐸P = ∫𝑀P 𝑑𝛿P (4-20) 
 
𝑃P =
𝑑𝐸P
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑀P?̇?P (4-21) 
4.2.4 Evaluation of Steering Model 
For the evaluation of the previously described steering model, the model is parameterized 
with the values of a fully loaded 12-t test truck99. This test truck was set up with measurement 
equipment to measure all the parameters listed in Figure 4-2. The steering torque and angle 
at the steering wheel were recorded by a measurement steering wheel, whereas the output 
torque of the steering system was measured with strain gauges at the pitman arm. The steer-
ing angle at the pitman arm was calculated from the steering wheel angle and the measured 
ratio (𝑖H2P). The accelerations in all three directions, the truck’s velocity and its GPS position 
were recorded additionally. 
The model equations and parameters for the steering torque caused by the friction inside the 
steering system (𝑀F) or by the lifting of the vehicle (𝑀𝐹𝑧) are determined or evaluated ex-
perimentally in advance. The friction torque (𝑀F) is measured during steering movements 
with the front axle jacked up. To measure the lifting torque (𝑀𝐹𝑧), the front wheels are posi-
tioned on so-called turntables so that no bore torque is superimposed on the lifting torque 
during the steering at standstill. The model equations for the bore torque (𝑀Bore), in turn, 
are evaluated during steering at standstill by subtracting the friction torque (𝑀F) and the 
lifting torque (𝑀𝐹𝑧). The torques due to the damping (𝑀D) and the inertia (𝑀𝐽) of the steering 
system are evaluated by test drives with a sinusoidal steering angle input. The model equa-
tions of the steering torques induced by the longitudinal forces (𝑀𝐹𝑥) and by the lateral forces 
at the wheels (𝑀𝐹𝑦) are evaluated by different driving maneuvers. 
The performed driving maneuvers, which are listed in Table 4-2, cover the whole range of 
possible steering torques, steering angles and steering angular velocities, whereby they also 
cover all possible steering powers. Hence, these driving maneuvers are suitable for the eval-
uation of the developed steering system simulation model. For each driving maneuver, sev-
eral test drives were carried out. The values in Table 4-2 correspond to the maximum values 
that occurred during these test drives. 
The first three driving maneuvers are artificial driving maneuvers, which are used only for 
covering the whole range of steering torque and steering power. The driving maneuver 
                                                 
99 Vehicle data see Table A-2 in the Appendix. 
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Standstill describes steering at standstill with the highest possible steering velocity over the 
entire steering angle range. The Figure 8 is a driving maneuver at low velocity, at which an 
eight is driven with maximum steering angle. The sine with 2 Hz describes a driving maneu-
ver in which a frequency of 2 Hz at an amplitude of approximately 60° is applied at the 
steering wheel. 
The highway driving, the country road, the mountain pass and the city driving all summarize 
driving maneuvers on a defined type of road. For each of those scenarios, several test drives 
are performed on different routes in and around Darmstadt in order to cover as much differ-
ent potential maneuvers as possible. Of course, there is no completeness claimed. The same 
approach is valid for the highway access/exit and the highway interchange. 
Table 4-2: Representative driving maneuvers conducted with by fully loaded 12-t truck 
Driving maneuver  𝐦 𝐱 in 
m
s
   ,𝐦 𝐱 in 
m
s2
 𝜿𝐦 𝐱 in
1
m
 
Standstill 0 0 0 
Figure 8 5 3.01 0.20 
Sine with 2 Hz 17 2.96 - 
Highway driving 25 2.45 2.13∙10-3 
Country road 20 3.43 7.14∙10-3 
Mountain pass 17 3.53 2.22∙10-2 
City driving 14 3.24 2.00∙10-2 
Turn-off (out of city) - 5.00 1.43∙10-2 
Lane change 25 2.16 - 
Avoidance maneuver 17 5.00 - 
Emergency stopping bay100 17 1.57 - 
Highway access/exit - 3.14 6.67∙10-3 
Highway interchange 25 3.14 2.50∙10-3 
 
The maneuvers turn-off, lane change, avoidance maneuver and emergency stopping bay 
were all performed on a test track at different initial velocities and different steering angle 
velocities, with the aim of determining the highest requirements for those driving maneuvers. 
The simulation model is used for dimensioning the steering system in the following sub-
chapters. Therefore, the evaluation of the simulation model compares the maximum steering 
torque, energy and power measured during each driving maneuver with the simulated values. 
For the dimensioning of the system, an accuracy of the model of ± 10 % seems to be suffi-
cient. The simulation model is considered as evaluated if the deviation of a simulated value 
to its corresponding measured value is less than 10 % of the measured value.  
                                                 
100 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for rural roads (2012), p.91. 
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The comparison of the maximum steering torque at the pitman arm (𝑀P,max) is shown in 
Figure 4-5. The deviation of the simulated steering torque at the pitman arm from the meas-
ured is within the 10 % range for all relevant maneuvers. The biggest steering torque occurs 
during steering in standstill and the lowest steering torque is required for a lane change and 
for steering into an emergency stopping bay. 
 
Figure 4-5: Comparison of measured and simulated maximum torque at pitman arm (𝑀P,max) 
A major portion of the required steering torque in all driving maneuvers except for steering 
at standstill is the torque due to the lateral forces at the front wheels (𝑀𝐹𝑦). The torque caused 
by the inertia (𝑀𝐽) has a main influence during the sine maneuver and the avoidance maneu-
ver, whereas the lifting torque (𝑀𝐹𝑧) makes a major contribution of the required steering 
torque during the maneuvers with a high maximum steering angle, which are the turn-off 
maneuver, the city driving, the Figure 8 and the steering at standstill. The bore torque 
(𝑀Bore) predominates in the maneuvers with extremely low velocities up to standstill. Those 
are the steering at standstill and the turn-off maneuver.  
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The maximum required steering energies (𝐸P,max) during the relevant driving maneuvers are 
compared in Figure 4-6. The steering energy is calculated with equation (4-20). The discrete 
driving maneuvers, which are finished after a defined period, such as the turn-off maneuver, 
are distinguished from the continuous driving maneuvers without a defined end, such as 
highway driving. The required steering energy during the continuous maneuvers is referred 
to the driving distance. The maximum steering energy required during a driving distance of 
1,000 m is used for the comparison. The maneuvers standstill and sine 2 Hz are not consid-
ered here, because only the steering torque and the steering power during those maneuvers 
are relevant for the design of the steering system. The maneuver with the most required 
steering energy is the figure 8, whereas during highway driving the least energy is necessary 
for steering. All simulated results deviate less than 10 % from the measured values. 
 
Figure 4-6: Comparison of measured and simulated maximum steering energy (𝐸P,max) 
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The evaluation of the steering power, calculated with equation (4-21) of the simulation 
model, is illustrated in Figure 4-7. Because the maximum required steering power (𝑃P,max) 
is independent of the duration of a driving maneuver, all relevant driving maneuvers are 
analyzed equally. All steering power results from the simulation deviate less than 10 % from 
the measured steering power for each relevant driving maneuver. Highway driving requires 
the least steering power, whereas steering in standstill necessitates the most steering power. 
 
Figure 4-7: Comparison of measured and simulated maximum steering power (𝑃P,max) 
Because the simulated steering torques, energies and powers are all within the defined devi-
ation range for the defined driving maneuvers, which covers all possible values of steering 
torque, energy and power, the simulation model is regarded as valid for the purpose of the 
further investigations. 
4.2.5 Transfer to Higher Front Axle Loads 
Because the truck used has a lower front axle load than the target range, the simulation model 
is applied in order to determine the requirements for the target 26-t truck. Thereby, the steer-
ing torque, energy and power requirements are derived for a truck with a maximum weight 
at the front axle of 8,500 kg as defined in the frame requirements before. The values of the 
other vehicle parameters of the considered 26-t truck are listed in the appendix101. 
                                                 
101 Vehicle data see Table A-3 in the Appendix. 
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The input data of the simulation model, which were recorded during test drives, are inde-
pendent of the vehicle parameters. Since the test truck and the target truck have the same 
steering kinematics, it is assumed that the steering angles at the front wheels (𝛿W) applied 
during the driving maneuvers and the steering ratios are the same for the 12-t test truck and 
for the 26-t truck. Thereby, the measured parameters of the angle at the pitman arm (𝛿P), the 
vehicle’s accelerations (𝑎𝑥,fa, 𝑎𝑦,fa, 𝑎𝑧,fa) and velocity (𝑣V) as well as the steering wheel 
torque (𝑀H) are used unmodified as model input for the 26-t truck. 
The vehicle parameters that have changed during the switch to a 26-t truck and influence the 
required steering torque, energy and power, are listed in Table 4-3. The geometric dimen-
sions and the mass of the truck change as well as the yaw inertia and thus influence the 
steering requirements. As described in section 4.2.3, the parameters of the wheel and tire 
influence the steering torque as well as the suspension kinematics of the front axle. Both of 
them as well as the inertia of the steering system change between a 12-t and a 26-t truck, the 
latter due to the more massive components required in the steering system. 
Table 4-3: Vehicle parameters influencing the required steering torque, energy and power 
Parameter Symbol 
Vehicle 
Mass 𝑚V 
Mass at front axle 𝑚V,fa 
Wheelbase W 
Distance from front axle to CoG f 
Track width 𝑤W 
Height of CoG ℎCoG 
Yaw inertia 𝐽𝑧 
Wheel/Tire 
Tire dimensions - 
Dynamic wheel radius 𝑟dyn 
Tire pressure 𝑝Tire 
Tire tread length tread 
Tire bore stiffness 𝑐Bore 
Maximum bore angle 𝛿Bore,max 
Bore constant 𝑏 
Suspension 
Castor angle 𝜏 
Kingpin angle 𝜎 
Scrub radius 𝑟0 
Castor offset 𝑟τ 
Steering system 
Inertia of steering system at pitman arm 𝐽eff,P 
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4.3 Operational Requirements 
The torque and power requirements of the steering system during correct operation without 
any fault inside the steering system are calculated based on representative driving maneu-
vers. Besides the driving on the different types of roads, such as highway, country roads, 
mountain pass and city roads, different maneuvers have been carried out. The maneuver 
Sine 2 Hz is representative for a hectic steering maneuver and Figure 8 for maneuvering at 
low velocities e.g. on a freight yard. The maneuver Standstill describes the steering at stand-
still. 
Figure 4-8 shows the steering torque and power requirements for the described driving ma-
neuvers. The maximum steering torque of 8,250 Nm and the maximum steering power of 
3,410 W are required for the steering at standstill, whereas the maximum pitman arm angular 
velocity of 0.86  ad/s occurs during the sine steering maneuver with a steering frequency 
of 2 Hz. Highway driving requires the lowest steering torque and power. 
  
Figure 4-8: Required steering torque and power for 26-t truck 
The steering energy required for the different maneuvers is not relevant during the correct 
operation of the steering system, because without any system fault, the power steering pump 
and the generator, which both are powered by the truck’s engine, provide the required steer-
ing power continuously. No energy storage is necessary here. 
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4.4 Redundancy Requirements 
Besides the steering torque, energy and power requirements of the steering system during 
correct operation, the requirements for the incorrect operation due to a system fault are im-
portant to be considered for a steering system for AD3+ of trucks as well. Whereas a fail-
silent steering system is sufficient for AD2-, a driver-independent fallback level is required 
for the steering functionality for AD3+, because in the event of a steering system fault the 
driver is available as immediate fallback for AD2-, but not for AD3+.102 
The requirements to this steering redundancy are determined in the following. Therefore, 
safe states for different road classes are defined in section 4.4.1 first. The fallback steering 
system has to be able to transfer the vehicle to the defined safe states in case of a system 
fault. The maneuvers that are necessary to transfer the vehicle to the specific safe states for 
the different road classes are derived in section 4.4.2. Based on these relevant driving ma-
neuvers, the fallback steering torque, energy and power requirements for the steering redun-
dancy are determined with the previously described steering model in subchapter 4.2.  
The content and results of the following sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.2.3 and 4.4.4 were published 
previously.103 
4.4.1 Definition of Safe States 
Since an automated vehicle contains a lot of E/E systems (electric/electronic), the definition 
of its safe states base on the ISO 26262 on functional safety of E/E systems of vehicles. A 
safe state is defined as an “operating mode of (a vehicle) without an unreasonable level of 
risk”104, whereas risk is defined as the “combination of the probability of occurrence of harm 
and the severity of that harm” and harm is the “physical injury or damage to the health of 
persons”104. In the context of automated driving, the safe state is described as an operating 
mode, in which no unreasonable risk occurs for all persons involved in road traffic.105 Thus, 
the internal system state as well as the environment of the vehicle are important for the safe 
state. 
Based on the definitions from the ISO 26262, eight requirements of the safe state are deter-
mined here and listed in Table 4-4. The first requirement is the most important and a high-
level requirement. All the other requirements serve to fulfill this superior requirement. The 
requirements no. 2 to no. 6 are the important requirements for the determination of the re-
dundancy requirements. The safe state in each specific driving situation depends on those 
                                                 
102 Matthaei, R. et al.: Autonomous Driving (2016), p.1544. 
103 Herold, M. et al.: Power Requirements for RASS (2019). 
104 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-1 (2018), p.21. 
105 Reschka, A.: Dissertation, Safe Operation of Automated Vehicle, p.54. 
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five requirements. Therefore, we separate the safe state for city roads, country roads, and 
highways. 
Table 4-4: Requirements to the safe state of an automated driving vehicle106 
No. Requirement 
1 No hazard for passengers, other road users, pedestrians or for the environment 
2 Vehicle stands still 
3 Visibility to other road users bigger than required stopping visibility 
4 Relative velocity to other road users less than 70 km/h 
5 No blocking of rescue routes 
6 No blocking of bridges, tunnels, intersections or roundabouts 
7 Protection of the stopping place and warning of other road users 
8 Emergency call (if necessary) 
 
In order to define a safe state for each different type of road, it is important to know all the 
specific properties of each type, especially according to the possibilities for a safe stop of 
the vehicle. The German guideline for the construction of city roads107a, the guideline for the 
construction of country roads108 and the guideline for the construction of highways109 de-
scribe the properties of the roads and are used to define three different road classes (RC) 
according to the possibility for a safe stop. 
The different types of roads are characterized into three road classes, according to the criteria 
in Table 4-5. The number of lanes, counting both directions, the availability of a hard shoul-
der or an emergency stopping bay, the speed limit, the maximum curvature (𝜅max) and the 
maximum required stopping visibility are used for the classification. The first road class 
(RC1) contains the roads with a permanent hard shoulder, i.e. highways except urban high-
ways. The second road class (RC2) describes the roads with emergency stopping bays in-
stead of a permanent hard shoulder, i.e. urban highways and big country roads with at least 
two lanes in one direction. The last road class (RC1), which requires steering maneuvers to 
get to a safe state, contains the roads without a hard shoulder and without any emergency 
stopping bays. City roads are not part of these three classes, because there are always speed 
limits below 70 km/h107b. A relative velocity between the stationary vehicle and other road 
users of more than 70 km/h is not possible. Hence, the transition to the safe state is always 
an immediate braking maneuver and no steering is required for this class. The claim is that 
the automated vehicle knows what the safe states and the maximum distances between the 
single safe states are and how it gets there, depending on the road class. 
                                                 
106 Reschka, A.: Safety Concept for Autonomous Vehicles (2016), pp. 473–484. 
107 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for urban roads (2006), (a) - | (b) p.13. 
108 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for rural roads (2012). 
109 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for highways (2008). 
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Table 4-5: Characterization of road classes110,111,112a 
Road class 1 2 3 
Number of lanes (both directions) ≥ 4 ≥ 3 2 
Hard shoulder available? yes partially none 
Emergency stopping bay available? - 
at least every 
1,000 m 
none 
Speed limit none ≥ 100 km/h ≤ 100 km/h 
Maximum curvature (𝜅max) 2.13∙10
-3m−1 3.57∙10-3m−1 5.00∙10-3m−1 
Maximum required stopping visibility 250 m 190 m 160 m 
 
The safe state of RC1 with a hard shoulder is the standstill on the hard shoulder. Usually, no 
other road user drives on the hard shoulder, thus there is no relative velocity to others. In 
addition, the stopping visibility has no influence on this safe state and no bridge, tunnel or 
rescue route is blocked here. The relevant maneuvers to reach the safe state depends on the 
number of lanes of the road and on which road the vehicle currently drives when a fault 
potentially occurs and thus the transition to the safe state is required. If the vehicle is not on 
the lane next to the hard shoulder, one or more lane changes and the change to the hard 
shoulder are the relevant maneuvers to reach the safe state. Because there are no hard shoul-
ders in areas of highway accesses or exits, a change to the hard shoulder could be temporarily 
not possible. In that case, the vehicle needs to drive on for a defined distance until the hard 
shoulder is available again. 
Driving into and stopping inside an emergency stopping bay is the safe state of RC2, where 
such a stopping bay is intended to be every 1,000 m. The emergency stopping bays are at 
least 84 m long and 3 m wide.112b Because the emergency stopping bay is no continuous 
lane, no other road user is able to drive on it, whereby the risk seems to be lower standing 
inside an emergency stopping bay as standing on a hard shoulder. The relevant maneuvers 
to reach the safe state inside a stopping bay contain one or more lane changes as well, the 
drive and stopping maneuver into the stooping bay and the required drive on to the next 
available stopping bay. It is also possible that there are hard shoulders temporarily available 
on this road class, but for the design requirements of the steering system, the highest fallback 
requirements are used, which occur for the drive into an emergency stopping bay for this 
road class. 
Because of the missing hard shoulders and the missing emergency stopping bays, the safe 
state of RC3 is not obvious. A safe stop at the side of the road is usually not possible due to 
a relative velocity to the other road users above 70 km/h. However, in practice junctions 
frequently appear on this road class, whereby a turn-off to a side road with a speed limit 
                                                 
110 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for urban roads (2006). 
111 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for highways (2008). 
112 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for rural roads (2012) , (a) - | (b) p.91. 
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lower than 70 km/h or to a road with a hard shoulder or emergency stopping bays is possible. 
A safe stop on such a side road, e.g. a city road, represents the safe state in this road class. 
Hence, the relevant maneuvers are the drive on until the next turn-off to a side road and the 
turn-off maneuver itself. Of course, it is possible that there is a stopping bay or a parking lot 
at this road class as well, but this is an exception and the fallback requirements for the steer-
ing system are higher for the turn-off maneuver and thus are the crucial design requirements. 
4.4.2 Relevant Driving Maneuvers 
Based on the previously defined safe states for the three different road classes, the different 
relevant driving maneuvers, listed in Table 4-6, are simulated for a 26-t truck to calculate 
the required steering torque, steering power and steering energy. 
Besides the previously mentioned relevant driving maneuvers, the “avoidance maneuver” is 
also considered as relevant, because it is possible at any time and at any road class that an 
avoidance maneuver becomes necessary. The different types of maneuvers are simulated 
several times with input data from driving tests on several roads, i.e. different routes of coun-
try roads, different highways and different city routes were tested. For each type of maneu-
ver, the biggest occurring values for torque, power and energy are used to determine the 
fallback requirements. This approach is supposed to cover the worst case of each type of 
maneuver. The measured data of the several maneuvers are combined according to the defi-
nition of the safe state in the previous section to determine the final fallback requirements 
for each road class. Hereby, the most critical moment for the failure of the steering system 
is assumed. However, a complete cover of all possible situations is not guaranteed of course. 
Table 4-6: Driving maneuvers relevant to reach the safe state 
Maneuver type  𝐦 𝐱 in 
m
s
   ,𝐦 𝐱 in 
m
s2
 𝜿𝐦 𝐱 in
1
m
 
Turn-off (out of city) - 5.00 1.43∙10-2 
Lane change 25 2.16 - 
Avoidance maneuver 17 5.00 - 
Emergency stopping bay113 17 1.57 - 
Highway access/exit - 3.14 6.67∙10-3 
Highway interchange 25 3.14 2.50∙10-3 
Road class 1 (RC1) 25 2.45 2.13∙10-3 
Road class 2 (RC2) 25 3.43 3.57∙10-3 
Road class 3 (RC3) 20 3.43 7.14∙10-3 
  
                                                 
113 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for rural roads (2012), p.91. 
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4.4.3 Fallback Requirements 
The fallback requirements for a steering system for AD3+ of trucks are split into the required 
fallback steering torque at the pitman arm, the fallback steering energy and the fallback 
steering power. The results are exemplary for a 26-t truck and are developed similar to the 
redundancy requirements of the steering system for the 12-t truck in a previous publication 
of the author of this thesis114. 
Figure 4-9 shows the maximum fallback steering torque and angular velocity occurring at 
the pitman arm during the different maneuvers. The maneuver types can be classified into 
three groups according to their required maximum steering torque. Group A considers the 
maneuvers requiring less than 1,100 Nm of torque at the pitman arm. With those maneuvers, 
regular driving on RC1 and RC2 is possible including lane changes, interchanges as well as 
the driving into an emergency stopping bay. Group B with required steering torques between 
1,100 Nm and 2,000 Nm contains the RC3 driving without turning maneuvers, the highway 
access/exit as well as an avoidance maneuver. The most advanced steering torque require-
ments between 2,000 Nm and 3,000 Nm arise for group C during turn-off maneuvers. The 
chamfers of the areas of the three different groups indicate the maximum occurring steering 
power of each group as also shown in Figure 4-10. 
 
Figure 4-9: Maximum fallback steering torque 
The energy required for steering during the different driving maneuvers (𝐸P) is calculated 
with equation (4-20). The calculated steering torque at the pitman arm (𝑀P) is integrated 
over the steering angle at the pitman arm (𝛿P). 
The maneuvers RC1, RC2 and RC3 are continuous maneuvers and the required energy de-
pends on the driven distance. However, to get an indication for the required steering energy 
                                                 
114 Herold, M. et al.: Power Requirements for RASS (2019), pp. 4–7. 
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during driving on these road classes, the maximum demanded steering energy on a driving 
distance of 1 km is used and illustrated with the required steering energy during the other 
maneuvers in Figure 4-10. 
The classification into the three groups of driving maneuvers is also feasible for the steering 
energy. Group A again has the lowest requirements with a required steering energy of max-
imum 200 J for the drive of a single maneuver. Between 200 J and 500 J are required by the 
maneuvers of group B. Group C requires the most steering energy by far with values be-
tween 500 J and 1,300 J. 
The steering power at the pitman arm of the truck occurring during the different driving 
maneuvers (𝑃P) is the derivation of the steering energy (𝐸P) as described in equation (4-21). 
Figure 4-10 shows the maximum steering power required during each maneuver type.  
 
Figure 4-10: Maximum fallback steering energy and fallback steering power 
The maneuver types are classified into three groups according to the maximum required 
steering power, similar to the previous classifications. Group A with the lowest power re-
quirement of maximum 70 W contains the RC1 and RC2, highway interchanges, lane 
changes and the driving into emergency stopping bays. The highway exit, the avoidance 
maneuver and the RC3 driving form group B with a maximum required steering power be-
tween 70 W and 400 W. The maneuver turn-off requires between 400 W and 600 W of steer-
ing power and thus is classified to group C.  
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The simulation results for the described maneuvers considering the required steering torque, 
power and energy as well as the classification of these maneuvers into three groups accord-
ing to their fallback requirements are listed in Table 4-7. The maneuvers are separated into 
the three groups without any overlapping. 
Table 4-7: Groups of fallback requirements 
Group Maneuver type   ,𝐦 𝐱   ,𝐦 𝐱 𝑬 ,𝐦 𝐱 
A 
Lane change 
< 1,100 Nm < 70 W < 200 J 
Emergency stopping bay 
Highway interchange 
Road class 1 (RC1) 
Road class 2 (RC2) 
B 
Avoidance maneuver 
1,100 – 
2,000 Nm 
70 – 400 W 
200 J – 
500 J 
Highway access/exit 
Road class 3 (RC3) 
C Turn-off (rural roads) 
2,000 – 
3,000 Nm 
400 - 600 W 
500 – 
1,300 J 
4.4.4 Steering Redundancy Requirements 
With the help of the determined fallback requirements in Table 4-7, steering redundancy 
requirements for the 26-t truck are developed for the three different road classes. This deri-
vation is similar to that for a 12-t truck in a previous publication115. 
For each road class, an exemplary combination is set up, consisting of maneuvers out of the 
three different requirement groups in Table 4-7, which are necessary to reach the defined 
safe state. The exemplary cases are set up according to the worst-case situations for the oc-
currence of a steering system fault, which were found by analyzing the roads in the surround-
ing area of Darmstadt. The torque and power requirements are independent of the number 
of necessary maneuvers to reach the safe state. Of course, the required steering energy in-
creases with an increasing number of necessary maneuvers and with an increasing necessary 
driving distance. 
The steering redundancy requirements (RR) are split into the required steering redundancy 
torque (𝑀RR), the redundancy power (𝑃RR) and the redundancy energy (𝐸RR). These are 
listed in Table 4-8. For the RC1 with a permanent hard shoulder, a worst-case scenario of a 
fault is if the system fault occurs while the truck is on the third lane from the hard shoulder, 
and thus requires three lane changes to stop on the hard shoulder and reach the safe state. 
Because lane changes are not always possible immediately, 1,000 m of RC1 driving are con-
sidered as well for determining the redundancy requirements. In that case, a maximum pit-
man arm torque (𝑀P,max) of 1,100 Nm, a maximum steering power (𝑃P,max) of 70 W and a 
                                                 
115 Herold, M. et al.: Power Requirements for RASS (2019), pp. 6–7. 
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maximum steering energy (𝐸P,max) of 800 J are necessary. If an avoidance maneuver is nec-
essary as well, the requirements for this road class increase to 2,000 Nm, 400 W and 1,300 J. 
The RC2 with emergency stopping bays is quite similar to RC1, but the difference is that a 
safe stop is not always immediately possible. A safe stop is only possible at an emergency 
stopping bay instead, which are only available at a distance of 1,000 m. Therefore, to reach 
a safe state of this road class in the worst case, 2,000 m of RC2 driving, two lane changes 
and the drive into an emergency stopping bay are necessary. Whereas the torque and power 
requirements are the same as for RC1, the required maximum steering energy (𝐸P,max) in-
creases to 1,000 J respectively to 1,500 J if an avoidance maneuver or another maneuver 
from group B is necessary. The RC3 differs from the other two, because there is no safe stop 
possible at the side of the road. In contrast, a turn-off maneuver is necessary to get to a road 
where a stop at the side of the road is possible or where the speed limit is below 70 km/h and 
thus a safe stop on the road is possible. Since a turn-off to such a road is not possible within 
a short distance in any case, a 5,000 m RC3 drive and a subsequent turn-off to a side road 
are considered as relevant to reach a safe state of this class. These maneuvers require the 
highest steering redundancy requirements of 3,000 Nm, 600 W and 3,800 J. 
Table 4-8: Steering redundancy requirements (RR) 
RC 
Exemplary maneuvers 
to reach safe state 
 𝐑𝐑  𝐑𝐑 𝑬𝐑𝐑 
1 
4x group A  
(add. avoidance maneuver: 1x group B) 
1,100 Nm 
(2,000 Nm) 
70 W 
(400 W) 
800 J 
(1.30 kJ) 
2 
5x group A  
(add. avoidance maneuver: 1x group B) 
1,100 Nm 
(2,000 Nm) 
70 W 
(400 W) 
1.00 kJ 
(1.50 kJ) 
3 
5x group B  
1x group C 
3,000 Nm 600 W 3.80 kJ 
4.4.5 Potential of Brake Steering as Fallback System 
A fallback for the steering functionality for AD3+ is not only realizable by a fail-operational 
steering system, but also by the brake system, which is able to steer the vehicle by braking 
only the wheels on one side of the vehicle, so-called differential braking or brake steering. 
This function could be taken over by the electronic stability control (ESC), which is manda-
tory in modern trucks. By using this already available system, synergetic effects would be 
used and additional hardware superfluous. 
However, the dynamic and the precision of brake steering are not comparable with those of 
a proper steering system.116 The author of this thesis has also proven in a previous investi-
gation that brake steering is not a sufficient fallback for a 12-t truck.117 
                                                 
116 Michael Reichenbach: Interview with Alexander Gaedke (2017), p.24. 
117 Herold, M. et al.: Differential Braking for Steering Redundancy (2018). 
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The maximum steering torque that can be applied stationary by differential braking at the 
steering of the 26-t truck is calculated in this section, to examine if brake steering is able to 
fulfill the steering redundancy torque requirements determined in the preceding subchapter. 
The steering torque that can be applied at the pitman arm by differential braking (𝑀𝐹𝑥) is 
calculated by equation (4-22), whereby the differential brake force (Δ𝐹𝑥,fa) is defined by 
equation (4-23). This differential force reaches its maximum if no braking force is applied 
at one front wheel and maximum braking force at the other front wheel. Hence, the maximum 
differential brake force (Δ𝐹𝑥,fa,max) is defined in equation (4-24) by the maximum friction 
coefficient between the tire and the road surface (𝜇max) and the front axle load (𝐹𝑧,fa). The 
stationary front axle load is used here for the calculation, because on the one hand addition-
ally driving torque decreases the deceleration by differential braking and thus decreases the 
load shift to the front axle.118 On the other hand, the wheel load on the inner front wheel, 
which is braked to generate steering torque due to the positive scrub radius, decreases be-
cause of the load shift to the outer wheels of the curve. It is assumed that the load shift to the 
front axle due to braking and the load shift to the outer wheels due to steering neutralize each 
other. 
 𝑀F𝑥 = Δ𝐹𝑥,fa ∙ 𝑟0 ∙ cos 𝜎 ∙ cos 𝜏 (4-22) 
 Δ𝐹𝑥,fa = 𝐹𝑥,fl − 𝐹𝑥,fr (4-23) 
 
Δ𝐹𝑥,fa,max = 𝜇max
𝐹𝑧,fa
2
 (4-24) 
With the vehicle and suspension data of the 26-t truck119 and assumed coefficients for the 
friction between a truck tire and a dry respectively a wet road surface, the maximum brake 
steering torque at the pitman arm for a dry road surface (𝑀F𝑥,max,dry) is 2,020 Nm and 
1,443 Nm for wet road conditions (𝑀F𝑥,max,wet). 
 𝑟0 = 0.07 m, 𝜎 = 0.14, 𝜏 = 0.06, 
𝐹𝑧,fa = 83.4 kN, 𝜇max,dry = 0.7, 𝜇max,wet = 0.5,  
 
 𝑀F𝑥,max,dry = 2,020 Nm  
 𝑀F𝑥,max,wet = 1,443 Nm  
Thereby, even in stationary state, the brake steering is not able to generate sufficient steering 
torque to fulfill the fallback requirements in Table 4-7. The brake steering is able to generate 
enough torque to meet the fallback steering torque requirements for group A and roughly for 
group B in dry conditions, but misses the requirements for group C significantly. In driving 
                                                 
118 Herold, M. et al.: Differential Braking for Steering Redundancy (2018), pp. 10–11. 
119 Vehicle data see Table A-3 in the Appendix. 
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situations with lower friction coefficients such as a wet road, this gap increases even more. 
The dynamic drawbacks of brake steering are not even considered in this examination. 
These results, together with the simulative study120, permit the conclusion that brake steering 
is not a sufficient fallback system for the steering functionality for the AD3+ of trucks if, as 
intended in this thesis, the application is not limited to RC1 or RC2, but should be feasible 
for all road classes. In addition, the influences of wheel load oscillations and the highly lim-
ited maneuverability during permanent braking argue against the use of brake steering as a 
fallback level. 
4.5 Conclusion of Requirement Analysis 
Starting with the frame requirements for a truck steering system suitable for AD3+, the re-
quirements for a correct operation of the steering system, but also the redundancy require-
ments for an incorrect operation due to a fault in the steering system are determined by the 
analysis in this subchapter. Whereas the frame requirements are already described in Table 
4-1, the operational and the redundancy requirements are listed in Table 4-9. A complete 
requirement list is attached in the appendix in Table A-4. 
Because the required fallback steering torque exceeds the maximum brake steering torque, 
a redundancy inside the steering system is necessary. The required steering system is called 
redundant active steering system (RASS). A fail-degraded redundancy is sufficient for the 
use case of AD3+ of trucks, since the redundancy requirements are much lower than the 
operational requirements for the correct operation of the steering system. 
Table 4-9: Operational and redundancy requirements 
 Requirement name Values, data Description 
O
p
er
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
 Maximum 
output torque 
8,500 Nm 
Maximum torque at pitman arm during cor-
rect operation 
Maximum angular 
velocity 
50 °/s 
Maximum angular velocity at pitman arm 
during correct operation 
Maximum 
output power 
3,500 W 
Maximum power of overall steering system 
at pitman arm during correct operation 
R
ed
u
n
d
a
n
cy
 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
 
Fallback torque 3,000 Nm 
Maximum output torque at pitman arm in 
case of a partial failure of the steering system 
Fallback power 600 W 
Maximum output power at pitman arm in 
case of a partial failure of the steering system 
Fallback energy 3,800 J 
Available steering energy at pitman arm in 
case of a failure of the power supply 
 
                                                 
120 Herold, M. et al.: Differential Braking for Steering Redundancy (2018). 
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There are three possible options for a RASS, which are a redundant electric power steering 
(EPS²), a redundant hydraulic power steering (HPS²) or a redundant hybrid power steering 
system (HPS + EPS). The EPS² is omitted, because the required maximum output torque of 
the steering system is not realizable solely by an electric motor with a power supply of 24 V 
and without a very high gear ratio, which would exceed the maximum dimensions of the 
steering system. Furthermore, the maximum output power would require a maximum current 
of 146 A, which would overload the vehicle’s power network, which is designed for a per-
manent maximum current of 110 A.121 The HPS² is excluded due to its low efficiency caused 
by the doubled hydraulic losses. Thus, a redundant hybrid steering system is the only suitable 
solution for a RASS for AD3+ of trucks. The used HPS subsystem delivers enough steering 
torque to fulfill the operational requirements, whereas the EPS only has to fulfill the de-
graded redundancy requirements. Furthermore, the EPS enables to increase the efficiency of 
the hybrid steering system compared to a standard HPS. 
                                                 
121 Maximum current of generators for a 24 V on-board network, which was found during a search in the 
internet. 
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5 System Architecture 
An appropriate system architecture is the basis for the development of a system that fulfills 
all previously determined requirements. Different possible functional structures of a hybrid 
RASS are analyzed in a first step. The derivation and implementation of a suitable functional 
safety concept is a crucial objective when developing systems for AD3+122 and has a great 
impact on the system architecture as well. Different system architectures, which meet the 
described requirements including the developed functional safety requirements, are de-
scribed and discussed. The superior system architecture is determined as the final system 
architecture at the end of this chapter. 
5.1 Functional Analysis 
According to the requirement analysis in the preceding chapter, a hybrid redundant active 
steering system (RASS) is required for AD3+ of trucks, since it is the only possible solution 
that fulfills the frame requirements as well as the operational and the redundancy require-
ments. The crucial subsystems of such a system are an electronic power steering (EPS) sub-
system and an active hydraulic power steering (AHPS) subsystem. These two subsystems 
provide the necessary functions based on the functional structures of the current SoA active 
steering systems described in subchapter 2.4. The possible structural combinations of these 
functions are analyzed and discussed. The detailed functional structures and their specific 
features, advantages and disadvantages are described hereafter. There will be a comparison 
of all structures in section 5.1.5. To build up the functional structures, symbols according to 
VDI 2222 are used, as shown in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1: Legend for functional structures123 
There is one symbol each for storing, conduction, transformation, conversion, summation 
and subtraction and different arrows for energy, information and material flow. The direc-
tions of the arrows represent the direction of the flows, i.e. the starting point is the steering 
wheel and the ending point is the steering linkage, which is connected to the wheels. The 
                                                 
122 Stolte, T. et al.: Towards Automated Driving (2015), p.673. 
123 Verein Deutscher Ingenieure: VDI 2222: Method for Developing Technical Systems (1993), p.16. 
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physical values linked to the arrows can be an energy (𝐸), a torque (𝑀) with a steering angle 
(𝛿), a rotation angle (𝜑) or a volume flow (𝑄) with a pressure (p). The indexes of the physical 
values are listed in the index directory. 
Furthermore, five different colors are used to illustrate, which function belongs to which 
subsystem. All functions required for a mechanical steering system are green, those that are 
added for a hydraulic power steering (HPS) are blue and those for an electric power steering 
(EPS) are orange. The additional functions for the modulation system are brown and the 
functions necessary for a feedback system are purple. 
5.1.1 RASS A 
The specific feature of the first function structure RASS A, shown in Figure 5-2, is the po-
sition at which the electric motor (EM) is connected to the steering shaft. It is connected to 
the input shaft of the steering gear (StG) by an additional gear before the torsion bar (TB). 
Thereby, the electric motor is able to control the hydraulic steering assistance by twisting 
the torsion bar as well as the modulation actuator (MA) by twisting the valve sleeve via an 
additional gear. The fact that the hydraulics are controllable via two different ways inde-
pendent of the driver, is the crucial edge of this specific functional structure. Thereby, the 
system is still able to generate high steering power by the hydraulic system independent from 
the driver if either the electric motor or the modulation actuator fails. 
 
Figure 5-2: Functional structure RASS A with steering gear (StG), variable power steering pump 
(vPSP), electric control unit (ECU), power electronics (PE), electric motor (EM), modulation actua-
tor (MA), valve torsion bar (VTB), and active valve (AV) 
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In addition to these two automated ways to control the hydraulic volume flow, the driver is 
able to control it by twisting the torsion bar, too. Thus, the driver gets the chance to oversteer 
the automated system. Since the torsion bar has to be designed for the torque of the electric 
motor, which is higher than the driver’s maximum torque, it has to be much stiffer than a 
torsion bar for a standard HPS. If the stiffness of the torsion bar were designed according to 
the maximum input torque of the driver, the more powerful EPS would always twist the 
torsion bar fully to the mechanical stop when it applies torque. This would cause backlash 
in the steering system. 
The stiffer torsion bar requires significantly more torque of the driver to steer compared to a 
standard HPS, which is why the driver functions only as a fallback in case of a fault of the 
electric system (EM and MA). But to comply the ECE R79 and in case of a fault, the steering 
force at the steering wheel is not allowed to exceed 450 N. This has to be considered during 
the design of the torsion bar. 
The option to control the hydraulics by the electric motor and the modulation actuator is a 
big benefit, but the two ways have to be coordinated which is a relatively complex control 
task. The control algorithm is implemented in the electric control unit (ECU), which controls 
the distribution of the electric energy by the power electronics (PE) and the adjustment of 
the energy demand of the power steering pump (PSP) by an adjustment mechanism (AM). 
Another characteristic of RASS A is that there is no need for a special steering gear. The 
special control module with the torsion bar, the modulation actuator and gear and the valve 
are adapted to a standard recirculating ball (RCB) steering gear. 
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5.1.2 RASS B 
The second functional structure RASS B distinguishes itself from RASS A by the position 
of the gear, which connects the electric motor to the steering shaft. As seen in Figure 5-3, 
the gear is fitted after the torsion bar (TB) at the steering gear (StG), which causes different 
characteristics compared to RASS A. 
Because the application point of the electric motor is behind the torsion bar, the electric 
motor (EM) is not able to twist it and thus to control the hydraulic steering assistance. There-
fore, the modulation is the only driver-independent way to control the hydraulics. If it fails, 
the system can still steer by the electric motor, but the maximum torque is limited and con-
siderably lower compared to the maximum torque of the system with hydraulic assistance. 
However, compared to RASS A, a less complex control strategy is necessary, since the mod-
ulation is the only way to automatically control the hydraulics. 
Because the electric motor applies torque only behind the torsion bar, the design of the tor-
sion bar is independent of the maximum torque of the electric motor. Hence, a standard 
torsion bar from a standard HPS is used, which requires significantly less torque by the driver 
to control the hydraulics and in case of a fault to oversteer the system, compared to RASS A. 
The position of the electric motor at the steering gear is not fixed in this functional structure. 
A mounting at the top or at the bottom of the steering gear’s input shaft is possible as well 
as at its output shaft. Like the first functional structure, RASS B neither requires a special 
steering gear. 
 
Figure 5-3: Functional structure RASS B with steering gear (StG), variable power steering pump 
(vPSP), electric control unit (ECU), power electronics (PE), electric motor (EM), modulation actua-
tor (MA), valve torsion bar (VTB) and active valve (AV) 
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5.1.3 RASS C 
In Figure 5-4, the third function structure RASS C is displayed. It differs from the first two 
functional structures because there is no torsion bar between the steering wheel and the steer-
ing gear. 
Due to the missing torsion bar, the hydraulics are only controllable by the modulation actu-
ator (MA). Even the driver is not able to control the hydraulics, which is a big disadvantage 
if the modulation fails. In this case, the electric motor (EM) is the fallback level with its 
limited maximum torque. If this fails as well, the driver is the last fallback level using the 
mechanical passage from the steering wheel to the wheels. Since he would not get any steer-
ing assistance, the steering performance would be restricted to the maximum manual torque 
of the driver. 
Another big drawback of this specific functional structure is that the driver is hardly able to 
oversteer the system, because of his significantly lower power compared to the power of the 
steering assistant systems.  
The biggest advantage of the RASS C is the freedom of design of the steering valve. As there 
is no torsion bar in the RASS C, the valve doesn’t have to be compatible to the torsion bar 
(e.g. rotary slide valve), but can be any valve design (e.g. proportional valve). Therefore, the 
design of the entire steering system and the control of the hydraulics are less complex. Also, 
a standard steering gear is used for the RASS C. 
 
Figure 5-4: Functional structure RASS C with steering gear (StG), variable power steering pump 
(vPSP), electric control unit (ECU), power electronics (PE), electric motor (EM), modulation actua-
tor (MA) and active valve (AV) 
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5.1.4 RASS D 
The distinctive feature of last functional structure RASS D, shown in Figure 5-5, is the miss-
ing mechanical passage between the steering wheel and the steering gear. Thereby, RASS D 
is a steer-by-wire system (SbW). 
The control of the hydraulics is similar as it is in RASS C and has the same pros and cons. 
The difference is the missing mechanical fallback level. In case of a fault of the modulation, 
the electric motor (EM) is the last fallback level, since the driver is not able to transfer torque 
to the steering gear due to the missing mechanical passage. 
 
Figure 5-5: Functional structure RASS D with steering gear (StG), variable power steering pump 
(vPSP), electric control unit (ECU), power electronics (PE), electric motor (EM), modulation actua-
tor (MA), active valve (AV) and feedback actuator (FA) 
The lack of the mechanical linkage between the steering wheel and the wheels cancels the 
dependency between the steering angle and the steering torque. It causes a design freedom 
of the steering behavior and the steering feel. A feedback actuator (FA) generates the feed-
back to the driver artificially. It is controlled by the ECU using sensor information about the 
torque and the angle at the output shaft of the steering gear. However, these additional com-
ponents for feedback generation make the whole system more complex. Another benefit of 
the missing steering shaft is a raise of safety in case of a frontal crash. In addition, the same 
standard steering gear can be used for vehicles with left- and right-hand drive. 
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5.1.5 Comparison of Different Functional Structures 
The detailed functional structures of a RASS are described in the previous sections. Table 
5-1 gives an overview of the special features as well as of the advantages and the disad-
vantages of the individual functional structures. 
As the driver is not able to control the hydraulic power steering (HPS) system for RASS C 
and RASS D, these two functional structures are not further considered in this thesis. The 
HPS is the most powerful steering actuator of the hybrid RASS, thus in case of an erroneous 
steering torque generation by the HPS, the driver is only able to counteract if he is able to 
override the active HPS control. Because RASS C and RASS D do not provide this ability 
to the driver, they miss the override ability requirement of the Vienna’s convention on road 
traffic124 and of the ECE R79125. 
Table 5-1: Comparison of function structures (FS) 
FS RASS A RASS B RASS C RASS D 
S
p
ec
ia
l 
 
fe
a
tu
re
s EM connected to 
steering shaft be-
fore steering valve 
EM connected to 
steering shaft after 
steering valve 
No TB, but 
mechanical passage 
from SW to wheels 
No TB & no 
mechanical passage 
from SW to wheels 
(SbW) 
A
d
v
a
n
ta
g
es
 
- double active 
HPS control 
- HPS controllable 
by the driver 
- oversteerable by 
the driver 
- standard RCB 
with stiffer TB 
- HPS controllable 
by the driver 
- standard TB: 
easy to oversteer 
by the driver 
- easy control: 
just one active 
HPS control 
- standard RCB 
- no TB: free 
design of valve  
- easy control of 
HPS 
- driver last 
fallback-level 
- standard RCB 
- no TB: free 
design of valve 
- easy control of 
HPS 
- free design of 
steering behavior 
(𝑇 & 𝛿) 
- free design of 
steering feel 
- no steering shaft: 
more safety & 
design freedom 
- standard RCB 
D
is
a
d
v
a
n
ta
g
es
 
- stiff TB requires 
high torques by 
driver to control 
HPS without EPS 
- complex 
coordination of 
double active 
HPS control 
- just one active 
HPS control 
- just one active 
HPS control  
- HPS not 
controllable by 
the driver 
- hardly override-
able by the driver 
- just one active 
HPS control  
- no mechanical 
fallback-level  
- additional feed-
back generation 
                                                 
124 United Nations: Convention on Road Traffic (1968), p.11. 
125 United Nations: ECE R79 r4 (2018), p.14. 
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5.2 Safety Analysis 
The safety analysis is a central step within the development of safety-relevant systems. The 
methodology of the safety analysis according to the ISO 26262 is illustrated in Figure 5-6. 
The methods used in the single steps of the analysis are listed on the left side, whereas the 
several results are illustrated symbolically on the right. 
 
Figure 5-6: Methodology of safety analysis 
The methodology is divided into three main steps. The first step is the item definition. Here, 
the steering system, which is in focus of the project, is defined in detail. The next main step, 
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the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA), starts with the analysis of the possible 
driving situations, which are relevant for the steering system. Thereby, the possible hazards 
are identified. Those are classified in the next step by assessing the ASIL of the single haz-
ardous situations. After the derivation of the safety goals, the HARA ends with their verifi-
cation. The last main step of the safety analysis is the development of the functional safety 
concept. Therefore, the functional safety requirements (FSR) are derived using the methods 
of fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). Those functional 
safety requirements are allocated to a functional safety concept by using unified modeling 
language (UML) diagrams. With the result of a functional safety concept and its verification, 
the safety analysis ends and the development continues on system, hardware and software 
level. 
5.2.1 Item Definition 
For an appropriate functional safety analysis, it is important to define the item of the analysis 
properly. Here, the item is the RASS for AD3+ of trucks, with an increased energy efficiency 
compared to standard HPS. The two functional structures RASS A and RASS B defined 
above and selected for the further approach are both considered for the safety analysis. 
The intended functionality of the RASS includes standard power steering and AD2- as well, 
but since the AD3+ is the innovative functionality of the RASS, the safety analysis focuses 
on that. However, for a complete valid safety analysis, the other functionalities have to be 
considered as well. For AD3+, the RASS generates steering torque independently of the 
driver and provides a system internal fallback level for the case of a fault, which provides 
fail-degraded active steering functionality until the driver takes over control or the vehicle 
is transferred into a safe state. 
The driver and the automated lateral guidance system deliver the signal inputs to the steering 
system, which in turn gives feedback about the driving situation to the driver. The steering 
system’s power inputs are the vehicle’s power network for the electric power supply and 
power steering pump (PSP) driven by the internal combustion engine (ICE) for the hydraulic 
power supply. 
Table 5-2 lists the intended system operation states. Besides the different levels of automa-
tion (LoA), the RASS has different power steering states (PS), in which the steering system 
generates the steering torque solely electric (EPS state), hydraulic (HPS state) or combined 
(hybrid state). Because the required steering torques decrease with increasing vehicle’s ve-
locity, at high velocities the EPS state is active to increase the efficiency. Only if the velocity 
is below a threshold (𝑣Switch), the hydraulic is active. Depending on the LoA and the fault 
state (FS), the system has different fallback states. During manual driving (LoA 0), the steer-
ing system has power steering and comfort functionality (e.g. active return to straight) and 
in case of a fault of one of the power steering systems, the other power steering system serves 
as a fallback. In AD3+ state, the steering system generates steering torque independently of 
the driver and steers automatically. The driver might take off his hands from the steering 
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wheel and focus on other tasks. In case of a fault of one active steering system, the other 
active system serves as a fallback and a take-over request (ToR) is sent to the driver, who 
has a specific period to take over the control. Otherwise, the system transfers the vehicle into 
a defined safe state. The driver is able to override the active steering system at any time 
independently of the LoA. If the driver intervenes during automated driving, the automated 
steering function is deactivated and just the power steering function remains. An unmoti-
vated steering action should be prevented safely at any time. 
Table 5-2: Intended system operation states, including power steering state (PS), SAE level of auto-
mation (LoA) and fault state (FS) 
PS LoA FS Fallback/Safe state 
EPS 0 No fault - 
EPS 0 Fault Driver & HPS by TB 
EPS 3+ No fault - 
EPS 3+ Fault 
HPS by modulator & take-over request (ToR) 
 transition to driver/safe state 
HPS 0 No fault - 
HPS 0 Fault Driver & EPS 
HPS 3+ No fault - 
HPS 3+ Fault 
EPS & ToR 
 transition to driver/safe state 
Hybrid 0 No fault - 
Hybrid 0 EPS Fault Driver & HPS by TB 
Hybrid 0 HPS Fault Driver & EPS  
Hybrid 3+ No fault - 
Hybrid 3+ EPS Fault 
HPS by modulator & ToR 
 transition to driver/safe state 
Hybrid 3+ HPS Fault 
EPS & ToR 
 transition to driver/safe state 
All 
Modes 
All 
Levels 
No fault 
or Fault 
Override able by the driver 
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5.2.2 Derivation of Safety Goals 
The second main part of the concept phase of the ISO 26262 is the hazard analysis and risk 
assessment (HARA), which results in different safety goals for the item of the analysis. The 
HARA is conducted according to the ISO 26262 and contains three main parts. First, the 
hazards and the situations in which those hazards can occur have to be determined. The 
following step is to classify the automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) of the determined 
hazardous situations. The final step of the HARA is the derivation and verification of the 
safety goals for the different hazards, which a fault of the steering system can cause.126 
Table 5-3 lists the steering system states and the driving situations, which are considered in 
the HARA. Each driving situation is analyzed separately for each combination of velocity 
and LoA.  
Table 5-3: Steering system states and driving situations considered during HARA 
Steering system state Description 
Velocity 
𝑣V ≤ 𝑣Switch  
Vehicle’s velocity is below the velocity threshold. The 
steering system is in hybrid power steering (hybrid) 
state. 
𝑣V > 𝑣Switch  
Vehicle’s velocity is above the velocity threshold. The 
steering system is in electric power steering state. 
Level of 
automation 
0 Manual driving 
AD3+ Highly automated driving 
Driving situation Description 
Straight 
Immediate stop 
possible 
In case of a fault, an immediate stop without any steer-
ing action is possible. 
Immediate 
pullout possible 
In case of a fault, an immediate pullout to the shoulder 
without any additional steering action is possible. 
Delayed pullout 
possible 
In case of a fault, a pullout to the shoulder after a short 
drive with additional steering action is possible.  
Turn-off 
necessary 
In case of a fault, a turn off the current road is neces-
sary to reach a safe state. 
Corner 
During Fault occurs during cornering. 
Before Fault occurs less than 1s before cornering. 
Lane change 
During Fault occurs during lane changing. 
Before Fault occurs less than 1s before lane changing. 
Avoidance 
maneuver 
During Fault occurs during evasive maneuvering. 
Before Fault occurs less than 1s before evasive maneuvering. 
Maneuvering - Maneuvering, e.g. on a yard with 𝑣V < 10 km/h. 
Transition 
to driver 
Hand-over 
Automated driving system intends a hand-over to the 
driver and gives a ToR. After a defined Take-over 
Time (ToT) the driver takes over the control. 
Driver interven-
tion 
Automated driving system does not intend a hand-over 
to the driver. The driver takes over the control by inter-
vening the automated driving system. 
 
                                                 
126 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-3 (2018), pp. 5–12. 
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The driving situations are distinguished into four different kinds of straights, depending on 
which maneuver is necessary to get to a safe stop. The next three driving situations, which 
are corner, lane change and avoidance maneuver, are distinguished regarding whether the 
vehicle is already in this situation or close to it. A driving situation that is only executed with 
low velocities is the maneuvering, e.g. on yards. The hand-over of the steering task from the 
automated system to the driver as well as the intervention of the driver into the automated 
driving maneuver are two driving situations, which have to be considered, too.  
Beside the driving situations, the possible hazards caused by the RASS have to be analyzed 
for the HARA. Possible hazards are faults of the components of the hybrid steering system. 
System faults can be errors or failures, which differs in the way that in case of an error, the 
system provides an erroneous function and in case of a failure it provides no function. The 
relevant hazards for the HARA are listed in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4: List of potential hazards 
Function Hazard Abbreviation 
Energy 
supply 
Failure of battery Batt F 
Failure of engine ICE F 
Energy 
adjusting 
Error of power electronics of RASS PE E 
Failure of power electronics of RASS PE F 
Error of adjustment mechanism for volume flow of vPSP vPSP E 
Failure of adjustment mechanism for volume flow of vPSP vPSP F 
Energy  
converter 
Error of electric motor of EPS in RASS A EM E (A) 
Error of electric motor of EPS in RASS B EM E (B) 
Failure of electric motor of EPS in RASS A EM F (A) 
Failure of electric motor of EPS in RASS B EM F (B) 
Error of modulator actuator of modulator in RASS A MA E (A) 
Error of modulator actuator of modulator in RASS B MA E (B) 
Failure of modulator actuator of modulator in RASS A MA F (A) 
Failure of modulator actuator of modulator in RASS B MA F (B) 
Sensor 
Error of steering wheel sensor Sensor E 
Failure of steering wheel sensor Sensor F 
Control 
Error of electronic control unit of RASS ECU E 
Failure of electronic control unit of RASS ECU F 
 
The derivation process of the safety goals (SG) from the relevant driving situations and the 
potential hazards is not a central issue of this thesis and thus not described in detail here. 
However, a suitable approach following the ISO 26262 is presented by Gillen.127 The haz-
ardous events are identified from the combination of the driving situations and the potential 
hazards and assessed with an ASIL according to ISO 26262. The safety goals of the RASS 
are derived from the identified hazardous events and their ASIL. To keep the amounts of 
safety goals manageable, the hazardous events are classified into groups with a technical 
relationship and similar ASIL according to Table 5-5. One safety goal is defined for each of 
                                                 
127 Gillen, C.: Dissertation, Development of efficient safety concepts for steering systems (2015). 
5 System Architecture 
76 
these groups. Thereby, the whole steering system is covered with only seven safety goals, 
which are also listed in Table 5-5. 
An error of the steering wheel sensor or of the ECU has to be prevented, in order to prevent 
unintended steering action at any time. The prevention of an error of the EPS or an error of 
the active valve have the same target. An erroneous power supply by the power electronic 
(PE) or the variable power steering pump (vPSP) would cause the generation of an erroneous 
amount of torque. This has to be prevented as well. 
Since the driver is not available as a fallback during AD3+, it is essential to guarantee that 
the active steering function of the RASS does not fail at any time during AD3+. To ensure 
this, a simultaneous failure of components within this group that would cause a failure of the 
EPS and the AHPS has to be avoided. To detect the driver’s intention always safely, a failure 
of the steering wheel sensor has to be prevented. For the safe power steering function, the 
internal combustion engine (ICS) and the vPSP should not fail. 
Table 5-5: List of safety goals for RASS 
ID Group Hazard Safety goal (SG) 
SG 1 
Sensor & ECU 
error 
Sensor E An erroneous sensing of the steering wheel input or 
an erroneous control signal of the electronic control 
unit should be prevented safely. 
ECU E 
SG 2 EPS error 
EM E (A) An erroneous torque output of the electric power 
steering should be prevented safely. EM E (B) 
SG 3 
Active valve 
error 
MA E (A) 
An erroneous opening of the active hydraulic valve 
by the modulator should be prevented safely. 
SG 4 
Power supply 
error 
PE E An erroneous power supply should be prevented 
safely. vPSP E 
SG 5 
Active steering 
failure 
Batt F 
A failure of the driver-independent steering torque 
generation should be prevented safely. 
PE F 
EM F (A) 
EM F (B) 
MA F (A) 
MA F (B) 
ECU F 
SG 6 Sensor failure Sensor F 
A failure of the sensing of the steering wheel input 
should be prevented safely. 
SG 7 
Power steering 
failure 
ICE F A failure of the power steering system should be 
prevented safely. vPSP F 
 
The defined safety goals are connected with their automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) 
in Table 5-6. There is an ASIL for each safety goal and each system state. Thereby, each 
safety goal has one ASIL depending on the power steering state and the LoA of the steering 
system. 
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The derived safety goals are verified according to ISO 26262-8 to ensure consistency re-
garding the item definition and suitability with the identified hazardous events and the de-
termined ASIL.128 
The hazardous events are derived directly from the item definition and classified into groups 
with a technical relationship. Thereby and by assigning each of these groups directly to the 
highest ASIL occurring in it, the safety goals are verified. 
Table 5-6: ASIL of different safety goals for different LoA and system states 
Safety groups 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Group 
3 
Group 
4 
Group 
5 
Group 
6 
Group 
7 
Sensor 
& ECU 
error 
EPS 
error 
Active 
valve 
error 
Power 
supply 
error 
Active 
steering 
failure 
Sensor 
failure 
Power 
steering 
failure 
Safety goal SG 1 SG 2 SG 3 SG 4 SG 5 SG 6 SG 7 
A
S
IL
 M
D
   ≤  𝐒𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐜𝐡 C B C A QM - A 
  >  𝐒𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐜𝐡 D C - C QM A A 
A
D
3
+
 
  ≤  𝐒𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐜𝐡 D D D C D B - 
  >  𝐒𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐜𝐡 D D - D D B - 
5.2.3 Safety Concept 
According to the ISO 26262, the objective of the functional safety concept is to derive the 
functional safety requirements from the safety goals, and to allocate them to the preliminary 
architectural elements of the item or to external measures in order to ensure the required 
functional safety. The functional safety concept includes the following parts:128 
 fault detection and failure mitigation 
 transition to safe sate 
 fault tolerance mechanism, by which a fault does not lead directly to the violation of 
the safety goal(s) and which maintains the item in a safe state (with/without degra-
dation) 
 fault detection and driver warning in order to reduce the risk exposure time to an 
acceptable interval 
 arbitration logic to select the most appropriate control request from multiple requests 
generated simultaneously by different functions 
The functional safety requirements are derived based on the previously defined safety goals. 
Therefore, starting with the assumption of not reaching a specific safety goal, it is analyzed 
which error/failure or chain of errors/failures leads to that miss. The ISO 26262 recommends 
                                                 
128 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-3 (2018), pp. 12–15. 
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the deductive method of a fault tree analysis (FTA), which uses the symbols in Table 5-7 to 
analyze the causes of potential faults. 
Table 5-7: Symbols of an FTA129 
Sym-
bol 
Name Description 
 
Event description 
Description of the event, which indicates a failure/failure state, 
the state of system/component, a condition or an action 
 
Conditioning event 
with description 
Event, which expresses a condition; Usually as input of an in-
hibit gate 
 
Undeveloped event Event, whose cause is not further analyzed 
 
OR gate Logic OR function of the input events 
 
AND gate Logic AND function of the input events 
 
Inhibit gate 
Gate with additional condition, which is connected with an 
AND function 
 
The analysis is based on the top event at the top of the fault tree, which describes a missed 
safety goal. Therefore, there is one fault tree for each safety goal. Using logical linkages, the 
top event is connected with possible causes for the missed safety goal. Thus, especially for 
redundant systems, the FTA is a very useful method for the safety analysis.130 
The fault path is explained exemplarily using the FTA of SG 5 shown in Figure 5-7. The 
superior event of each fault tree is on steering system level and represents the corresponding 
negated safety goal. The lower rectangles describe errors and failures on functional level. 
The diamonds at the bottom of each fault tree contain the errors or failures of the single 
components. Underneath the top event is the determined ASIL, depending on the steering 
system state. 
The fifth safety goal is “A failure of the driver-independent steering torque generation should 
be prevented safely”. Hence, the undesired top event of the fault tree in Figure 5-7 is the 
“Failure of active steering”. 
If there is no active steering during AD3+, the safety goal 5 with ASIL D is missed. On 
component level, the reasons for that fault are a failure of the electric power supply, a failure 
                                                 
129 Edler, F. et al.: Fault tree analysis in theory and practice (2015), pp. 20–23. 
130 Deutsches Institut für Normung: DIN 25424 Fault Tree Analysis (1981). 
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of the ECU or a failure of the actuators. In the EPS state above 𝑣Switch, a failure of the 
electric motor already causes a failure of the active steering, whereas in Hybrid state below 
𝑣Switch the active steering only fails if both the electric motor and the modulator fail simul-
taneously. 
 
Figure 5-7: Fault tree analysis (FTA) for SG 5 
The safety concept derives functional safety requirements from the safety goals. Theoreti-
cally, safety goals are abstract and superior safety requirements, but the safety goals refer to 
the overall system and not only to sub-systems, elements, components and their functions.131 
Because of its high value, the functional safety concept has to be verified regarding its con-
sistency with the safety goals and its ability to avoid hazardous situations. To avoid misun-
derstandings during the evaluation and to support an efficient method, an appropriate presen-
tation of the functional safety concept is necessary. For this purpose, safety concept diagrams 
(SCD) are recommended by literature.131 
Safety concept diagrams are related in the way of illustration to the system modeling lan-
guage (SysML) respectively to requirement diagrams. SysML is based itself on the unified 
modeling language (UML). Figure 5-8 shows the exemplary SCD for SG 5. 
The SCD is structured like an inverse tree, where the root of the tree is always a safety goal 
(SG). An identity (ID), an ASIL and a short description of the safety goals characterize the 
                                                 
131 Gillen, C.: Dissertation, Development of efficient safety concepts for steering systems (2015), p.63. 
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safety goals. An ID, an ASIL and a short description of the requirements in the model also 
characterize the functional safety requirements (FSR). In this thesis, aggregations are used 
to illustrate that one or more requirements are necessary to fulfill superior functional safety 
requirements or safety goals. In the example of Figure 5-8, the FSR 5.1.1 and the FSR 5.1.2 
are mandatory to fulfill the FSR 5.1. Furthermore, the aggregation transmits the ASIL, i.e. 
the lower FSR of a superior FSR with an ASIL D also have ASIL D.  
Figure 5-8 describes the FSR of the safety concept, which have to be fulfilled to achieve 
SG 5, which is defined as “A failure of the driver-independent steering torque generation 
should be prevented safely”. This safety goal has ASIL D and is fulfilled if all first-level 
FSR beneath it, which are FSR 5.1, FSR 5.2, FSR 5.3 and FSR 5.4, are fulfilled. The SCD 
is explained exemplarily using the FSR 5.1, which consists of the sub-requirements “A fail-
ure of the electric power supply should be detected safely.” (FSR 5.1.1) and “In case of a 
failure of the electric power supply driver should be informed and the energy supply by a 
shunt circuit with a second redundant battery until the transition to a defined safe state is 
completed should be ensured.” (FSR 5.1.2). 
A more extensive description of the FTA and SCD of the other safety goals is not content of 
this thesis, as the methodology of determining them has no new value. The crucial results of 
this thesis are the description of the final consequences of the safety concept and its imple-
mentation in the system architecture. Both are described below. 
The central functional safety requirements and their implementation in the system architec-
ture are named in Table 5-8. Furthermore, the safety goals allocated by the different func-
tional safety requirements are listed here. The necessary redundant active steering function-
ality requires redundancies of the active steering actuators, the active steering control, the 
system observation and the electric power supply. To ensure that the driver can override the 
system, correct sensing of the steering wheel input by a redundant sensor setup is indispen-
sable as well. The requirement for a redundant power steering functionality is fulfilled auto-
matically if redundant active steering functionality is available. All safety goals are assigned 
at least to one FSR, whereby the FSR are verified. The implementation in the system archi-
tecture is described in the following subchapter in more detail. 
Table 5-8: Functional safety requirements and their implementation 
Functional safety requirements 
Implementation in 
system architecture 
Allocated 
safety goals 
Redundant active 
steering actuators 
Electric motor & 
modulator 
SG 2, SG 3, SG 5 
Redundant active steering control Redundant ECU 
SG 1, SG 2, SG 3, 
SG 4, SG 5, SG 7 
Redundant system observation Redundant ECU 
SG 1, SG 2, SG 3, 
SG 4, SG 5, SG 6, SG 7 
Redundant electric power supply 
Generator & 
redundant batteries 
SG 2, SG 3, SG 4, 
SG 5, SG 7 
Redundant sensing of 
steering wheel input 
Redundant steering 
wheel sensor 
SG 1, SG 2, SG 3, 
SG 6, SG 7 
Redundant power steering EPS & HPS SG 2, SG 3, SG 7 
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Figure 5-8: Safety concept diagram with functional safety requirements (FSR) for SG 5 
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5.3 Redundant Active Steering System 
Different system designs are derived based on the determined requirements, the developed 
functional structures for RASS A and RASS B, and on the results of the safety analysis. All 
designs have the same components in common, but their structure differs. The components 
of the RASS are listed in Table 5-9. 
The results of the safety analysis in Table 5-8 in combination with the operational and the 
redundancy requirements in Table 4-9 determine the composition and the specifications of 
the components of the RASS. The electric power steering (11) and the active hydraulic 
power steering (15) form the required redundant active steering system. The detailed pur-
poses of each component of the RASS are described hereafter. 
Table 5-9: Components of the RASS 
ID Component ID Component 
1 Steering wheel 12 Electric motor 
2 
Redundant steering wheel torque &  
angle sensor 
13 Overlay gear 
3 Recirculating ball steering gear 14 Electronic control unit (ECU) 1 
4 Internal combustion engine 15 Active hydraulic power steering (AHPS) 
5 Redundant electric power supply 16 Active valve with modulator 
6 Generator (24 V, 110 A) 17 Variable power steering pump (vPSP) 
7 Battery isolator 18 Tank 
8 Battery 1 (24 V, 160 Ah) 19 ECU 2 
9 Battery 2 (24 V, 160 Ah) 20 Pitman arm 
10 Diode 21 Push rod 
11 Electric power steering (EPS) 22 Tie rod 
5.3.1 Sensor and Controller 
The redundant steering wheel sensors (2) ensure a safe detection of the driver’s intention for 
a correct steering assistance in manual driving mode. During AD3+, the redundant sensors 
are responsible for a correct detection of a driver intervention or the observation of the tran-
sition process during a hand-over from manual to automated driving or reverse. 
Two electric control units are implemented for the redundant active steering control, whereas 
the first ECU (14) is primarily responsible for the control of the electric motor and the second 
ECU (19) for the control of the active valve. This means that in normal operation, exactly 
one ECU is active per active steering subsystem. However, in the background the signals are 
continuously checked for plausibility by the other ECU in the system. The ECU thus take 
over the monitoring function among each other and determine which ECU is affected in the 
event of a fault by means of suitable structure and procedures.132 
                                                 
132 Isermann, R.: Fault tolerance in mechatronic systems (2016), pp. 43–45. 
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5.3.2 Electric Power Steering System 
The electric power steering (EPS) (11) serves as one of the two active steering systems, 
which are able to generate steering torque independently of the driver. In order to increase 
the efficiency of the RASS, the EPS also serves as the sole power steering as long as its 
maximum torque is sufficient. It is the fallback level for the AHPS in the event of a fault of 
the active valve. 
To implement this functionality, the EPS consists of an electric motor (12) as actuator, a 
torque overlay gear (13) that reduces the rotational speed of the EM and overlays the elec-
trically generated torque on the steering gear, and an already described ECU (14). The as-
sembly position of the EPS and the connection to the other components of the RASS via the 
overlay gear is variable. A different assembly position causes different functionalities, as 
described for RASS A and RASS B, or just advantages or disadvantages regarding the as-
sembly space. 
5.3.3 Active Hydraulic Power Steering 
The other active steering system of the RASS is the active hydraulic power steering 
(AHPS, 15). The AHPS supports the EPS if its torque is not sufficient for the power steering 
or the automated steering and serves as a fallback level in the event of a fault of the EPS. 
Besides the standard HPS components such as the variable power steering pump (vPSP, 17) 
and tank (18), the AHPS has an additional active valve (16) and ECU (19) for the driver-
independent generation of steering torque. The last two components are new compared to a 
standard HPS and are responsible for turning the passive HPS into an active steering system 
suitable for automated driving. 
5.3.4 Electric Power Supply 
For driverless steering, the RASS requires electrical power. The vehicle's electrical power 
network is responsible for this. In AD3+, the electric power supply must provide sufficient 
power at all times to enable the RASS to safely steer the vehicle. In the event of a fault, the 
electric power supply must provide at least as much power and energy as it is required to 
reach a defined safe state.133 
Therefore, the redundant electric power supply (5) consists of a generator (6) and two paral-
lel batteries (8, 9). An isolator (7) and a diode (10) isolate the two batteries to ensure power 
supply even in case of a fault of one battery. 
                                                 
133 The redundancy requirement regarding the fallback energy is defined in Table 4-9. 
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5.3.5 Other Components 
The remaining components are not connected to one of the determined requirements directly, 
but they are indispensable for the other components to fulfill them. The internal combustion 
engine (4) runs the power steering pump (17), which transports the hydraulic liquid from the 
tank (18) to the active valve (16). The pitman arm (20) is the output interface of the recircu-
lating ball (RCB) steering gear (3) to the steering kinematics. The push rod (21) transmits 
the output steering power from the pitman arm to one steered wheel, which is connected to 
the other wheel by the tie rod (22). 
5.3.6 System Design 
The components described above do not represent an innovation in themselves. Here, the 
components are assembled into innovative system architectures for the RASS regarding the 
comprehensive requirements identified in this thesis. The first system design RASS A is 
shown in Figure 5-9. 
 
Figure 5-9: System architecture RASS A 
Its particular feature is that the EPS (11) is connected to the steering system at the input shaft 
of the active valve (16) by a gear (13) to overlay torque to the driver’s input torque. Because 
the EPS is mounted upstream of the valve, it is able to control the valve as well besides the 
driver and the AHPS (15). Thereby, an additional possibility to control the active valve for 
example in the event of a fault of the modulator is enabled on the one hand. On the other 
hand, this causes the problem that the torque of the EPS is transmitted through the torsion 
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bar, which makes its design very difficult. Usually the stiffness of the torsion bar is designed 
according to the maximum input torque of the driver and has a significant influence on the 
steering feel. Because the maximum torque of the EPS is considerably higher than that of 
the driver, such a design would usually cause a complete twisting of the torsion bar and a 
steering with play in the center position when the EPS is actuated. If the stiffens of the torsion 
bar was designed according to the maximum torque of the EPS, it would significantly in-
crease the driver’s effort to control the valve and thus cause a sluggish steering feel. A torque 
split between the driver and the EPS solves this issue as long as the EPS does not fail. An-
other drawback of this design is that the output torque generated by the EPS and that by the 
AHPS are not controllable independently of each other, because the EPS has a direct influ-
ence on the active valve. 
Figure 5-10 shows the second possible system design RASS B1. Compared to the first sys-
tem design, the EPS (11) is mounted by the torque overlay gear (13) at the shaft between the 
active valve (16) and the RCB steering gear (3). Thereby, the opportunity to control the 
active valve by the EPS does not exist, but the difficulties with the stiffness of the torsion 
bar neither. The stiffness of the torsion bar is designed according to the driver’s maximum 
input torque. Because the torque of the EPS is added downstream the active valve, the control 
of the EPS and the AHPS are independent. 
 
Figure 5-10: System architecture RASS B1 
The third possible system design RASS B2 is illustrated in Figure 5-11. Compared to the 
first two system designs, the EPS (11) is connected at the end of the input shaft of the steering 
gear (3) by the overlay gear (13). This system design has the same functionality as RASS B1, 
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but the difference is the mounting position of the EPS below the steering gear. Because the 
assembly position of the steering gear compared to the steered axle is relatively fixed to 
minimize the influence of the suspension on the steering system and thus also the position 
of the steering gear compared to the cab floor is more or less fixed, the assembly space above 
the steering gear is limited. The mounting of the EPS below the steering gear enables a sig-
nificantly bigger assembly space for the EPS, but also for the active valve above the steering 
gear. The space below the steering gear is limited only by the ground clearance of the vehi-
cle. 
 
Figure 5-11: System architecture RASS B2 
A fourth possible system design that is considered has the same functionality as RASS B1 
and RASS B2, but the EPS (11) is mounted at the output shaft of the steering gear, by an 
overlay gear (13) close to the pitman arm (20). However, this design has the big drawback 
that EPS does not use the already available transmission from the input shaft to the output 
shaft of the steering gear to amplify its torque at the pitman arm. Hence, for this steering 
design the required ratio of the overlay gear (13) is significantly higher than for the other 
system designs. A higher required gear ratio not only increases the costs of the overlay gear, 
but also increases its dimensions and its weight. Therefore, this system design is not consid-
ered as a suitable solution in this thesis. 
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5.4 Conclusion on New System Architecture 
Two suitable functional structures (RASS A & RASS B) are developed based on the require-
ment analysis in chapter 4. The item definition according to the developed functional struc-
tures is used as an input for the safety analysis, which results in several safety goals for the 
RASS. These safety goals are used to develop a suitable safety concept and to derive differ-
ent functional safety requirements. 
The final safety requirements as well as the frame requirements, the operational and the 
redundancy requirements serve as a basis for the determination of the specifications of the 
subsystems and components of the RASS. These components are combined into three dif-
ferent suitable system designs, whereas the functionality of RASS A differs from the func-
tionality of the other two system designs (RASS B1 & RASS B2). Each of these system 
architectures represents an innovation, since there is not a single steering system in the SoA 
that meets all the requirements determined in this thesis for AD3+ of trucks. 
RASS B2 is selected as the final system design for the further thesis. It is superior compared 
to the other system designs, since it allows an independent control of the EPS and the AHPS 
and has advantages over the other designs in terms of assembly space. 
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6 State Transitions 
The increased functionality of the new Redundant Active Steering System (RASS) and its 
increased complexity compared to standard steering systems of trucks require a strategy for 
the operation of the RASS. Such a strategy is developed in this chapter. Therefore, all po-
tential states, which are necessary for the intended functionality of the RASS, are first deter-
mined and described. Various indicators are used to determine the current state of the system. 
The operation strategy distinguishes between three types of state transitions on the first level, 
which are transitions of the power steering state, transitions of automation state and transi-
tions caused by system faults. 
6.1 System States 
The RASS and its components require different states to provide the high functionality. The 
operation strategy of the RASS uses several state indicators to identify the currently required 
state for the system and transmits the system to it. All state indicators used by the operation 
strategy are listed in Table 6-1. 
The automation state indicator (𝑎) describes if the vehicle drives manually or automatically 
on the one hand and the behavior of the driver on the other hand. The driver is inactive during 
automated driving and remains inactive until the system requests him to take over. In con-
trast, the driver gets active if he intends to intervene and to override the automated system. 
During manual driving, the driver is obviously active to steer the vehicle. In case the driver 
intends to transmit to automated driving, he sends a hand-over command to the system and 
becomes inactive. 
The different power steering states of the RASS are signaled by the power steering indica-
tor (𝑝). It defines if the electric power steering (EPS) state, the stand-by hybrid state, the 
active hybrid state or the hydraulic power steering state is enabled. The first three power 
steering states are operational states, whereas the hydraulic power steering state is only ac-
tivated, in case of a fault of the EPS. 
This EPS fault as well as a fault of the active valve are displayed by the fault state indica-
tor (𝑓). The strategy differs between errors and failures. In the event of an error, the affected 
system delivers an incorrect functionality, whereas it has no functionality in case of a failure. 
Hence, a deactivation of the affected system is required only in case of an error. 
The transition progress indicator (𝑡𝑝) observes the progress of the state transition process. It 
may be the case that an intended state transition is not possible, e.g. due to non-fulfilled 
transition conditions. Another possibility is that a transition is not completed successfully, 
because a system fault occurs during the transition process, whereby the transition is not 
possible anymore and fails. The transition progress indicator shows if the transition process 
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is not possible, still in progress, completed or failed. The state transition process is shown in 
Figure 6-1 for a generic state transition. 
 
Figure 6-1: Process of a generic state switch 
In the event of a system fault during AD3+, when no driver is available to take over the 
control, the RASS enables the vehicle to drive into a defined safe state. The safe state indi-
cator (𝑠) signals the RASS whether the vehicle is already in a safe state or not. 
Irrespective of the level of automation, the RASS issues a take-over request to the driver 
when a fault occurs. The take-over request indicator (𝑡𝑜𝑟) displays whether a take-over is 
requested by the system and in case it is, for how long it is already requested. This period is 
important in the event that the driver does not comply with the ToR. If the driver does not 
comply with the ToR within a defined period, the vehicle transfers itself into a safe state as 
long as the RASS is still operational. 
The last two indicators, the vehicle’s velocity indicator (𝑣) and the steering torque indicator 
(𝑚), are decisive for the selection of the power steering state of the RASS. To increase the 
efficiency of the RASS and to decrease its hydraulic losses, it intends to perform as many 
driving situations in EPS state as possible. Because the steering torque requirements are at-
tainable for all driving situations above a defined velocity of the vehicle, the HPS is not 
required here and is disabled. Below this velocity threshold, the RASS enables the HPS, but 
only uses it in the event the EPS maximum steering torque is not sufficient for the required 
torque. For this purpose, the vehicle’s velocity indicator (𝑣) shows whether the velocity is 
below or above the threshold (𝑣Switch) and the steering torque indicator (𝑚) displays whether 
the EPS maximum torque is sufficient for the required steering torque or not. 
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Table 6-1: System state indicators 
Indicator Value Description 
Automation state indicator 
𝑎 0 Driver active, manual driving 
𝑎 1 Driver inactive, hand-over command, manual driving to automated driving 
(intended by the driver) 
𝑎 2 Driver active, intervention, automated driving to manual driving 
(intended by the driver) 
𝑎 3 Driver inactive, take-over request, automated driving to manual driving 
(intended by the system) 
𝑎 4 Driver inactive, automated driving 
Power steering state indicator 
𝑝 0 Electric power steering state 
𝑝 1 stand-by hybrid state 
𝑝 2 active hybrid state 
𝑝 3 Hydraulic power steering state 
Fault state indicator 
𝑓 0 No fault 
𝑓 1 EPS failure, EPS deactivated 
𝑓 2 Active valve failure, Active valve deactivated 
𝑓 3 EPS error 
𝑓 4 Active valve error 
Transition progress indicator 
𝑡𝑝 0 State transition not possible 
𝑡𝑝 1 State transition in progress 
𝑡𝑝 2 State transition completed 
𝑡𝑝 3 State transition failed 
Safe state indicator 
𝑠 0 Vehicle not in safe state 
𝑠 1 Vehicle in safe state 
Take-over-request indicator 
𝑡𝑜𝑟 0 No take-over request 
𝑡𝑜𝑟 1 Take-over request for less than x seconds 
𝑡𝑜𝑟 2 Take-over request for more than x seconds 
Steering torque indicator 
𝑚 1 𝑀PS ≤ 𝑀EPS,max  
𝑚 2 𝑀PS > 𝑀EPS,max  
Vehicle’s velocity indicator 
𝑣 1 𝑣V < 𝑣Switch  
𝑣 2 𝑣V > 𝑣Switch  
 
The main states of the RASS and their indicators are illustrated in Figure 6-2. The composi-
tion of the torque at the pitman arm (𝑀P), the driver’s torque at the steering wheel (𝑀H) as 
well as the torque (𝑀AHPS), volume flow (𝑄PSP) and active valve angle (𝜑AV) of the AHPS 
are defined for each state as well. 
The four operational states of the RASS are the combinations of manual driving and auto-
mated driving with EPS state and hybrid state. As long as the system is operated correctly, 
it is in one of these four states. The other four states are only relevant in the event of a fault 
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inside the RASS. The target state is determined based on the type of fault and the state in 
which the RASS is at the time the fault occurs. 
The processes of the transition of the power steering states, of the automation states and the 
transitions caused by faults are described in the following subchapters in detail. 
 
Figure 6-2: Main states of RASS 
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6.2 Power Steering States 
The transitions of the power steering states are described first, since the power steering state 
is independent of the automation state, but not vice versa. Starting with the description of 
the intended functionality of each power steering state and the conditions for a transition 
between the states, this subchapter concludes with the implementation of the different power 
steering states in the system and component design. 
6.2.1 Intended Functionality 
The base for the determination of the power steering state is shown in Figure 6-3. The start-
ing point for determining the required power steering torque at the pitman arm (𝑀P) is, on 
the one hand, the steering wheel torque of the driver (𝑀H) and, on the other hand, the current 
vehicle velocity (𝑣V). The required torque at the pitman arm (𝑀P) is the sum of the torque 
required by the automated driving system (𝑀AD) and the servo steering torque (𝑀Servo), 
which is defined by the servo characteristic based on the driver’s input torque and the veloc-
ity. 
 
Figure 6-3: Base for the determination of the power steering state 
The goal of the different power steering states and their transitions, which both are shown in 
Figure 6-4, is to increase the efficiency of the RASS by decreasing its hydraulic losses com-
pared to a standard truck HPS. This is achieved by a reduced and demand-oriented use of 
the HPS. Since the required steering torques in the high velocity range above a defined ve-
locity threshold (𝑣Switch) do not exceed the maximum torque of the EPS, it is permissible to 
deactivate the HPS by reducing the hydraulic volume flow (𝑄vPSP) to zero and steer solely 
electrically. This prevents hydraulic losses in the steering system. Only potential losses in 
the power steering pump remain. This state is called EPS state (𝑝 = 0). 
Below this velocity threshold (𝑣Switch), it is possible that steering torques are required which 
the EPS cannot deliver. In that case, the HPS provides the missing torque. However, during 
most of the driving maneuvers in the lower velocity range, the maximum EPS torque is 
sufficient. In order to use this efficiency potential, sole electric steering is intended in these 
situations as well. Because high required torque peaks can occur in this velocity range at 
very short notice at any time, it is necessary to have the HPS constantly ready (stand-by) for 
operation to support the EPS. A deactivation of the HPS is not possible, but it could be 
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disabled by keeping the active valve in center position (𝜑AV =  0). This state is called stand-
by hybrid state (𝑝 = 0), whereas it is called active hybrid state (𝑝 = 2) if the HPS supports 
the EPS. A way to turn off the hydraulics in the stand-by hybrid state is developed and 
described in the following section. 
In order to avoid constant changes between the EPS state and the hybrid state, a hysteresis 
is implemented in the system by making the velocity threshold variable. If the RASS is in 
EPS state, the threshold is set to a lower value (𝑣Switch,low) and to an upper value 
(𝑣Switch,high) as soon as it transfers to the hybrid state. 
The RASS is also suitable for a solely HPS state (𝑝 = 3). Because this state does not lead to 
an increase in efficiency compared to a standard HPS, it is only used as a fallback state in 
the event of an EPS fault. Reversely, the EPS is used as a fallback state for an HPS fault. 
 
Figure 6-4: Intended power steering states 
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6.2.2 Implementation in System Design 
The intended electric power steering state is easy to implement into the system design of the 
RASS. This state does not directly affect the system design, but it requires a variable power 
steering pump (vPSP) with an adjustable volume flow, as already available on the market 
today134. As explained before, the EPS State is selected in the velocity range above the 
threshold (𝑣Switch), where the maximum torque of the EPS is sufficient for all required steer-
ing torques. Hence, the HPS is deactivated by reducing the volume flow of the vPSP (𝑄vPSP) 
to zero as shown in Figure 6-5, whereby the hydraulic losses are minimized. The EPS serves 
the required steering torque completely. 
Below the defined velocity threshold, the RASS is in hybrid state and the PSP is enabled. 
Since the potentially required steering torque increases with decreasing driving velocity, the 
volume flow that directly influences the torque of the HPS is increased with decreasing ve-
locity as well. Exemplary characteristics of the volume flow of the PSP over the vehicle’s 
velocity are shown in Figure 6-5. 
 
Figure 6-5: Variable volume flow of PSP 
The implementation of the hybrid state in the system design, especially of the intended stand-
by hybrid state requires an innovative approach. Figure 6-6 illustrates this approach for man-
ual driving. Decisive for the desired functionality is a rotary slide valve, which can be actu-
ated not only by the twist of the torsion bar by the driver, but also by a valve sleeve rotatable 
by a modulation actuator. By tracking the torsion of the torsion bar with the adjustable valve 
sleeve, it is possible to keep the valve in center position during the stand-by hybrid state as 
long as the maximum EPS torque is sufficient for the required steering torque (𝑀req). In this 
state, the torsion angle of the sleeve (𝜑VS) is equal to that of the torsion bar (𝜑VTB), whereby 
the resulting angle of the active valve (𝜑AV) remains zero. The required steering torque at 
the pitman arm (𝑀P) is served solely by the EPS torque (𝑀EPS), besides by the torque of the 
                                                 
134 Lauth, H. J. et al.: Needs based controllable pumps (2002), pp. 110–111. 
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driver at the steering wheel (𝑀H). The torque of the active HPS (𝑀AHPS) is zero. This reduces 
hydraulic losses even while the pump is running.135 
The active hybrid state is enabled as soon as the torque required at the pitman arm exceeds 
the maximum torque of the EPS. The valve sleeve is turned back so that the active valve is 
opened and the AHPS generates the missing torque. An exact knowledge of the valve char-
acteristics and an exact and fast control of the valve sleeve are necessary in this case so that 
the transition from stand-by hybrid state to active hybrid state and vice versa is controlled in 
such a way that the driver does not recognize any of this in the steering feel. However, the 
continuous hydraulic volume flow through the valve even in center position during the stand-
by hybrid state does not cause any steps in the steering torque and thus supports a smooth 
steering feel. If the required steering torque (𝑀req) exceeds the available power steering 
torque, the difference must be applied by the driver through additional torque at the steering 
wheel (𝑀H). As a result, the active valve continues to rotate at very high required torques 
without generating additional servo torque. 
 
Figure 6-6: Hybrid state in manual driving with required steering torque (𝑀req), steering torque at 
pitman arm (𝑀P) and valve angles (𝜑) 
                                                 
135 This approach can save up to 712 W of hydraulic power losses at static torque. The proof is attached in the 
appendix A.5. 
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The hybrid state for automated driving is shown in Figure 6-7. In contrast to manual driving, 
the torsion bar of the active valve is not twisted here because the driver does not apply torque 
to the steering wheel (𝑀H = 0) during automated driving. This facilitates the implementation 
of the stand-by hybrid state, as the torsion bar (𝜑VTB), the sleeve (𝜑VS) and thus the overall 
valve (𝜑AV) all remain in center position without tracking. The required torque (𝑀req) is also 
served solely electrically by the EPS. 
If this torque is not sufficient anymore, the active valve is opened by turning the valve sleeve 
to generate the additionally required steering torque. To achieve the same valve angle (𝜑AV) 
as by the driver in manual mode, the sleeve (𝜑VS) is rotated by the same amount as the 
torsion bar (𝜑VTB) in manual mode in the opposite direction. 
By the adjustable sleeve of the active valve and by the tracking of the sleeve during manual 
driving, it is possible to reduce the hydraulic losses not only in EPS state, but also in stand-
by hybrid state. 
 
Figure 6-7: Hybrid state in automated driving with required steering torque (𝑀req), steering torque 
at pitman arm (𝑀P) and valve angles (𝜑) 
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6.3 Transitions of Automation State 
Besides the two automation states manual driving and automated driving136, there are three 
different types of transitions between these automation states. Table 6-1 already introduced 
the state indicators for those states and transitions. The three types of transitions are the hand-
over from manual driving to automated driving, the take-over by the driver from the auto-
mated driving and the driver intervention in the automated driving. The following section 
describes the intended functionality of the RASS concerning these transitions and discusses 
the focus on the implementation of the driver intervention. Its implementation in the system 
design is developed afterwards. 
6.3.1 Intended Functionality 
The operation strategy of the RASS differs in two automation states and three types of tran-
sitions between them. Figure 6-8 shows the corresponding intended functionality of the 
RASS, which is independent of the previously described power steering state. 
 
Figure 6-8: Intended functionality for transitions between MD and AD 
                                                 
136 The focus in this thesis is on AD3+. 
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In manual driving state (𝑎 = 0), the driver controls the steering system and is assisted by the 
EPS or by both EPS and HPS, whereas the driver is inactive during automated driving state 
(𝑎 = 4) and the steering is automatically controlled, either solely by the EPS or hybrid by 
the EPS and the AHPS. The exact function for both the manual driving and the automated 
driving is described in the previous subchapter on power steering. 
In this thesis, the term hand-over describes the transition from manual driving to automated 
driving. This is the simplest of the three transitions, as the driver has to initiate it consciously, 
which means that he is aware of the situation. When the driver starts the transition process 
in manual driving state (𝑎 == 0), the automation state indicator jumps to (𝑎 == 1) and the 
system checks whether the conditions for a hand-over are fulfilled. If the driver applies no 
torque at the steering wheel (𝑀H == 0), the active valve is in center position (𝜑AV == 0), 
the driver has his/her hands off the steering wheel and no fault occurs (𝑓 == 0), the condi-
tions for the hand-over are fulfilled. As soon as the transition process is completed (𝑡𝑝 ==
2), the RASS is in automated driving state (𝑎 == 4). 
The first type of transition from automated driving state to manual driving state is the tran-
sition intended by the automated system, e.g. because the system reaches its limits. This 
transition is called take-over in this thesis. If the automated system is no longer able to safely 
control the vehicle, it requests the driver to take over the control (𝑎 == 3). During AD3+, 
this happens with a certain lead time, so that the driver has enough time to become aware of 
the situation again in order to safely take over control. The transition to manual driving state 
is carried out when the hands-on condition for a take-over is fulfilled. The amount of time 
that the driver has to take over the control has been investigated in various publications and 
varies from five seconds137,138 to 15 seconds139. The steering torque generated independently 
of the driver is reduced to zero as soon as the driver has taken over the control. 
The second type of transition from automated driving state to manual driving state is called 
driver intervention, because it is not intended by the automated system but by the driver. 
This transition occurs, for example, if the automated system makes an incorrect steering 
input and the driver wants to correct it. Thereby, the Vienna’s convention on road traffic also 
requires the driver to have control over the vehicle at all times. 140 This is only guaranteed if 
the driver can switch off the automated system and switch to manual driving state by inter-
vening. However, it is not practicable to make an immediate transition in case the driver’s 
intervention is very subtle. 
                                                 
137 Ito, T. et al.: Time Required for Take-over from Automated to Manual Driving (2016), p.6. 
138 Gold, C. et al.: Take over (2013), p.1940. 
139 Becker, J.; Helmle, M.: Architecture and System Safety Requirements for AD (2015), p.42. 
140 United Nations: Convention on Road Traffic (1968), p.11. 
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On the one hand, it should be avoided that the driver unintentionally interferes the automated 
steering system, on the other hand it is essential for safety that the take-over time in an emer-
gency situation is as short as possible. The driver interferences on the automated steering are 
avoidable by high torques on the steering wheel that prevent the driver from overriding, and 
by a SbW. Nevertheless, it has to be ensured that the driver is able to intervene directly in 
critical situations and override the system. Both presented options, the high torque solution 
and the SbW solution, create problems to implement this emergency behavior. A new ap-
proach is required.141a 
Since the RASS is no SbW system, the driver interferences are avoided by high steering 
wheel torques. Since an additional device for the input of an intervention request by the 
driver141a is too complicated, not intuitive and probably too slow in a critical situation, the 
approach chosen in this thesis is that the system recognizes an intervention by the driver only 
via his steering wheel input, but avoids unintended interferences. The implementation of this 
intended functionality is described in the section hereafter. 
If the driver initiates the intervention in order to switch to manual driving (𝑎 == 2), the 
system checks the following transition conditions. The steering wheel torque by the driver 
(𝑀H) has to extend the intervention torque threshold (𝑀DI). However, to avoid unintended 
interferences of the driver, the system conducts the transition not immediately as soon as the 
steering wheel torque exceeds the torque threshold. The driver has to apply this amount of 
torque over a defined period of time to intervene the system. The system registers the time 
that the driver’s torque exceeds the torque threshold. If this time exceeds the defined inter-
vention time threshold (𝑡DI), the system conducts the transition. If the driver’s torque exceeds 
the torque threshold for less time than the defined time threshold, no transition happens. 
The detailed abort action of the automated steering is not in focus of this thesis, but it can be 
designed, for example, as a steep decrease, as a slower fade out or a stepwise decrease. A 
complete shutdown of the automated system as soon as the driver intervention is detected 
would be the most effective intervention.141b 
While other publications discuss whether a driver intervention is correct or not, this thesis 
does not address this issue. For the RASS, it is only important to recognize whether the 
driver intervention is intended or not and, if intended, to switch to manual driving state as 
fast as possible. 
6.3.2 Example of Implementation 
The implementation example of the intended functionality concerning the transition of the 
automation state focuses on driver intervention and the associated ability to override the 
                                                 
141 Kalb, L.; Bengler, K.: Controlling Automated Steering (2018), (a) pp. 588–597 | (b) 592–595. 
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automated steering by the driver. The implementation of the previously described new ap-
proach for the driver intervention is illustrated in Figure 6-9. The torque the driver applies 
on the steering wheel (𝑀H) is shown here over the period of time (𝑡) he applies the torque. 
In order to exclude undesired interferences of the driver, but to transfer the control as fast as 
possible in the case of desired interventions by the driver, the torque applied by the driver is 
considered in combination with the application time in order to identify an intended inter-
vention. 
If the driver applies a smaller amount of torque at the steering wheel, he has to apply this for 
a longer period of time so that the operation strategy of the RASS recognizes the intervention 
request. This prevents, for example, the system from transferring to manual driving state due 
to an accidental touching of the steering wheel by the driver. 
However, to guarantee a fast transition to the driver if he strengthens his transition request 
by applying a big amount of steering wheel torque, e.g. because of an emergency evasion 
maneuver, but also guarantee no unintended transitions, the torque threshold (𝑀DI) and the 
time threshold (𝑡DI) are dynamic values depending on each other. By using any mathematical 
relation, the target behavior is that the torque threshold (𝑀DI) decreases with an increasing 
application time of steering wheel torque. For example, this behavior could be achieved by 
an integral of the steering wheel torque over the application time or by a characteristic line 
as shown in Figure 6-9. 
 
Figure 6-9: Driver intervention thresholds with the driver intervention time (𝑡DI) and the driver’s 
torque at the steering wheel (𝑀H) 
In this example, the intervention time threshold is minimum (𝑡DI,min) if the driver applies a 
high amount of steering torque to guarantee a fast transition to manual driving. If the driver 
applies exactly the minimum value of the intervention torque threshold (𝑀DI,min), the inter-
vention time threshold reaches its maximum (𝑡DI,max) before a transition is initiated. The 
characteristic between the two extreme values (𝑡DI,min for 𝑀DI,max & 𝑡DI,max for 𝑀DI,min) 
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has to be monotonously decreasing and can be linear, degressive, or progressive curve. If the 
steering wheel torque of the driver is smaller than the intervention torque threshold or the 
time of application is shorter than the intervention time threshold or both, no transition is 
carried out. 
The implementation of the steering torque generation during the manual driving state and 
during the automated driving state is already described in subchapter 6.2 about the different 
power steering states. 
6.4 Transition to Fallback States 
In addition to the already presented states in fault-free operation, the RASS also has addi-
tional fallback states that represent the system-internal fallback level in the event of a fault. 
This is necessary for AD3+, since per definition the driver is not available as an immediate 
fallback level if a fault occurs. Faults can occur both during manual driving and during au-
tomated driving142. Both cases are considered below. First, the intended functionality is dis-
cussed before the implementation in the system design is explained. 
6.4.1 Intended Functionality 
During manual driving state, the RASS primarily has power steering functionality in addi-
tion to possible comfort functions. Due to the two different power steering system, the RASS 
is able to assist the driver in EPS state or in hybrid state, as described in subchapter 6.2. In 
the event of a fault within one of those systems, the RASS offers an internal fallback level. 
The transition logic that the system follows is shown in Figure 6-10. 
If an error occurs in the EPS (𝑓 == 3) during the EPS state or during the hybrid state, it is 
first deactivated to avoid unmotivated steering actions. The driver is then informed of the 
omitted EPS function and the HPS comes into effect as a power steering fallback level, in 
the same way as in the case of a failure of the EPS (𝑓 == 1). In this case, the HPS is not 
disabled in high velocity ranges for safety reasons, as it would have been in normal opera-
tion. If the active valve shows an error (𝑓 == 4), the erroneous system is also deactivated 
first. Just as in the event of an active valve failure (𝑓 == 2), the driver is informed and the 
RASS transfers to the fallback level. If the active valve is omitted, the EPS always represents 
a fallback level. If, apart from the active valve, the remaining HPS components are func-
tional, the standard HPS also represents a fallback level during manual driving. 
                                                 
142 The focus in this thesis is on AD3+. 
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Figure 6-10: Transitions caused by faults during MD 
During automated driving, the RASS represents the driver-independent steering function. 
The special feature of the new system is the presence of two driver-independent steering 
systems with the EPS and the AHPS, which enable AD3+. This redundancy is required for 
AD3+ because it cannot be assumed that the driver is available as an immediate fallback. In 
case of a fault of one of the active systems, the RASS has to offer an own fallback level. 
Figure 6-11 illustrate the transition logic in case of a fault during AD3+. 
The procedure in the event of an error (𝑓 == 3, 𝑓 == 4) or a failure (𝑓 == 1, 𝑓 == 2) 
during automated driving is the same as for manual driving. The erroneous system is deac-
tivated and the driver is informed in both cases. However, the further transition logic differs 
compared to manual driving. 
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Figure 6-11: Transitions caused by faults during AD3+ 
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Since the driver is not available as an immediate fallback during AD3+, the system transfers 
directly to the AHPS state as fallback if an EPS fault has been detected and to the EPS as 
fallback if the AHPS has a fault. In both cases, the RASS sends a take-over request to the 
driver (𝑡𝑜𝑟 == 1), as the redundancy required for AD3+ is no longer given due to the omis-
sion of one active system. 
The time required by the driver to take over the steering task safely varies between five 
seconds and more than ten seconds, as indicated in the literature.143 This time should at least 
be given to the driver to take over the control. However, if the driver does not react after a 
longer period to be still defined (𝑡𝑜𝑟 == 2), the RASS automatically transfers the vehicle 
into a defined safe state (𝑠 == 1). The safe states and the steering requirements the fallback 
systems have to fulfill for a safe transfer to them are defined in subchapter 4.4. If the driver 
reacts within this period, the RASS transfers to manual driving (𝑎 == 0) with the corre-
sponding power steering state. 
6.4.2 Implementation in System Design 
The transitions caused by an error and resulting shutdown of the EPS are independent of the 
current automation state. Since the AHPS is already enabled during hybrid state, if the EPS 
is omitted only an adjustment of the sleeve of the active valve is necessary in order to com-
pose the missing steering torque. During the EPS state, the omission of the EPS is not un-
critical because here the AHPS is deactivated and the PSP does not stand-by with pumping 
hydraulic fluid. In order for the AHPS to serve as a fallback for the EPS, the PSP has to build 
up hydraulic volume flow and pressure first. Since modern PSP build up their maximum 
volume flow within 30 milliseconds, this start-up time affects the steering feel, but it is not 
critical for safety.144 
An error or failure of the AHPS while the RASS is in EPS state does not cause a transition 
directly. However, the RASS informs the driver and transfers the vehicle into a safe state if 
the driver does not react to a take-over request. If the function of the AHPS is omitted due 
to an error or failure of the active valve during hybrid state, the transition to the fallback 
level depends on the valve position at the time of the failure. If the active valve fails in center 
position, the AHPS generates no torque and the EPS can easily jump in as a fallback. In 
contrast, if the active valve fails out of center position, the AHPS constantly produces steer-
ing torque. In this case, there are three different ways to safely transfer the RASS to its 
fallback level. 
The first option is to implement a mechanism that returns the active valve into its center 
position in the event of a failure of the valve actuator without any external energy required. 
A torsion spring is a way of turning the valve back to the center position in the event of a 
                                                 
143 Gold, C.; Huesmann, A.: Controllability of highly automated vehicle guidance (2017), p.50. 
144 Lauth, H. J. et al.: Needs based controllable pumps (2002), p.102. 
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fault, but it requires increased power during correct operation. This drawback excludes this 
option as a solution. 
Reducing the volume flow of the PSP to zero is the second option to evade an off-centered 
failure of the active valve. If there is no hydraulic pressure and no volume flow, an open 
active valve causes no steering torque. Thus, only the EPS generates steering torque as 
fallback. Drawbacks of this option are that if the PSP is deactivated, the HPS can no longer 
be used by the driver in manual driving state and that it is only possible with an intact elec-
trical power supply, as the PSP delivers full volume flow in the currentless state for safety 
reasons. 
The third option is designed for a currentless state with an off-centered failed active valve. 
In this case, the active valve must be designed so that the driver is able to override the valve 
sleeve even if its torsion angle is maximum. This design is described in section 7.2.2. 
6.5 Conclusion of State Transitions 
The previous chapter describes the potential states of the RASS, which are mainly the power 
steering states, the automation states, and the fallback states. Several state indicators are 
defined, which are used by the operation strategy of the RASS to determine the current sys-
tem state and to perform necessary state transitions. 
The power steering can switch to three different states in order to increase the efficiency of 
the RASS. The tracking of the valve sleeve represents a novel solution to reduce the hydrau-
lic losses even while the PSP is running. This solution requires a special valve design, which 
is described in the following chapter. 
On the one hand, the transition from the manual driving state to the automated driving state 
is defined as hand-over and it is only conducted if the driver intends it and all conditions for 
a safe hand-over are fulfilled. On the other hand, two different transitions are distinguished 
for the switch from automated driving state to manual driving state. If the automated driving 
system exceeds its limits and is not able to control the vehicle safely without the driver, it 
sends a take-over request to the driver. In contrast, if the driver wants to override the auto-
mated system without its intention, it is called driver intervention. An approach with dy-
namic intervention torque and time thresholds distinguishes an intended driver intervention 
from an unintended driver interference. 
In addition, the RASS is intended to be able to perform the power steering task in manual 
driving state as well as the automated steering task in the automated state in two different 
ways. Therefore, it provides fallback states for each potential fault in each combination of 
power steering state and automation state. The transition of the vehicle to a defined safe state 
and the driver’s ability to override the automated steering system even in case of any poten-
tial fault are guaranteed by fallback logics of the RASS and the design of the crucial com-
ponents. The latter are developed and described in the following. 
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7 Design Specifications of Components 
In the last step of this thesis, the design specifications of the two active steering systems of 
the RASS and their components are developed based on all previous findings. Therefore, the 
requirements for the EPS including the electrical power supply are further specified first and, 
based on these, an initial constructive design is developed. In addition, the specifications for 
the AHPS are derived with a special focus on the active valve. This is specially designed for 
the tracking mechanism of the valve sleeve and the driver’s ability to override the system. 
7.1 Electric Power Steering 
The electric power steering (EPS) consist of the electric motor (EM), which is connected at 
the lower end of the input shaft of the steering gear by an overlay gear (OG) and is controlled 
by the ECU. It also includes the redundant electric power supply, which supplies not only 
the EPS with electric power, but also all other components of the RASS. 
The requirements for the electric power steering are derived directly from the redundancy 
requirements. The maximum steering torque that the EPS generates at the pitman arm 
(𝑀EPS,max) is defined by the maximum required fallback torque (𝑀RR) in equation (7-1). The 
maximum power of the EPS (𝑃EPS,max) is also determined by the maximum required fallback 
power (𝑃RR) in equation (7-2)  
 𝑀EPS,max = 𝑀RR = 3,000 Nm (7-1) 
 𝑃EPS,max = 𝑃RR = 600 W (7-2) 
7.1.1 Redundant Electric Power Supply 
The redundant electric power supply is responsible for a safe energy supply of all compo-
nents of the RASS, specifically for providing the energy for the EPS.  
The maximum required fallback steering power (𝑃RR) and the voltage of the vehicle power 
network (𝑈) set the minimum required current from the generator in equation (7-3) to 25 A. 
This is required in addition to the current of a standard truck generator with 80 A. A gener-
ator with a maximum current of 110 A covers the additional demand. 
 𝐼EPS =
𝑃RR
𝑈
=
600 W
24 V
= 25 A (7-3) 
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The batteries are designed redundantly, to ensure the power supply even in the event of a 
failure of the generator and one of the two batteries. The minimum capacity (𝐶min) of 160 Ah 
of each battery is defined in equation (7-4) by the voltage of the power network and the 
maximum required fallback steering energy (𝐸RR) in Table 4-9 to guarantee enough electric 
power supply to reach a safe state in case of a fault of the generator and one battery.  
 𝐶min =
𝐸RR
𝑈
=
3,800 J
24 V
= 158. 3̅ Ah ≈ 160 Ah (7-4) 
The specifications of the components of the redundant electric power supply are listed in 
Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1: Specifications of components of redundant electric power supply 
ID Component Specifications 
5 Redundant electric power supply - 
6 Generator 𝑈 = 24 V, 𝐼m𝑎𝑥 = 110 A  
7 Battery isolator - 
8 Battery 1 𝑈 = 24 V, 𝑄min = 160 Ah  
9 Battery 2 𝑈 = 24 V, 𝑄min = 160 Ah  
10 Diode - 
7.1.2 Electric Motor 
The voltage of the direct current vehicle power network (𝑈) sets the voltage of the electric 
motor to 24 V. Due to the higher power density and better efficiency compared to asynchro-
nous motors, a brushless direct current (BLDC) motor is used. This allows higher power and 
torque to be generated with the same dimensions. In addition, BLDC are very precise and 
dynamically controllable. 145 
A potential choice for an electric motor has a nominal power (𝑃EM,n) of 701 W and a maxi-
mum torque (𝑀EM,max) of 6.45 Nm.
146 Hence, the motor fulfills the fallback power require-
ment. The maximum torque of the EPS at the pitman arm (𝑀EPS,max) depends on the ratio 
of the overlay gear (𝑖EM2H). 
  
                                                 
145 Gaedke, A. et al.: Electric Power Steering Systems (2017), p.422. 
146 Data sheet of electric motor is attached in appendix A.4. 
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7.1.3 Torque Overlay Gear 
The gear ratio of the overlay gear from the electric motor to the input shaft of the steering 
gear (𝑖EM2H) is set so that the maximum output torque of the electric motor (𝑀EM,max) is 
sufficient to generate the required torque at the pitman arm (𝑀EPS,max). Since the torque of 
the EM is also transferred by the RCB from the input shaft to the pitman arm, this ratio (𝑖H2P) 
has to be considered as well. Equation (7-5) calculates the required ratio of the overlay gear 
of the EPS: 
 
𝑖EM2H =
𝑀EPS,max
𝑀EM,max ∙ 𝑖H2P
=
3,000 Nm
6.45 Nm ∙ 24
≈ 19.4 (7-5) 
This high required transmission ratio is fulfilled, for example, by a two-stage planetary gear, 
as shown in Figure 7-1. The gear is flanged coaxially under the steering gear to the input 
shaft. The electric motor is also mounted coaxially under the steering gear to the housing of 
the steering gear via the housing of the gear unit. The right side of Figure 7-1 shows the 
installation position. Between the overlay gear and the steering gear is a flange in which the 
oil return of the HPS to the tank is integrated. 
 
Figure 7-1: Exploded view of overlay gear (left), installation position of EPS (right) 
Table 7-2 lists the defined specifications of the components of the electric power steer-
ing (EPS). An additional requirement of the overlay gear not specified here is the lowest 
possible backlash in order to guarantee backlash-free steering. 
Table 7-2; Specifications of components of EPS 
ID Component Specifications 
11 Electric power steering (EPS) 
𝑀EPS,max = 3,000 Nm147  
𝑃EPS,max = 600 W  
12 Electric motor 
𝑈 = 24 V, DC 
𝑀EM,max = 6.45 Nm  
13 Overlay gear 𝑖EM2H = 20  
14 Electronic control unit (ECU) 1 - 
                                                 
147 Torque generated at pitman arm 
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7.2 Active Hydraulic Power Steering 
Like standard HPS, the active hydraulic power steering (AHPS) also consists of a hydraulic 
cylinder integrated in the RCB steering gear, a hydraulic valve, a variable power steering 
pump (vPSP) and a tank for the hydraulic fluid. In contrast to the standard system, however, 
the AHPS is controllable actively and independently of the driver by the active valve. The 
ECU controls the active valve and the adjustable PSP. 
The maximum steering torque the AHPS generates at the pitman arm (𝑀AHPS,max) results 
from the difference between the maximum required operational torque (𝑀OS) and the maxi-
mum torque of the EPS at the pitman arm (𝑀EPS,max) in equation (7-6). The same approach 
is used to determine the maximum power of the AHPS (𝑃AHPS,max) in equation (7-7). The 
torque is referred to the pitman arm. 
 𝑀AHPS,max = 𝑀OS −𝑀EPS,max = 8,500 Nm − 3,000 Nm = 5,500 Nm (7-6) 
 𝑃AHPS,max = 𝑃OS − 𝑃EPS,max = 3,500 W − 600 W = 2,900 W (7-7) 
7.2.1 Hydraulic Piston & Adjustable Power Steering Pump 
The hydraulic piston and the vPSP are standard HPS parts. However, by the summation of 
the output torques and power of the EPS and the AHPS, they can be designed smaller and 
less powerful compared to a standard HPS with the same operational requirements as the 
RASS. The specifications of both components depend strongly on each other. The size of 
the piston area has a direct influence on the vPSP requirements. 
Based on the required maximum torque of the AHPS (𝑀AHPS,max) and angular velocity at 
the pitman arm (?̇?P,max), the required hydraulic force at the piston (𝐹Piston,max) and the pis-
ton’s maximum velocity (𝑣Piston,max) are calculated using the piston area (𝐴Piston) in equa-
tion (7-8) and (7-9). Based on these, the required maximum pressure (𝑝vPSP,max) and maxi-
mum volume flow (𝑄vPSP,max) of the PSP are derived in equation (7-10) and (7-11). 
 𝐹Piston,max =
𝑀AHPS,max
𝑖Piston2P
=
5,500 Nm
0.05
m
 ad
= 1.1 ∙ 105 N (7-8) 
 
𝑣Piston,max = ?̇?P,max ∙ 𝑖Piston2P = 0.87
 ad
s
∙ 0.05
m
 ad
= 4.36 ∙ 10−2
m
s
 (7-9) 
 
𝑝vPSP,max =
𝐹Piston,max
𝐴Piston
=
1.1 ∙ 105 Nm
7.3 ∙ 10−3m2
= 150 ∙ 105
N
m2
 (7-10) 
 
𝑄vPSP,max = 𝑣Piston,max ∙ 𝐴Piston = 4.36 ∙ 10
−2
m
s
∙ 7.3 ∙ 10−3m2 = 25
l
min
 (7-11) 
7 Design Specifications of Components 
110 
7.2.2 Active Valve 
The central and new element of the AHPS is the active valve (AV). It enables the AHPS to 
control the steering torque independently of the driver input. Figure 7-2 illustrates a potential 
valve design, which is suitable for the described intended functionality. The components of 
this active valve design are listed in Table 7-3. The active valve is designed as a rotary slide 
valve with a valve sleeve adjustable by an integrated actuator. 
Table 7-3: Components of the active valve 
 
 
The input shaft (22), the output shaft (23), the torsion bar (24) and the valve shaft (25) are 
almost equivalent to those of a standard rotary slide valve. The valve shaft (25) is fixed to 
the input shaft (22), which in turn is mechanically connected to the output shaft (23) via the 
torsion bar (24) but can be rotated relative to it. This torsion angle of the torsion bar (𝜑VTB) 
describes the torsion angle of the valve shaft relative to the output shaft and is induced by 
the driver’s torque at the steering wheel, whereby the driver controls the valve. The new 
active adjustment mechanism consists of the adjustable valve sleeve (26), an angle overlay 
gear (27) and an electric motor (28) as actuator. The rotation of the valve sleeve (𝜑VS) rela-
tive to the output shaft can be generated by the motor via the angle overlay gear. Thereby, 
the active valve is controllable independently of the driver by the electric motor, which itself 
is controlled by the ECU. In order to guarantee the ability of the driver to override the active 
valve, several mechanical stops are integrated in the valve design to limit the rotation angle 
ID Name 
22 Input shaft 
23 Output shaft 
24 Torsion bar 
25 Valve shaft 
26 Valve sleeve 
27 Angle overlay gear 
28 Electric motor 
29 Limiter rotation angle between valve shaft & valve sleeve 
30 Limiter rotation angle between output shaft & valve sleeve 
31 Limiter rotation angle between valve shaft & output shaft 
32 Valve housing 
33 Input throttle chamber A 
34 Input throttle chamber B 
35 Output throttle chamber A 
36 Output throttle chamber B 
37 Hydraulic Cylinder 
38 Hydraulic Piston 
39 Absolute Pressure Senor 1 
40 Absolute Pressure Senor 2 
41 Relative Pressure Senor 
P Hydraulic channel from power steering pump 
A Hydraulic channel to chamber A of hydraulic steering gear 
B Hydraulic channel to chamber B of hydraulic steering gear 
T Hydraulic channel to hydraulic tank 
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between the valve shaft and the valve sleeve (29), the rotation angle between the output shaft 
and the valve sleeve (30) and the rotation angle between the valve shaft and the output 
shaft (31). The valve housing (32) is also specially designed considering the integration of 
the angle overlay gear and the electric motor on the one hand, and the sealing of the high 
hydraulic pressure at the adjustable valve on the other hand. The design of the housing cover 
of a standard HPS was used as a basis, in which the housing of a standard valve is integrated. 
 
Figure 7-2: Conceptual design of active valve 
In addition to the driver-independent control of the hydraulic steering torque, the active valve 
also functions in hybrid state to keep the valve in center position by tracking the valve sleeve 
as long as the EPS is sufficient for the required steering torque to reduce hydraulic losses. 
Furthermore, a mechanism is integrated into the active valve, which ensures that the driver 
can override the active valve and thus the hydraulic torque generated independently of the 
driver at any time. Both functions and mechanisms are described hereafter. 
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7.2.2.1 Tracking of Valve Sleeve 
The tracking function of the RASS and its potential for energy saving148 are already de-
scribed in subchapter 6.2. The implementation and consequences on the valve design are 
explained here. Therefore, three different valve states are defined in Figure 7-3. The neutral 
state (a) in which no steering torque is generated, the stand-by hybrid state (b) in which the 
driver is only supported the EPS and the active hybrid state in which both EPS and AHPS 
support the driver are shown. The torque distribution and the valve angles are defined here 
for the hybrid state. The opening angle of the active valve (𝜑AV) is defined in equation (7-12) 
by the torsion angle of the torsion bar (𝜑VTB) and the rotation angle of the valve sleeve (𝜑VS). 
 𝜑AV = 𝜑VTB − 𝜑VS (7-12) 
 
Figure 7-3: Hybrid state, a) neutral state, b) stand-by. c) active with steering wheel torque (𝑀H), 
steering torque at pitman arm (𝑀P) and valve angles (𝜑) 
The valve states corresponding to the three states marked in Figure 7-3 are shown in Figure 
7-4. All elements of the active valve are not rotated and in center position in the neutral state 
(a) and there is also no driver torque at the steering wheel, thus no steering torque is applied 
at the pitman arm. If the driver applies torque at the steering wheel, the torsion bar is twisted. 
                                                 
148 This approach can save up to 712 W of hydraulic power losses at static torque. The proof is attached in the 
appendix A.5. 
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During stand-by hybrid state (b), the maximum EPS torque is sufficient to generate the re-
quired pitman arm torque. Hence, the valve sleeve is rotated by the same angle as the torsion 
bar to keep the valve effectively in center position and thus to reduce the hydraulic losses. 
The resulting torque at the pitman arm (𝑀P) is the sum of the driver’s torque (𝑀H) and the 
torque of the EPS (𝑀EPS). The AHPS applies no torque (𝑀AHPS). If the RASS switches to 
active hybrid state (c), the valve sleeve is rotated back to neutral position, whereby the active 
valve is effectively opened. The AHPS supports the driver and the EPS with torque (𝑀AHPS). 
 
Figure 7-4: Valve states, a) neutral state, b) stand-by. c) active 
By this mechanism implemented in the active valve, the hydraulic losses are reduced not 
only in EPS state, when the PSP is deactivated, but also in hybrid state with an active PSP 
as long as the EPS torque is still sufficient. However, as soon as the EPS cannot produce the 
required pitman arm torque, the AHPS generates the missing extended steering torque. The 
dynamics of the AHPS activation depends on the dynamics of the adjustment of the sleeve 
of the active valve. 
7.2.2.2 Driver’s Ability to Override the Active Valve 
The second new function implemented in the new active valve design is the ability of the 
driver to override it. Therefore, different mechanical stops are integrated inside the active 
valve to limit the rotation angles between different parts of the active valve. Figure 7-5 il-
lustrates the mechanical stops inside the valve design. The mechanical stop (29) limits the 
relative rotation angle between the valve shaft (25) and the valve sleeve (26) to a maximum, 
which corresponds to the maximum resulting overall active valve opening angle (𝜑AV). This 
prevents the valve from over-twisting. The second mechanical stop (30) limits the relative 
rotation angle between the output shaft of the valve (25) and the valve sleeve (26) and thus 
the maximum rotation angle of the valve (𝜑AV). In addition, the maximum rotation angle of 
the torsion bar relatively to the valve’s output shaft (23) is limited by the third mechanical 
26
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stop (31), which is also responsible for the transfer of the driver’s steering wheel torque in 
case of a fully twisted torsion bar. This mechanical stop is also integrated into standard steer-
ing valves in order to limit the maximum torsion angle of the torsion bar and to transmit the 
additional torque applied by the driver directly to the valve outlet shaft. 
 
Figure 7-5: Mechanical stops of active valve149 
These three mechanical stops have the function of ensuring that the driver can override the 
active valve, as explained in Figure 7-6. Five different points of the valve characteristic are 
used here to explain how the driver is able to counteract or to amplify the active valve. The 
corresponding valve states are shown in Figure 7-7 and Figure 7-8. The valve state (a) rep-
resents the initial state with a fully rotated valve sleeve (𝜑VS = 𝜑VS,max) and a non rotated 
valve shaft (𝜑VTB = 0). Equation (7-12) defines the resulting valve angle (𝜑AV = -𝜑VS,max). 
If the driver applies torque on the steering wheel against the driver-independent torque, the 
valve shaft (25) is rotated in the same direction as the sleeve (26), reducing the valve opening 
until the valve results in the center position (𝜑AV = 0) in state (b). The resulting torque of 
the AHPS decreases with a decreasing valve opening between state (a) and state (b) as shown 
in the upper part of Figure 7-6. If the driver continues to increase his torque at the steering 
wheel, the rotation angle of the valve shaft exceeds the angle of the valve sleeve 
(𝜑VTB > 𝜑VS), which changes the sign of the generated torque at the pitman arm (𝑀P). The 
counteracting torque at the pitman arm increases until the valve shaft reaches its maximum 
rotation angle (𝜑VTB,max) in state (c), limited by the mechanical stop (31). Due to the me-
chanical stop, a further increase in the driver’s torque does not result in any further opening 
of the valve and thus does not increase the torque of the AHPS. The maximum rotation angle 
of the valve sleeve is limited by the mechanical stop to half of the maximum rotation angle 
                                                 
149 Sectional view of Figure 7-2 
𝜑VS,max
2
4
2
4
C-C D-D
Mechanical stop
VTB - VS
Mechanical stop
VTB – Output shaft
VS – Output shaft
𝜑AV ,max
𝜑VTB ,max
25
26 26
25
23
3029
31
 7.2 Active Hydraulic Power Steering 
  115 
of the valve shaft, as described in equation (7-13), to ensure the driver’s ability to override 
the system.  
 𝜑AV,max = 𝜑VTB,max = 2𝜑VS,max (7-13) 
 
 
Figure 7-6: Overriding the active valve with steering wheel torque (𝑀H), steering torque at pitman 
arm (𝑀P) and valve angles (𝜑) 
Thereby, the driver is able to open the active valve twice as much as the valve sleeve to 
override the automated system at any time. The stiffness of the torsion bar determines the 
torque (𝑀H,OR,min) that the driver needs to apply at least to override the automated system. 
According to ECE R79, this torque must not exceed 12.5 Nm. 
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Figure 7-7: Valve states counteracting by the driver 
The driver is not only able to counteract the AHPS, but also to amplify it. Figure 7-8 shows 
the same initial state (a) as before. By applying additional rectified torque at the steering 
wheel, the driver rotates the valve shaft in the opposite direction to the sleeve and thus opens 
the active valve further. This increases the torque of the AHPS until the valve hits the me-
chanical stop (29) between the valve shaft and the valve sleeve in state (d). The maximum 
opening angle of the active valve corresponds to the negative maximum rotation angle of the 
valve shaft (𝜑AV = −𝜑AV,max = −𝜑VTB,max). The torque generated by the AHPS is maxi-
mum, too. As the angle between the valve shaft and the valve sleeve is at its limit, a further 
increase of the driver’s torque causes a further rotation of the valve shaft, but a turn-back of 
the valve sleeve to the center position (𝜑VS = 0) in state (e). 
 
Figure 7-8: Valve states amplified by the driver  
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7.2.2.3 Sensing of the Valve State 
For the implementation of the described functionality, it is necessary to sense the differential 
pressure (Δ𝑝HPS) inside the hydraulic steering gear, the torsion angle of the valve torsion bar 
(𝜑VTB), the steering wheel torque (𝑀SW), and/or the torsion angle of the active valve (𝜑AV). 
The differential pressure (Δ𝑝HPS) is the most important parameter to know, because it is the 
output value of the active valve, which generates the hydraulic steering assistance. Two pos-
sible sensor setups are described in Figure 7-9. 
Sensor setup 1 on the left side of Figure 7-9 uses two absolute pressure sensors (39, 40) and 
one differential pressure sensor (41). The pressure inside chamber A (𝑝A) is measured by the 
absolute pressure sensor (39) and the pressure inside chamber B (𝑝B) by sensor (40). The 
difference (Δ𝑝HPS) described by (7-14) is measured with the differential pressure sensor (41). 
This sensor setup with three pressure sensors ensures the sensing of the crucial parameter 
(Δ𝑝HPS) redundantly, whereby even in case of a fault of one sensor a correct sensing is guar-
anteed. 
 Δ𝑝HPS = 𝑝A − 𝑝B (7-14) 
The other sensor setup 2 on the right side of Figure 7-9 requires one pressure sensor less. 
The differential pressure sensor (41) is the same as in the first setup. In contrast to setup 1, 
only one absolute pressure sensor (39) is used and measures the output pressure of the power 
steering pump (𝑝PSP) and thereby the pressure in the high-pressure chamber of the hydraulic 
cylinder. The direction of the differential pressure inside the cylinder is determined by the 
differential pressure sensor (41). This setup also guarantees the detection of a fault of one of 
the two sensors, but does not guarantee a safe operation after a sensor fault has occurred. 
The torsion angle of the valve’s torsion bar (𝜑VTB) and the steering wheel torque (𝑀SW) are 
connected by the stiffness of the torsion bar (𝑐VTB) as described by (7-15). Therefore, it is 
sufficient to measure one of these two parameters and to calculate the other.  
 𝑀SW = 𝑐VTB ∙ 𝜑VTB (7-15) 
Beside the measurement of the steering wheel torque (𝑀SW) with a standard torque sensor, 
an innovative possibility is to measure the angle of the torsion bar (𝜑VTB) inside the valve 
and to calculate the steering wheel torque. Thereby, an additional torque sensor is not re-
quired for operation of the steering system, but it is mandatory to use it for redundancy. 
Other sensor setups than these two are possible as well, but not described here. 
7 Design Specifications of Components 
118 
 
Figure 7-9: Valve scheme with sensor setup 1 (left) and sensor setup 2 (right) 
The specifications of the components of the active valve, which are determined in this sec-
tion, are summarized in Table 7-4. 
Table 7-4: Specifications of components of AHPS 
ID Component Specifications 
3 Recirculating ball steering gear 𝐴Piston = 7.3 ∙ 10
−3m2  
15 Active hydraulic power steering (AHPS) 
𝑀HPS,max = 5,500 Nm  
𝑃HPS,max = 2,900 W  
16 Active steering valve with modulator 𝑀OR ≤ 12.5 Nm  
17 Variable power steering pump (vPSP) 
𝑝max = 150 ba   
𝑄max = 25
l
min
  
18 Tank - 
19 ECU 2 - 
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7.3 Conclusion on Design Specifications 
The designs of the two subsystems of the RASS, the electric power steering (EPS) and the 
active hydraulic power steering (AHPS), are specified in more detail in the preceding chap-
ter. The redundancy requirements, determined in subchapter 4.4, are used to define the spec-
ifications of the EPS. The battery capacity of the redundant electric power supply fulfills the 
required fallback energy to be able to reach a safe state in any case. The maximum power 
and torque of the actuator of the EPS, which consist of the electric motor and a torque overlay 
gear, are defined based on the required fallback power and fallback torque. Thereby, in the 
event of a fault of the AHPS, the EPS is still able to steer the vehicle safely and to transfer 
it to a safe state. 
The power and torque specifications of the AHPS are determined to fulfill the lack of power 
and torque between the operational requirements and the fallback requirements. Hence, the 
combination of the EPS and the AHPS fulfills the operational requirements, but both systems 
fulfill the fallback requirements on their own. This approach makes it possible to dimension 
the components of the AHPS smaller than the components of a comparable standard HPS 
and thus to save energy, weight, assembly space and costs. The active valve of the AHPS is 
specially designed for the described tracking mechanism and the ability of the driver to over-
ride the system. The tracking mechanism enables an arbitrary distribution of the required 
steering torque to the EPS and the AHPS, whereby the functionality of the RASS is signifi-
cantly increased compared to the currently available truck steering systems. The transitions 
between the different states of the RASS are implemented using the new innovative func-
tionality and the described operation strategies. In addition, this functionality enables to save 
energy by implementing the newly developed tracking mechanism. The most important fea-
ture of the active valve is the driver’s ability to override it at any time, which is guaranteed 
by the integration of different mechanical stops. 
The design specifications determined in this chapter are the final step for the development 
of the steering system concept for AD3+. These specifications take into account all previ-
ously defined requirements of the RASS and implement the required fail-degraded function-
ality of the steering system for AD3+ of trucks for the first time. In addition, the innovative 
system architecture by combining EPS and AHPS enables the hydraulic components to be 
designed with significantly lower performance specifications than a comparable standard 
HPS, whereby the functionality is significantly increased. 
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8 Final Steering System Concept 
The result of the approach of this thesis is a new innovative redundant active steering system 
for trucks with an increased functionality and efficiency compared to the currently available 
truck steering systems. The developed new system is called RASS and is described in an 
invention disclosure150 which is being patented. Table 8-1 compares the functionality of the 
new RASS with those of the SoA of active steering systems for trucks that are described in 
subchapter 2.4. 
The RASS, like all the SoA systems presented, has a variable steering torque assistance for 
the driver and is able to actively generate steering torque, i.e. independently of the driver. 
Hence, the RASS is suitable for AD2- of trucks just like the other systems. Unlike the other 
steering systems with hydraulic steering assistance, the EPS does not meet the high perfor-
mance requirements of a truck steering system with the existing 24 V power network. 
The new RASS enables an arbitrary distribution of the required steering torque between the 
two existing subsystems EPS and HPS through its innovative system architecture150. In ad-
dition, pure electric steering assistance is possible. This increased functionality is exploited 
by innovative operation strategies for driverless steering and increased system efficiency, 
which are documented in an invention disclosure151 which is applied for patent. 
HPS systems with an active valve only generate the steering power hydraulically and not by 
an electric drive. Their electric drive only controls the active valve to modulate the hydraulic 
steering torque, but does not generate steering torque by its own. Therefore, sole electric 
power steering is not possible with these systems. 
In contrast, the existing hybrid power steering systems are able to generate steering torque 
solely electrically. However, they are not able to distribute the torque requirements to their 
HPS and EPS arbitrarily, because of their system architecture. In these systems, the EPS 
torque is transmitted through the steering valve, which means that the steering valve is not 
controllable independently of the EPS. 
With the help of a variable PSP (vPSP), the new RASS as well as the other hydraulically 
assisted systems are able to reduce the hydraulic losses in driving situations with high ve-
locities, e.g. highway driving. At high velocities, no high steering power is required, thus the 
hydraulic volume flow of the vPSP is reduced, which reduces the hydraulic losses. With the 
new RASS and the current hybrid steering systems, it is even possible to deactivate the pump 
in the high velocity range, in which the power steering is solely electric. 
                                                 
150 Herold, M. et al.: Redundant Active Steering System (2018). 
151 Herold, M.; Winner, H.: Method to control RASS (2019). 
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Table 8-1: Comparison of RASS with SoA 
Functionality EPS152 
HPS with  
active valve 
Hybrid power 
steering 
RASS 
Suitable for trucks with 
24 V power network 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Variable steering torque 
assistance 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Active generation of 
steering torque 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arbitrary distribution of 
torque to EPS and HPS 
- No No Yes 
Pure electric power steering Yes No Yes Yes 
Reduction of hydraulic losses 
during high velocities 
- Yes Yes Yes 
Reduction of hydraulic losses 
during low velocities 
- No No Yes 
Redundancies No No No Diverse 
Suitable for AD2- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Suitable for AD3+ No No No Yes 
 
What is new about the RASS, however, is that the hydraulic losses can also be reduced in 
the low velocity range. Although the EPS alone can cover most of the steering power even 
at low velocities, it is possible that higher steering power is required at any time. Therefore, 
it is not possible to reduce the volume flow of the PSP in the low velocity range, because 
otherwise the required steering power cannot be applied immediately. In order to still be able 
to steer purely electrically in this velocity range and thus reduce the hydraulic losses, the 
new functionality of the RASS to arbitrarily distribute the steering torque between the EPS 
and the HPS is used to develop an innovative operation strategy. By tracking the valve sleeve 
to the torsion of the torsion bar, the valve is kept in center position and thus no hydraulic 
torque is applied as long as the EPS torque is sufficient. While the valve is in center position, 
the differential pressure inside the hydraulic system is low, whereby the hydraulic losses are 
low as well. This tracking mechanism is recorded in an invention disclosure153 which is cur-
rently being filed as a patent. This saves, for example, up to 712 W of hydraulic power loss 
at maximum static moment of the EPS. 154 This functionality is only enabled by the new 
RASS and not by the currently available steering systems. 
The biggest advantage of the RASS over the existing systems is the presence of two active 
systems within the RASS. In combination with the RASS’s redundant power supply and the 
redundant ECU, it fulfills the redundancy required for AD3+ and thus enabled the RASS for 
                                                 
152 A steer by wire system is also a pure electric steering system and thus is not suitable for trucks with 24 V 
power network. 
153 Herold, M.; Winner, H.: Double Controlled Steering Valve (2018). 
154 The proof is attached in the appendix A.5. 
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AD3+.155 These redundancies are all missing in the steering systems of the current SoA, 
whereby none of them is suitable for AD3+. 
In addition to the functional advantages of the new system architecture of the RASS over the 
existing truck steering systems, the strategies developed for the various state changes also 
represent an innovation of this thesis.156 The RASS has two different power steering states 
and two different automation states during fault-free operation. The strategy for the transfer 
of the power steering state selects the states based on the current vehicle speed and the re-
quired power steering torque. During the EPS state, the vPSP is deactivated to reduce the 
hydraulic losses. In stand-by hybrid state, the steering torque is still generated solely by the 
EPS, but the PSP is already activated to support the EPS immediately if the required steering 
torque exceeds its limits. In this case, the RASS switches to the active hybrid state and gen-
erates the steering torque combined by the EPS and AHPS. 
Regardless of the power steering state, the RASS differs between three types of automation 
state transfer. The hand-over described the transition from the manual driving state to the 
automated driving state. When switching from automated driving state to manual driving 
state, a distinction is made between whether the change is intended by the system or by the 
driver. The former is called take-over, since the system requires the driver to take over the 
control as soon as the system exceeds its limits, for example. If the transfer from automated 
driving to manual driving is not desired by the system, but is caused by the driver’s input at 
the steering wheel, this is referred to as driver intervention. In this case, a new approach with 
dynamic thresholds is developed in this thesis for the intervention torque and the minimum 
intervention time by the driver so that, on the one hand, unintended interferences of the driver 
on the automated steering system are prevented and, on the other hand, intentional interven-
tions by the driver immediately lead to the transfer of control.156 
Since the RASS must not only assist the driver or even take over the steering task completely 
in fault-free operation, but also in the event of a fault, strategies are also developed in this 
thesis on how the RASS switches to fallback states in the event of a fault of a subsystem. 
These strategies differ depending on whether the RASS is in the manual driving state or in 
automated driving state when a fault occurs. In manual driving state, the second system of 
the RASS compensates the fault of the other system and supports the driver as power steering 
fallback. The driver is informed about the switch to the fallback state. In the event of a fault 
of one active system during automated driving state, the other active system serves as 
fallback and continues generating steering torque independently of the driver. The system 
informs the driver of the switch into the fallback state and requests him to take over the 
control. If he does not comply with this request within a defined period of time, the RASS 
being in its fallback state transfers the vehicle into a defined safe state.156 
                                                 
155 Herold, M. et al.: Redundant Active Steering System (2018). 
156 Herold, M.; Winner, H.: Method to control RASS (2019). 
 7.3 Conclusion on Design Specifications 
  123 
The EPS and the AHPS subsystems of the RASS concept are elaborated in this thesis to such 
an extent that the specifications of the components, which are crucial for the function and 
the functional safety of the RASS, are defined. The energy capacity of the redundant electric 
power supply and the overall power of the EPS are determined based on the results of the 
analysis of the redundancy requirements. The power of the AHPS is determined by the lack 
of power of the EPS compared to the operational requirements. The active valve is designed 
in order to implement the described tracking functionality on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, to ensure the ability of the driver to override the active valve at any time.157 
                                                 
157 Herold, M.; Winner, H.: Double Controlled Steering Valve (2018). 
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9 Conclusion and Outlook 
This thesis analyses the state of the art and research in the field of steering systems for trucks 
and identifies the significant gaps. Currently, there is no steering system that is suitable for 
highly automated driving (AD3+) of trucks. This is mainly due to the lack of redundancy in 
all known steering systems, which is required in the application of AD3+ to ensure the func-
tional safety. 
At the beginning of this thesis, driving tests and simulations based on these tests are used to 
determine operational and redundancy requirements for the steering system for AD3+ of 
trucks. The latter are the fallback requirements the steering system has to fulfill even in case 
of a fault inside the steering system to ensure a safe steering functionality. The investigations 
have shown that there is no need for a fully fail-operational steering system design for the 
AD3+ use case, but a fail-degraded design is sufficient. This means that in the event of a 
fault, the steering system does not have to meet all the operational requirements, but only 
the lower redundancy requirements.  
This result has a decisive influence on the suitable system architectures. A redundant electric 
power steering system (EPS) is not able to fulfill those determined requirements using to-
day’s standard 24 V onboard power network of trucks. Since a redundant active hydraulic 
power steering system (HPS) does not fulfill current efficiency requirements, the only suit-
able steering system design for AD3+ considering the frame requirements of this thesis is a 
redundant hybrid steering system, which is a combination of an electric power steering sys-
tem and an active hydraulic power steering system. 
The performed functional safety analysis results in a functional safety concept with redun-
dancies for the actuators, the sensors, the control and the power supply of steering system. 
The subsystems of the steering system are specified to fulfill all functional safety require-
ments and combined to realize a Redundant Active Steering System (RASS) which provides 
a diverse redundancy. 
This thesis shows that a multiple of system states of current steering systems is required for 
the operation of such a RASS for AD3+ of trucks. As the RASS is a hybrid system, different 
power steering states are provided for its operation. Different automation states are required 
to enable manual driving as well as automated driving158. In the event of a system fault, the 
RASS suitable for AD3+ also has to provide fallback states to guarantee a safe operation 
without a take-over by the driver. In order to ensure that the RASS is always in the right 
state, this thesis develops an operation strategy that performs the state transitions based on 
logical rules. 
                                                 
158 The RASS enables partially automated driving as well as highly automated driving, whereby only highly 
automated driving is considered within this thesis. 
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The active valve proves to be the crucial component for the implementation of the intended 
functionality as well as the functional safety and the guarantee that the driver is able to over-
ride the system.  
The concept of a redundant active steering system (RASS) developed in this thesis serves as 
a basis for the further development of a steering system suitable for AD3+ of trucks. The 
next step of the development is the empirical proof of feasibility of the new innovative con-
cept. This includes primarily the functional verification of the fallback strategies and of the 
arbitrary distribution of the required steering torque between the EPS and the AHPS. It has 
to be investigated to what extent the tracking mechanism increases the efficiency of the 
RASS in reality, whether the driver is always able to override the system by means of the 
integrated mechanical stops and how well the transitions of the power steering state or of the 
automation state work. 
In addition to proving the functionality, there will be a great research focus on the steering 
feel. On the one hand, it is essential to prove the dynamics of the variable PSP to be sufficient 
for the switch from EPS state to hybrid state and the dynamics of the active valve for the 
transition between the stand-by hybrid state and the active hybrid state. On the other hand, 
there is research need on the transition process between manual driving and automated driv-
ing and reverse. Special focus should be on the driver intervention here. The exact values 
for the dynamic thresholds have to be evaluated in trial studies for example. 
The necessity of a RASS for AD3+ trucks with a 24 V on-board power network, as devel-
oped in this thesis, is evident. As long as the 24 V vehicle power network remains the only 
on-board network for trucks, the RASS will be mandatory in all AD3+ trucks. As soon as, 
for example, the 48 V on-board power network replaces the 24 V network or supplements it 
as a second on-board network, the much less complex redundant EPS seems to be able to 
fulfill the operational requirements of trucks and thus will probably take precedence over the 
RASS. 
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A Appendix 
A.1 Legal Requirements 
A.1.1 Definitions from ECE R79 
Table A-1: Definitions according to the ECE R79 
Term Description 
Autonomous 
steering systems 
System is controlled from off-board the vehicle and the driver will not 
necessarily be in primary control of the vehicle. 
Automatically 
commanded 
steering func-
tion (ACSF) 
Function within an electronic control system where actuation of the 
steering system results from automatic signals on-board the vehicle in 
order to assist the driver. 
ACSF A Function that operates at a speed no greater than 10 km/h to assist the 
driver, on demand, in low speed or parking maneuvering. 
ACSF B1 Function that assists the driver in keeping the vehicle within the chosen 
lane, by influencing the lateral movement of the vehicle. 
ACSF B2 Function which is initiated/activated by the driver and which keeps the 
vehicle within its lane by influencing the lateral movement of the vehi-
cle for extended periods without further driver command/confirmation 
ACSF C Function which is initiated/activated by the driver and which can per-
form a single lateral maneuver (e.g. lane change) when commanded by 
the driver. 
ACSF D Function which is initiated/activated by the driver and which can indi-
cate the possibility of a single lateral maneuver (e.g. lane change) but 
performs that function only following a confirmation by the driver. 
ACSF E Function which is initiated/activated by the driver and which can contin-
uously determine the possibility of a maneuver (e.g. lane change) and 
complete these man oeuvres for extended periods without further driver 
command/confirmation. 
Corrective steer-
ing function 
(CSF) 
Control function within an electronic control system whereby, for a lim-
ited duration, changes to the steering angle may result from the auto-
matic signals on-board the vehicle, in order:  
(a) To compensate a sudden, unexpected change in the side force of the 
vehicle; 
(b) To improve the vehicle stability (e.g. side wind, differing adhesion 
road conditions "μ-split") 
(c) To correct lane departure. (e.g. to avoid crossing lane markings, leav-
ing the road). 
Emergency 
steering func-
tion (ESF) 
Control function which can automatically detect a potential collision and 
automatically activate the vehicle steering system for a limited duration, 
to steer the vehicle with the purpose of avoiding or mitigating a collision 
with another vehicle or obstacle. 
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A.2 Requirement Analysis 
A.2.1 Vehicle Parameters 
Table A-2: Vehicle Parameters for fully loaded MAN L2000 12.224 
Parameter Symbol Value Unit 
Vehicle 
Mass 𝑚V 11,900 kg 
Mass at front axle 𝑚V,fa 4,340 kg 
Wheelbase W 3.25 m 
Distance from front axle to CoG f 2.06 m 
Track width 𝑤W 1.94 M 
Height of CoG ℎCoG 1.20 m 
Yaw inertia 𝐽𝑧 29,000 kgm2 
Wheel/Tire 
Tire dimensions - 245/75 R17.5 134 L - 
Dynamic wheel radius 𝑟dyn 0.40 m 
Tire pressure 𝑝Tire 6 ∙ 10
5 N/m2 
Tire tread length tread 0.05 m 
Tire bore stiffness 𝑐Bore 14.65 ∙ 10
3 Nm/ ad 
Maximum bore angle 𝛿Bore,max 0.11  ad 
Bore constant 𝑏 3,307 Nm2 
Suspension 
Castor angle 𝜏 6.1 ∙ 10−2  ad 
Kingpin angle 𝜎 0.14  ad 
Scrub radius 𝑟0 0.07 m 
Castor offset 𝑟τ 2.4 ∙ 10
−2 m 
Steering system 
Ratio between SW and W 𝑖H2W 13.23 − 15.72 - 
Ratio between SW and P 𝑖H2P 15.56 − 18.94 - 
Ratio between P and W 𝑖p2W 0.82 − 0.93 - 
Inertia of steering system at pitman arm 𝐽eff,P 15.00 kgm
2 
Friction coefficient of steering ?̂?F 106 Nm 
Damping coefficient of steering 𝑑D 1.38 Nm/ ad 
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Table A-3: Vehicle parameters of fully loaded 26-t truck 
Parameter Symbol Value Unit 
Vehicle 
Mass 𝑚V 26,000 kg 
Mass at front axle 𝑚V,fa 8,500 kg 
Wheelbase W 4.80 + 1.35 m 
Distance from front axle to CoG f 3.10 m 
Track width 𝑤W 2.06 M 
Height of CoG ℎCoG 1.40 m 
Yaw inertia 𝐽𝑧 135,000 kgm
2 
Wheel/Tire 
Tire dimensions - 385/55 R22.5 160 K - 
Dynamic wheel radius 𝑟dyn 0.48 m 
Tire pressure 𝑝Tire 8 ∙ 10
5 N/m2 
Tire tread length tread 0.07 m 
Tire bore stiffness 𝑐Bore 28.63 ∙ 10
3 Nm/ ad 
Maximum bore angle 𝛿Bore,max 0.11  ad 
Bore constant 𝑏 8,466 Nm2 
Suspension 
Castor angle 𝜏 6.1 ∙ 10−2  ad 
Kingpin angle 𝜎 0.14  ad 
Scrub radius 𝑟0 0.07 m 
Castor offset 𝑟τ 2.9 ∙ 10
−2 m 
Steering system 
Ratio between SW and W 𝑖H2W 13.23 − 15.72 - 
Ratio between SW and P 𝑖H2P 15.56 − 18.94 - 
Ratio between P and W 𝑖p2W 0.82 − 0.93 - 
Inertia of steering system at pitman arm 𝐽eff,P 15.00 kgm
2 
Friction coefficient of steering ?̂?F 106 Nm 
Damping coefficient of steering 𝑑D 1.38 Nm/ ad 
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A.2.2 Requirement List 
Table A-4: Complete requirement list 
 Requirement name Values, data Description 
F
ra
m
e 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
 
Level of driving 
automation 
AD3+ 
Steering system suitable for SAE level of 
automation 3 and higher 
Maximum steering 
wheel force/torque159 
200 N/50 Nm (correct 
operation), 450 N/112.5 Nm 
(incorrect operation) 
Maximum force required by the driver at 
the steering wheel; 
Override ability160/ 
Maxim force/torque 
for overriding161 
50 N/12.5 Nm 
Automated control of the steering is over-
rideable by the driver at any time with 
limited effort 
Functional safety ISO 26262 conforming 
Development of mechatronic steering 
system according to 
latest version of ISO 26262 
Output interface Pitman arm with push rod 
Interface between output of steering sys-
tem and truck’s steering kinematic 
Electric 
power supply 
24 V 
Electric power supply by 
vehicle’s power network 
Dimensions162 
550 x 400 x 550 mm 
(length x height x width) 
Dimensions of steering gearbox 
Hydraulic 
power supply89 
max. 25 l/min 
max. 185 bar 
Hydraulic power supply by power steer-
ing pump 
O
p
er
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
r
e-
q
u
ir
em
e
n
ts
 
Maximum 
output torque 
8 500 Nm 
Maximum torque at pitman arm during 
correct operation 
Maximum angular ve-
locity 
50 °/s 
Maximum angular velocity at pitman arm 
during correct operation 
Maximum 
output power 
3 500 W 
Maximum power of overall steering sys-
tem at pitman arm during correct opera-
tion 
R
ed
u
n
d
a
n
cy
 r
e
q
u
ir
e-
m
en
ts
 
Fallback torque 3 000 Nm 
Maximum output torque at pitman arm in 
case of a partial failure of the steering 
system 
Fallback power 600 W 
Maximum output power at pitman arm in 
case of a partial failure of the steering 
system 
Fallback energy 3 800 J 
Available steering energy at pitman arm 
in case of a failure of the power supply 
 
                                                 
159 Cp. United Nations: ECE R79 r4 (2018), p.30. 
160 Cp. United Nations: Convention on Road Traffic (1968), p.11. 
161 Cp. United Nations: ECE R79 r4 (2018), p.14. 
162 Data for MAN TGS 26:440 
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A.3 Functional Safety Analysis 
A.3.1 Definition of Important terms of ISO 26262163 
Table A-5: Definitions of ISO 26262 
Term Description 
Automotive 
safety integrity 
level (ASIL) 
“one of four levels to specify the item's or element's  necessary ISO 26262 re-
quirements and safety measures to apply for avoiding an unreasonable risk, with 
D representing the most stringent and A the least stringent level”164 
Controllability “ability to avoid a specified harm or damage through the timely reactions of the 
persons involved, possibly with support from external measures 
NOTE 1: Persons involved can include the driver, passengers or persons in the 
vicinity of the vehicle's exterior. 
NOTE 2: The parameter C in hazard analysis and risk assessment represents the 
potential for controllability.” 
Degradation “state or transition to a state of the item or element with reduced functionality, 
performance, or both” 
Diversity “different solutions satisfying the same requirement, with the goal of achieving 
independence 
NOTE 1: Diversity does not guarantee independency, but can deal with certain 
types of common cause failures. 
NOTE 2: Diversity can be a technical solution or a technical means to apply. 
NOTE 3: Diversity is one way to realize redundancy.” 
  
                                                 
163 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-12 (2018). 
164 In addition to the four ASIL, QM (quality management) denotes no requirement to comply with ISO 26262 
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Emergency 
operation 
“operation mode of an item, for providing safety after the reaction to a fault until 
the transition to a safe state is achieved 
NOTE 2: When a safe state cannot be directly reached, or cannot be timely 
reached, or cannot be maintained after the detection of a fault, a safety mecha-
nism can transition the item to emergency operation for providing safety until 
the transition to a safe state is achieved and maintained. 
NOTE 4: Degradation can be part of the concept for emergency operation.” 
Error “discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition, and 
the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition 
NOTE 1: An error can arise as a result of a fault within the system, or compo-
nent being considered.” 
Exposure “state of being in an operational situation that can be hazardous if coincident 
with the failure mode under analysis 
NOTE 1: The parameter “E” in hazard analysis and risk assessment represents 
the potential exposure to the operational situation” 
External  
measure 
“measure that is separate and distinct from the item which reduces or mitigates 
the risks resulting from the item” 
Failure “termination of an intended behavior of an element or an item due to a fault 
manifestation 
NOTE: Termination can be permanent or transient.” 
Fault “abnormal condition that can cause an element or an item to fail” 
Fault tolerance “ability to deliver a specified functionality in the presence of one or more speci-
fied faults 
NOTE 1: Specified functionality can be intended functionality.” 
Functional 
safety 
“absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning behav-
iour of E/E systems” 
Functional 
safety concept 
“specification of the functional safety requirements, with associated information, 
their allocation to elements within the architecture, and their interaction neces-
sary to achieve the safety goals” 
Functional 
safety  
requirement 
“specification of implementation-independent safety behavior, or implementa-
tion-independent safety measure, including its safety-related attributes 
NOTE 1: A functional safety requirement can be a safety requirement imple-
mented by a safety-related E/E system, or by a safety-related system of other 
technologies, in order to achieve or maintain a safe state for the item taking into 
account a determined hazardous event. 
NOTE 2: The functional safety requirements might be specified independently 
of the technology used in the concept phase, of product development. 
NOTE 3: Safety-related attributes include information about ASIL.” 
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Hazard “potential source of harm” 
Hazard analysis 
and risk  
assessment 
(HARA) 
“method to identify and categorize hazardous events of items and to specify 
safety goals and ASILs related to the prevention or mitigation of the associated 
hazards in order to avoid unreasonable risk” 
Item “system or combination of systems, to which ISO 26262 is applied, that imple-
ments a function or part of a function at the vehicle level” 
Redundancy “existence of means in addition to the means that would be sufficient to perform 
a required function or to represent information 
NOTE 1: Redundancy is used in ISO 26262 with respect to achieving a safety 
goal or a specified safety requirement, or to representing safety-related infor-
mation. 
NOTE 2: The redundancy could be implemented homogenously or within diver-
sity. 
EXAMPLE 1: Duplicated functional components can be an instance of redun-
dancy for the purpose of increasing availability or allowing fault detection. 
EXAMPLE 2: The addition of parity bits to data representing safety-related in-
formation provides redundancy for the purpose of allowing fault detection.” 
Residual risk “risk remaining after the deployment of safety measures” 
Risk “combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that 
harm” 
Safe state “operating mode, in case of a failure, of an item without an unreasonable level of 
risk 
NOTE 2: While normal operation can be considered safe, the definition of safe 
state is only in the case of failure in the context of the ISO 26262 series of stand-
ards.” 
Safety “absence of unreasonable risk” 
Safety  
architecture 
“set of elements and their interaction to fulfill the safety requirements” 
Safety goal “top-level safety requirement as a result of the hazard analysis and risk assess-
ment at the vehicle level 
NOTE 1: One safety goal can be related to several hazards, and several safety 
goals can be related to a single hazard.” 
Safety measure “activity or technical solution to avoid or control systematic failures and to de-
tect or control random hardware failures, or mitigate their harmful effects 
NOTE 1: Safety measures include safety mechanisms.” 
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Safety  
mechanism 
“technical solution implemented by E/E functions or elements, or by other tech-
nologies, to detect and mitigate or tolerate faults or control or avoid failures in 
order to maintain intended functionality or achieve or maintain a safe state 
NOTE 1: Safety mechanisms are implemented within the item to prevent faults 
from leading to single-point failures and to prevent faults from being latent 
faults. 
NOTE 2: The safety mechanism is either 
a) able to transition to, or maintain, the item in a safe state, or 
b) able to alert the driver such that the driver is expected to control the effect of 
the failure, as defined in the functional safety concept.” 
Severity “estimate of the extent of harm to one or more individuals that can occur in a po-
tentially hazardous event 
NOTE: The parameter “S” in hazard analysis and risk assessment represents the 
potential severity of harm.” 
T&B “Trucks, Buses, trailers and semi-trailers” 
Truck “motor vehicle designed to transport goods, or equipment on-board the chassis 
NOTE 1: It may also tow a trailer.” 
T&B vehicle 
configuration 
“technical characteristics of a T&B base vehicle and body builder equipment that 
do not change during operation 
NOTE 1: Changes may occur during rebuilding.” 
Unreasonable 
risk 
“risk judged to be unacceptable in a certain context according to valid societal 
moral concepts” 
Variance in 
T&B vehicle 
operation 
“use of a T&B vehicle with different dynamic characteristics influenced by 
cargo or towing during the service life of  the vehicle 
EXAMPLE: T&B with or without load, T&B with variations in load distribu-
tion, truck with or without trailer, tractor with or without semi-trailer (tractor 
solo).” 
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A.3.2 Classification of Hazardous events 
Table A-6: Classes of severity165a 
 
Class 
S0 S1 S2 S3 
Description No injuries 
Light and moderate 
injuries 
Severe and life-
threatening injuries 
(survival probable) 
Life-threatening injuries 
(survival uncertain), 
fatal injuries 
Table A-7: Classes probability of exposure regarding operational situations165a 
 
Class 
E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 
Description Incredible 
Very low 
probability 
Low 
probability 
Medium 
probability 
High 
probability 
Table A-8: Classes of controllability165b 
 
Class 
C0 C1 C2 C3 
Description 
Controllable 
in general 
Simply 
controllable 
Normally 
controllable 
Difficult to control 
or uncontrollable 
Table A-9: ASIL determination165c 
Severity class Exposure class 
Controllability class 
C1 C2 C3 
S1 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM QM 
E3 QM QM A 
E4 QM A B 
S2 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM A 
E3 QM A B 
E4 A B C 
S3 
E1 QM QM A 
E2 QM A B 
E3 A B C 
E4 B C D 
                                                 
165 International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-3 (2018), p.8. (a) p.8 | (b) p.9 | (c) p.10 
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A.3.3 Fault Tree Analyses 
 
Figure A-1: Fault tree safety goal 1 
 
Figure A-2: Fault tree safety goal 2 
Error of Sensor & ECU
ASIL D
AD SAE LoA ≥ 3
C3
SG 1: An erroneous sensing of the 
steering wheel input or an 
erroneous control signal of the 
electronic control unit should be 
prevented safely.
Error of the 
sensor
Wrong sense of the 
steering wheel 
torque and angle
Wrong control of 
electronic systems
Error of the ECU
Error of electric motor
ASIL D
AD SAE LoA ≥ 3
C3
SG 2: An erroneous torque output 
of the electric power steering 
should be prevented safely.
Error of the EM
Wrong amount of 
electric steering 
power
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Figure A-3: Fault tree safety goal 3 
 
Figure A-4: Fault tree safety goal 4 
ASIL D
Error of Active Valve Modulator
AD SAE LoA ≥ 3
C3
v ≤ vSwitch
C4
SG 3: An erroneous opening of 
the active hydraulic valve by the 
modulator should be prevented 
safely.
Error of the 
modulator
Wrong amount of 
hydraulic steering 
power
v ≤ vSwitch
C4
v > vSwitch
C5
Error of power supply
SG 4: An erroneous power supply 
should be prevented safely.
ASIL C ASIL D
AD SAE LoA ≥ 3
C3
Error of the 
power electronic
Wrong adjustment of 
the electric power
Wrong adjustment of 
the hydraulic power
Error of PSP 
adjustment 
mechanism
Error of the 
power electronic
Wrong adjustment of 
the electric power
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Figure A-5: Fault tree safety goal 6 
A.3.4 Safety Concept Diagrams 
 
Figure A-6: Safety concept diagram safety goal 1 
Failure of sensor
SG 6: A failure of the sensing of 
the steering wheel input should 
be prevented safely. ASIL B
AD SAE LoA ≥ 3
C3
No sense of the 
steering wheel 
torque and angle
Failure of the 
SW sensor
FSR 1.1.1
An error of the SW sensor 
should be detected safely.
ASIL D
FSR 1.1
A wrong sense of the 
steering wheel torque and 
angle due to an error of 
the SW sensor should be 
prevented safely.
ASIL D
FSR 3.2.2
In case of an error of the 
ECU driver should be 
informed and a safe 
automated operation until 
the transition to a defined 
safe state is completed 
should be  ensured.
ASIL D
FSR 1.2
A wrong control of the 
electronic systems due to 
an error of the ECU should 
be prevented safely.
ASIL D
FSR 3.2.1
An error of the ECU should 
be detected safely.
ASIL D
FSR 3.1.2
In case of an error of the 
SW sensor driver should 
be informed and the 
transition to a defined safe 
state should be  ensured.
ASIL D
SG 1
An erroneous sensing of the steering wheel 
input or an erroneous control signal of the 
electronic control unit should be prevented 
safely.
ASIL D
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Figure A-7: Safety concept diagram safety goal 2 
 
Figure A-8: Safety concept diagram safety goal 3 
FSR 2.1.1
An error of the EM should 
be detected safely.
ASIL D
FSR 2.1
A wrong amount of 
electric steering power 
due to an error of the EM 
should be prevented 
safely.
ASIL D
FSR 2.1.2
In case of an error of the 
EM driver should be 
informed and a safe 
automated operation until 
the transition to a defined 
safe state is completed 
should be  ensured.
ASIL D
SG 2
An erroneous torque output of the electric 
power steering should be prevented safely
ASIL D
FSR 3.1.1
An error of the modulator 
should be detected safely.
ASIL D
FSR 3.1
A wrong amount of 
hydraulic steering power 
due to an error of the 
modulator should be 
prevented safely.
ASIL D
FSR 3.1.2
In case of an error of the 
modulator the driver 
should be informed and a 
safe automated operation 
until the transition to a 
defined safe state is 
completed should be  
ensured.
ASIL D
SG 3
An erroneous opening of the active hydraulic 
valve by the modulator should be prevented 
safely.
ASIL D
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Figure A-9: Safety concept diagram safety goal 4 
 
Figure A-10: Safety concept diagram safety goal 6 
  
FSR 4.1
A wrong adjustment of the 
electric power due to an 
error of the power 
electronic should be 
prevented safely.
ASIL C
FSR 4.1.1
An error of the power 
electronic should be 
detected safely.
ASIL C
FSR 4.2.2
In case of an error of the 
PSP adjustment 
mechanism the driver 
should be informed and a 
safe automated operation 
until the transition to to a 
defined safe state is 
completed should be  
ensured.
ASIL C
FSR 4.2
A wrong adjustment of the 
hydraulic power due to an 
error of the PSP 
adjustment mechanism 
should be prevented 
safely.
ASIL C
FSR 4.2.1
An error of the PSP 
adjustment mechanism 
should be detected safely.
ASIL C
FSR 4.1.2
In case of an error of the 
power electronic the 
driver should be informed 
and a safe automated 
operation until the 
transition to the driver or 
to a defined safe state is 
completed should be  
ensured.
ASIL C
SG 4
An erroneous power supply should be 
prevented safely.
ASIL C
FSR 4.1
A wrong adjustment of the 
electric power due to an 
error of the power 
electronic should be 
prevented safely.
ASIL D
FSR 4.1.1
An error of the power 
electronic should be 
detected safely.
ASIL D
FSR 4.1.2
In case of an error of the 
power electronic the 
driver should be informed 
and a safe automated 
operation until the 
transfer to a defined safe 
state is completed should 
be  ensured.
ASIL D
SG 4
An erroneous power supply should be 
prevented safely.
ASIL D
FSR 6.1.1
A failure of SW sensor 
should be detected safely.
ASIL B
FSR 6.1
In case of a failure of the 
SW sensor driver should 
be informed and a safe 
automated operation until 
the transition to the driver 
or to a defined safe state is 
completed should be 
ensured.
ASIL B
SG 6
A failure of the sensing of the steering wheel 
input should be prevented safely.
ASIL B
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A.4 Data Sheet Electric Motor 
Table A-10: Data sheet electric motor166 
Specification Symbol Value Unit 
Nominal power 𝑃EM,n 701 W 
Nominal voltage 𝑈EM,n 24 V 
Nominal current 𝐼EM,n ≤ 33.3 A 
Nominal speed ?̇?EM,n 413  ad/s 
Nominal torque 𝑀EM,n 1.7 Nm 
Starting current 𝐼EM,n 485 A 
Torque constant 𝐾M 0.057 Nm/A 
Maximum power 𝑃EM,max 1,819 W 
Maximum speed ?̇?EM,max 995  ad/s 
Maximum torque 𝑀EM,max 6.45 Nm 
 
  
                                                 
166 Dunkermotoren: BG95 (2018). 
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A.5 Proof of Reduction of Hydraulic Losses by 
Tracking 
This chapter demonstrates by means of a simplified model calculation that the new tracking 
strategy developed in this thesis actually reduces hydraulic losses even when the PSP is run-
ning. For this purpose, the hydraulic power loss inside the valve in the center position during 
stand-by mode is calculated first. Then the HPS power is calculated that would be necessary 
to generate the same torque as the maximum EPS torque. The difference between these two 
powers minus the maximum power of the EPS results in the power loss that can be saved. It 
should of course be noted that the model is simplified and idealized. However, this shows 
that tracking is a promising strategy to increase the efficiency of the RASS.  
The hydraulic steering valve is modeled as a Wheatstone bridge with four bridges (B1 – B4), 
as shown in Figure A-11. The bridges B1 and B4 or B2 and B3 are pairs and change their 
flow resistance in pairs. Due to the mechanical design of the steering valve, the cross section 
area of B1 (𝐴1) is always equal the cross section area of B4 (𝐴4). The same is valid for B2 
and B3 (𝐴2 = 𝐴3). The equations in this chapter describe the hydraulic behavior of the 
valve.167 
 
Figure A-11: Hydraulic diagram steering valve167 
In the center position, the pressure inside the chamber A (𝑝A) is described with the pressure 
of the PSP (𝑝PSP) by (A-1) 
 𝑝A = 𝑝PSP −
𝑄1
2
𝐵1
2 (A-1) 
and with the pressure of the tank (𝑝0) by (A-2), 
 𝑝A = 𝑝0 +
𝑄2
2
𝐵2
2 (A-2) 
                                                 
167 Hullmann, J. et al.: Mechanical and Hydraulic Gears (2017), pp. 310–313. 
Left Right
Inflow
Backflow Backflow
Inflow
Left Right
1 3
42
A B
Piston
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Input Shaft
1 3
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Whereas the bridge is defined by (A-3) with the valve flow constant (𝑘Valve), the associated 
cross section area (𝐴𝑖𝑖) and the desnity of the hydraulic oil (𝜌Oil). 
 𝐵𝑖 = 𝑘Valve ∙ 𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∙ √
2
𝜌Oil
  (A-3) 
All bridges are equally open in the center position, resulting in (A-4), (A-5) and (A-6). 
 𝐵1 = 𝐵2 = 𝐵3 = 𝐵4 (A-4) 
 𝐴1 = 𝐴2 = 𝐴3 = 𝐴4 (A-5) 
 
𝑄1 = 𝑄2 = 𝑄3 = 𝑄4 =
𝑄PSP
2
 (A-6) 
The pressure difference (Δ𝑝) between the PSP and the tank is defined by (A-7) based on the 
previous equations. 
 Δ𝑝 = 𝑝PSP − 𝑝0 =
𝑄1
2
𝐵1
2 +
𝑄2
2
𝐵2
2 =
𝑄PSP
2
4𝐵1
2  (A-7) 
Using (A-7) and the volume flow of the PSP (𝑄PSP), the power that is lost inside the valve 
in center position during stand-by hybrid mode (𝑃loss,sb) is calculated by (A-8). 
 Ploss,sb = Δ𝑝 ∙ 𝑄PSP =
𝜌Oil
4𝑘Valve
2 ∙ 𝐴1
2 ∙ 𝑄PSP
3  (A-8) 
With the following parameters168 of the PSP and the valve, 𝑃loss,sb is 0.65 W. 
 
𝜌Oil = 0.839
kg
m3
 
𝑘Valve = 0.8 
𝐴1 = 5.39 ∙ 10
−6m2 
𝑄PSP = 4.17 ∙ 10
−4
m3
s
 
𝑃loss,sb = 0.65 W 
 
The required hydraulic power (𝑃HPS,active) to reach the same static torque as the maximum 
torque of the EPS (𝑀EPS,max) is set by pressure difference (Δ𝑝) inside the two chambers of 
the hydraulic piston and the volume flow of the PSP (𝑄PSP) in (A-9). The pressure difference 
is defined by the piston area (𝐴Piston) and the ratio from the piston to the pitman arm 
(𝑖Piston2P). 
                                                 
168 Data from steering supplier.  
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 𝑃HPS,active = Δ𝑝 ∙ 𝑄PSP =
𝐹HPS ∙ 𝑄PSP
𝐴Piston
=
𝑀EPS,max ∙ 𝑄PSP
𝑖Piston2P ∙ 𝐴Piston
 (A-9) 
With the following parameters, the 𝑃HPS,active is calculated to 3,425 W. 
 
𝑀EPS,max = 3000 Nm 
𝑖Piston2P = 0.05
m
 ad
 
𝐴Piston = 7.3 ∙ 10
−3m2 
𝑄PSP = 4.17 ∙ 10
−4
m3
s
 
𝑃HPS,active = 3,425 W 
 
The maximum power of the EPS (𝑃EPS, 𝑎𝑥) at maximum static torque is calculated from the 
maximum current (𝐼EM, 𝑎𝑥) and the voltage (𝑈) in equation (A-11). The maximum current 
(𝐼EM, 𝑎𝑥) is defined by the maximum static torque of the electric motor (𝑀EM,max) and its 
torque constant (𝐾M) by equation (A-10). 
 𝐼EM, 𝑎𝑥 =
𝑀EM,max
𝐾M
=
6.45 Nm
0.057 Nm/A
≈ 113 A (A-10) 
 𝑃EPS, 𝑎𝑥 = 𝑈 ∙ 𝐼EM, 𝑎𝑥 = 24 V ∙ 113 A = 2,712 W (A-11) 
With the maximum power output of the EPS 𝑃EPS,max a maximum power loss of 712 W can 
be saved according to (A-12) by using tracking. 
 𝑃Save, 𝑎𝑥 = 𝑃HPS,active − 𝑃loss,sb − 𝑃EPS,max ≈ 712 W (A-12) 
 
List of References 
144 
List of References 
Ballarin, C.: The truck on its way to an autonomous means of transport (2016) 
Ballarin, Christian: Der Lkw auf dem Weg zum autonomen Transportmittel, in: ATZextra 
(8), Issues 21, pp. 36–41, 2016 
Becker, J. et al.: System architecture and safety requirements for AD (2017) 
Becker, Jan; Helmle, Michael; Pink, Oliver: System architecture and safety requirements 
for automated driving, in: Automated Driving, Springer, 2017 
Becker, J.; Helmle, M.: Architecture and System Safety Requirements for AD (2015) 
Becker, Jan; Helmle, Michael: Architecture and System Safety Requirements for 
Automated Driving, in: Meyer, Gereon; Beiker, Sven (Eds.): Road Vehicle Automation 2, 
Lecture Notes in Mobility, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2015 
Birsching, J. E.: HPS with magnetic torque overlay (2014) 
Birsching, Joel E.: Hydraulic-Power Steering System with Maagnetic Torque Overlay, 
Steering Solutions IP Holding [US], Patent US2014224565 (A1), Patent application 
number: US201414180000 20140213, 2014 
Bosch Mobility Solutions: Automated and efficient for the future (2018) 
Bosch Mobility Solutions: Automated and efficient for the future; 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=2ahUKEw
iKtIiG5tHfAhWIzqQKHV9pBmwQFjABegQICRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bosch
-mobility-solutions.com%2Fmedia%2Fglobal%2Fproducts-and-services%2Fcommercial-
vehicles%2Fsteering-systems%2Fsteering-
systems%2Ffolder_for_steering_systems_for_commercial_vehicles.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3x
6b0XI4_2J8StrYJ-bPmM, 2018, Access 03.01.2019 
Brockmann, S.; Schlott, S.: The long way to autonomous truck driving (2015) 
Brockmann, Siegfried; Schlott, Stefan: Der weite Weg zum autonomen Lkw-Fahren, in: 
ATZ - Automobiltechnische Zeitschrift (1), Issues 117, pp. 8–13, 2015 
Brosig, S.; Lienkamp, M.: Driver Assistance System Functions (2017) 
Brosig, Stefan; Lienkamp, Markus: Driver Assistance System Functions, in: Harrer, 
Manfred; Pfeffer, Peter (Eds.): Steering Handbook, Springer International Publishing, 
Cham, 2017 
Brunner, G.; Negele, K.: Electrification of the steering (2008) 
Brunner, Gabriel; Negele, Klaus: Electrification of the steering, in: steering tech 2008, 
Technische Universität München, Garching, 2008 
 List of References 
  145 
Brunner, S.; Harrer, M.: Steering Requirements (2017) 
Brunner, Sina; Harrer, Manfred: Steering Requirements, in: Harrer, Manfred; Pfeffer, Peter 
(Eds.): Steering Handbook, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2017 
Cacilo, A. et al.: Highly automated driving on highways (2015) 
Cacilo, Andrej; Schmidt, Sarah; Wittlinger, Philipp; Herrmann, Florian; Bauer, Wilhelm; 
Sawade, Oliver; Doderer, Hannes; Hartwig, Matthias; Scholz, Volker: Hochautomatisiertes 
Fahren auf Autobahnen - Industriepolitische Schlussfolgerungen, 2015 
Christian Rief: aFAS Steering System (2018) 
Christian Rief: aFAS Schlusspräsentation, Frankfurt am Main, 2018 
Deutsches Institut für Normung: DIN 25424 Fault Tree Analysis (1981) 
Deutsches Institut für Normung: , DIN Fehlerbaumanalyse - Methode und Bildzeichen, 
Beuth Verlag, Berlin, 1981 
Dunkermotoren: BG95 (2018) 
Dunkermotoren: BG95; https://www.dunkermotoren.de/produkte/bldc-motor-ec-
motor/detail/885950500017/, 2018, Access 06.01.2019 
Edler, F. et al.: Fault tree analysis in theory and practice (2015) 
Edler, Frank; Soden, Michael; Hankammer, René: Fehlerbaumanalyse in Theorie und 
Praxis, Imprint: Springer Vieweg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2015 
Embark - Self-Driving Semi Trucks (2019) Embark - Self-Driving Semi Trucks; 
https://embarktrucks.com/, 2019, Access 07.02.2019 
Engström, J. et al.: Deployment of Automated Trucking (2019) 
Engström, Johan; Bishop, Richard; Shladover, Steven E.; Murphy, Michael C.; O’Rourke, 
Laurence; Voege, Tom; Denaro, Bob; Demato, Richard; Demato, Divya: Deployment of 
Automated Trucking, in: Meyer, Gereon; Beiker, Sven (Eds.): Road vehicle automation 5, 
Lecture Notes in Mobility, Springer, Cham, Switzerland, 2019 
European Union: Framework for the approval of motor vehicles (2007) 
European Union Establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their 
trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such 
vehicles, 05.09.2007 
Flämig, H.: Autonomous vehicles and autonomous driving in freight transport (2016) 
Flämig, Heike: Autonomous vehicles and autonomous driving in freight transport, in: 
Maurer, Markus et al. (Eds.): Autonomous driving, Springer Open, Berlin, Heidelberg, 
2016 
Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for urban roads 
(2006) 
Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Richtlinie für die Anlage von 
Stadtstraßen, FGSV Verlag GmbH, Köln, 2006 
List of References 
146 
Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for highways 
(2008) 
Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Richtlinie für die Anlage von 
Autobahnen, FGSV Verlag GmbH, Köln, 2008 
Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Guideline for rural roads 
(2012) 
Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen: Richtlinie für die Anlage von 
Landstraßen, FGSV Verlag GmbH, Köln, 2012 
Freedman, D. H.: Self-Driving Trucks 
Freedman, David H.: Self-Driving Trucks; 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603493/10-breakthrough-technologies-2017-self-
driving-trucks/, Access 04.02.2019 
Gaedke, A. et al.: Driver assistance for trucks (2015) 
Gaedke, Alexander; Greul, Roland; Kanngießer, Stefan; Boos, Nicolas: Driver assistance 
for trucks – from lane keeping assistance to smart truck maneuvering, in: Pfeffer, Peter 
(Ed.): 6th International Munich Chassis Symposium 2015, Proceedings, Springer 
Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden, 2015 
Gaedke, A. et al.: Electric Power Steering Systems (2017) 
Gaedke, Alexander; Heger, Markus; Sprinzl, Michael; Grüner, Stefan; Vaehning, 
Alexander: Electric Power Steering Systems, in: Harrer, Manfred; Pfeffer, Peter (Eds.): 
Steering handbook, Springer, Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London, 2017 
Gillen, C.: Dissertation, Development of efficient safety concepts for steering systems 
(2015) 
Gillen, Christoph: Entwicklung effizienter Sicherheitskonzepte für Lenksysteme, 
Dissertation, Aachen, 2015 
Gold, C. et al.: Take over (2013) 
Gold, Christian; Damböck, Daniel; Lorenz, Lutz; Bengler, Klaus: “Take over!” How long 
does it take to get the driver back into the loop?, in: Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (1), Issues 57, pp. 1938–1942, 2013 
Gold, C.; Huesmann, A.: Controllability of highly automated vehicle guidance (2017) 
Gold, C.; Huesmann, A.: Beherrschbarkeit hochautomatisierter Fahrzeugfuehrung-
Zwischen Uebernahmezeit und Zeitbudget, in: Haus der Technik (144), 2017 
Hallenbeck, M. E. et al.: Vehicle Classification Rules (2014) 
Hallenbeck, Mark E.; Selezneva, Olga I.; Quinley, Rich: Verification, refinement, and 
applicability of long-term pavement performance vehicle classification rules, 2014 
Harrer, M.; Pfeffer, P.: The Future of Steering Systems (2017) 
Harrer, Manfred; Pfeffer, Peter: The Future of Steering Systems, in: Harrer, Manfred; 
Pfeffer, Peter (Eds.): Steering Handbook, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2017 
 List of References 
  147 
Hecker, F.: Brake-Based Stability Assistance Functions (2016) 
Hecker, Falk: Brake-Based Stability Assistance Functions for Commercial Vehicles, in: 
Winner, Hermann et al. (Eds.): Handbook of Driver Assistance Systems, Springer 
International Publishing, Cham, 2016 
Herold, M. et al.: Differential Braking for Steering Redundancy (2018) 
Herold, Maximilian; Said, Oussama; Winner, Hermann: Simulative Assessment of 
Differential Braking for Steering Redundancy in Automated Driven Trucks, in: Verein 
Deutscher Ingenieure (Ed.): SIMVEC, Baden Baden, 2018 
Herold, M. et al.: Redundant Active Steering System (2018) 
Herold, Maximilian; Winner, Hermann; Fu, Zaoqing: Redundant Active Steering System, 
2018 
Herold, M. et al.: Power Requirements for RASS (2019) 
Herold, Maximilian; Liebler, Maximilian; Winner, Hermann: Power Requirements for a 
Redundant Automated Steering System for Trucks, in: 26th International Technical 
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 2019 
Herold, M.; Winner, H.: Double Controlled Steering Valve (2018) 
Herold, Maximilian; Winner, Hermann: Double controlled steering valve for hybrid 
redundant active steering system with driver intervention, 2018 
Herold, M.; Winner, H.: Method to control RASS (2019) 
Herold, Maximilian; Winner, Hermann: Method to control redundant automated steering 
system with driver intervention, 2019 
Hesse, B.: Dissartation, Interferences between driving dynamics and power network 
(2011) 
Hesse, Benjamin: Wechselwirkung von Fahrzeugdynamik und Kfz-Bordnetz unter 
Berücksichtigung der Fahrzeugbeherrschbarkeit, Dissartation 
Universitätsbibliothek Duisburg-Essen, 2011 
Hilgers, M.: Chassis and Axles (2016) 
Hilgers, Michael: Nutzfahrzeugtechnik lernen: Chassis und Achsen, Springer Fachmedien 
Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden, 2016 
Hilgers, M.: Electrics and Mechatronics (2016) 
Hilgers, Michael: Nutzfahrzeugtechnik lernen: Elektrik und Mechatronik, Springer 
Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden, 2016 
Hoepke, E.; Breuer, S.: Commercial Vehicle Technology (2016) 
Hoepke, Erich; Breuer, Stefan (Eds.) Nutzfahrzeugtechnik, Springer Fachmedien 
Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden, 2016 
Huang, P.-S.; Pruckner, A.: Steer by Wire (2017) 
Huang, Pei-Shih; Pruckner, Alfred: Steer by Wire, in: Harrer, Manfred; Pfeffer, Peter 
(Eds.): Steering Handbook, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2017 
List of References 
148 
Hullmann, J. et al.: Mechanical and Hydraulic Gears (2017) 
Hullmann, Johannes; James, David; Seewald, Alois; Span, Eduard; Wiertz, Alexander: 
Mechanical and Hydraulic Gears, in: Harrer, Manfred; Pfeffer, Peter (Eds.): Steering 
handbook, Springer, Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London, 2017 
International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262 (2018) 
International Organization for Standardization: , ISO standard Road vehicles - Functional 
safety, Schweiz, 2018 
International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-12 (2018) 
International Organization for Standardization: , ISO standard Road vehicles - Functional 
safety - Adaption of ISO 26262 for motorcycles, Schweiz, 2018 
International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-3 (2018) 
International Organization for Standardization: , ISO standard Road vehicles - Functional 
safety - Concept phase, Schweiz, 2018 
International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-5 (2018) 
International Organization for Standardization: , ISO standard Road vehicles - Functional 
safety - Product development at the hardware level, Schweiz, 2018 
International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-6 (2018) 
International Organization for Standardization: , ISO standard Road vehicles - Functional 
safety - Product development at the software level, Schweiz, 2018 
International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-4 (2018) 
International Organization for Standardization: , ISO standard Road vehicles - Functional 
safety - Product development at the system level, Schweiz, 2018 
International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262-1 (2018) 
International Organization for Standardization: , ISO standard Road vehicles - Functional 
safety - Vocabulary, Schweiz, 2018 
International Organization for Standardization: ISO/PAS 21448 SOTIF (2019) 
International Organization for Standardization: , ISO standard Road vehicles - Safety of the 
intended functionality, Schweiz, 2019 
Isermann, R.: Mechatronic Systems (2008) 
Isermann, Rolf: Mechatronische Systeme, 2. Edition, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New 
York, NY, 2008 
Isermann, R.: Fault tolerance in mechatronic systems (2016) 
Isermann, Rolf: Fehlertoleranz bei mechatronischen Systemen, in: Forschung im 
Ingenieurwesen 1-2, Issues 80, pp. 41–56, 2016 
Ito, T. et al.: Time Required for Take-over from Automated to Manual Driving (2016) 
Ito, Toshio; Takata, Arata; Oosawa, Kenta: Time Required for Take-over from Automated 
to Manual Driving, in: , SAE Technical Paper Series, SAE International400 
Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA, United States, 2016 
 List of References 
  149 
Janz, B. et al.: Steering valve with planetary gear (2009) 
Janz, Bernd; Mueller, Hens H.; Kirschbaum, Sven: Lenkventil mit Planetengetriebe, 
TEDRIVE HOLDING BV [NL], Patent DE102009029532 (A1), Patent application 
number: DE20091029532 20090917, 2009 
Kalb, L.; Bengler, K.: Controlling Automated Steering (2018) 
Kalb, Luis; Bengler, Klaus (Eds.) Modelling the Process of Controlling an Automated 
Steering Maneuver, Springer, 2018 
Kirschbaum, M.: Highly automated driving for commercial vehicles (2015) 
Kirschbaum, Markus: Highly automated driving for commercial vehicles, in: Pfeffer, Peter 
(Ed.): 6th International Munich Chassis Symposium 2015, Proceedings, Springer 
Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden, 2015 
Knorr-Bremse: iHSA Control Module (2018) 
Knorr-Bremse: iHSA Control Module; http://knorr-
bremse.de/en/commercialvehicles/products_1/steering/ihsa_steering_system/standard_pag
e_commercialvehicles.jsp, 2018, Access 03.01.2019 
Knorr-Bremse: Truck RCB Steering Gear with iHSA Control Module (2018) 
Knorr-Bremse: Truck RCB Steering Gear with iHSA Control Module; http://knorr-
bremse.de/en/commercialvehicles/products_1/steering/truck_recirculating_ball_steering_w
ith_ihsa_module/standard_page_5_commercialvehicles.jsp, 2018, Access 03.01.2019 
Lauth, H. J. et al.: Needs based controllable pumps (2002) 
Lauth, H. J.; Webert, D.; Scholz, T.; Agne, I. (Eds.) Bedarfsorientiert ansteuerbare 
Pumpen–Reduzierte Leistungsaufnahme von Lenk-, Fahrwerks-und Getriebesystemen, 7, 
2002 
Martin, H. et al.: Functional Safety of ADS (2016) 
Martin, Helmut; Tschabuschnig, Kurt; Bridal, Olof; Watzenig, Daniel: Functional Safety of 
Automated Driving Systems: Does ISO 26262 Meet the Challenges?, in: Watzenig, Daniel; 
Horn, Martin (Eds.): Automated driving, Springer, [Switzerland], 2016 
Matthaei, R. et al.: Autonomous Driving (2016) 
Matthaei, Richard; Reschka, Andreas; Rieken, Jens; Dierkes, Frank; Ulbrich, Simon; 
Winkle, Thomas; Maurer, Markus: Autonomous Driving, in: Winner, Hermann et al. 
(Eds.): Handbook of Driver Assistance Systems, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 
2016 
Maurer, M. et al.: Autonomous driving (2016) 
Maurer, Markus; Gerdes, J. C.; Lenz, Barbara; Winner, Hermann (Eds.) Autonomous 
driving, Springer Open, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2016 
Michael Reichenbach: Interview with Alexander Gaedke (2017) 
Michael Reichenbach: Interview with Alexander Gaedke: Mit 1000 Parametern für das 
Lenkgefühl können wir richtig Gas geben, in: ATZ - Automobiltechnische Zeitschrift (6), 
pp. 22–24, 2017 
List of References 
150 
Mitschke, M.; Wallentowitz, H.: Dynamics of motorvehicles (2014) 
Mitschke, Manfred; Wallentowitz, Henning: Dynamik der Kraftfahrzeuge, Springer 
Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden, 2014 
Müller, J.-H.: Torque overlay for hydraulic steering (2010) 
Müller, Jens-Hauke: Momentenüberlagerung für Hydraulische Lenkungen, in: ATZ - 
Automobiltechnische Zeitschrift 7-8, Issues 112, pp. 556–559, 2010 
Reimann, G. et al.: Steering Actuator Systems (2016) 
Reimann, Gerd; Brenner, Peter; Büring, Hendrik: Steering Actuator Systems, in: Winner, 
Hermann et al. (Eds.): Handbook of Driver Assistance Systems, Springer International 
Publishing, Cham, 2016 
Reimpell, J.; Betzler, J. W.: Basics Chassis (2005) 
Reimpell, Jörnsen; Betzler, Jürgen W.: Fahrwerktechnik, Vogel, Würzburg, 2005 
Reschka, A.: Dissertation, Safe Operation of Automated Vehicle 
Reschka, Andreas: Fertigkeiten-und Fähigkeitengraphen als Grundlage des sicheren 
Betriebs von automatisierten Fahrzeugen im öffentlichen Straßenverkehr in städtischer 
Umgebung, Dissertation 
TU Braunschweig 
Reschka, A.: Safety Concept for Autonomous Vehicles (2016) 
Reschka, Andreas: Safety Concept for Autonomous Vehicles, in: Maurer, Markus et al. 
(Eds.): Autonomous driving, Springer Open, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2016 
Robert Bosch GmbH: New steering systems for tomorrow's mobility (2017) 
Robert Bosch GmbH: New steering systems for tomorrow's mobility; https://www.bosch-
mobility-solutions.com/en/products-and-services/passenger-cars-and-light-commercial-
vehicles/steering-systems/electric-power-steering-systems/, 2017, Access 26.01.2019 
Shladover, S. E. et al.: Demonstration of automated heavy-duty vehicles (2006) 
Shladover, Steve E.; Lu, Xiao-Yun; Song, Bongsob; Dickey, Susan; Nowakowski, 
Christopher; Howell, Adam; Bu, Fanping; Marco, David; Tan, Han-Shue; Nelson, David: 
Demonstration of automated heavy-duty vehicles, in: California Partners for Advanced 
Transit and Highways (PATH), 2006 
Society of Automotive Engineers: J3016 Terms related to driving automation (2016) 
Society of Automotive Engineers: , Technical Report Taxonomy and definitions for terms 
related to on-road motor vehicle automated driving systems, SAE International, 2016 
Stolte, T. et al.: Towards Automated Driving (2015) 
Stolte, Torben; Reschka, Andreas; Bagschik, Gerrit; Maurer, Markus: Towards Automated 
Driving, in: 2015 IEEE 18th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation 
Systems (ITSC 2015), Gran Canaria, Spain, IEEE, Piscataway, NJ, 2015 
 List of References 
  151 
Stolte, T. et al.: On Functional Safety of Vehicle Actuation Systems (2016) 
Stolte, Torben; Hosse, René S.; Becker, Uwe; Maurer, Markus: On Functional Safety of 
Vehicle Actuation Systems in the Context of Automated Driving, in: IFAC-PapersOnLine 
(11), Issues 49, pp. 576–581, 2016 
Stolte, T. et al.: Safety goals and functional safety requirements (2016) 
Stolte, Torben; Bagschik, Gerrit; Maurer, Markus: Safety goals and functional safety 
requirements for actuation systems of automated vehicles, in: 2016 IEEE 19th International 
Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, IEEE, 
Piscataway, NJ, 2016 
United Nations: Convention on Road Traffic (1968) 
United Nations Convention on Road Traffic; Consolidated Version, 08.11.1968 
United Nations: ECE WP.1/159 (2017) 
United Nations Report of the Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety on its seventy- fifth 
session, 03.10.2017 
United Nations: ECE R79 r4 (2018) 
United Nations Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regard to 
steering equipment; Revision 4, 07.11.2018 
Verein Deutscher Ingenieure: VDI 2222: Method for Developing Technical Systems 
(1993) 
Verein Deutscher Ingenieure: , VDI-Richtlinie VDI 2222 Blatt 1: Methodik zum 
Entwickeln und Konstruieren technischer Systeme und Produkte, Verein Deutscher 
Ingenieure, Düsseldorf, 1993 
Volvo Trucks Magazine: Benefits of Volvo Dynamic Steering (2017) 
Volvo Trucks Magazine: Benefits of Volvo Dynamic Steering; 
https://www.volvotrucks.in/en-in/news/magazine-online/2017/apr/tech-in-focus-vds.html, 
2017, Access 19.02.2019 
WABCO: Active Steering Technology (2018) 
WABCO: Active Steering Technology; https://www.wabco-
auto.com/de/produkte/kategorie/active-steering/, 2018, Access 02.01.2019 
Wiesel, U. et al.: Hybrid steering system for reducing fuel consumption (2010) 
Wiesel, Urs; Schwarzhaupt, Andreas; Frey, Michael; Gauterin, Frank: Hybride Lenkung 
zur Verbrauchs-Reduktion beim Nutzfahrzeug, in: ATZ - Automobiltechnische Zeitschrift 
(1), Issues 112, pp. 62–68, 2010 
Winner, H. et al.: When does By-Wire arrive brakes and steering? (2004) 
Winner, H.; Isermann, R.; Hanselka, H.; Schürr, A.: Wann kommt By-Wire auch für 
Bremse und Lenkung?, in: VDI report, pp. 59–71, 2004 
List of References 
152 
Winner, H. et al.: Handbook of Driver Assistance Systems (2016) 
Winner, Hermann; Hakuli, Stephan; Lotz, Felix; Singer, Christina (Eds.) Handbook of 
Driver Assistance Systems, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2016 
ZF Friedrichshafen AG: ZF Press Release (2018) 
ZF Friedrichshafen AG: ZF Presents the World's First Prototype of an Electric Steering 
System; 
https://press.zf.com/site/press/de_de/microsites/press/list/release/release_41949.html, 
2018, Access 02.01.2019 
 Own Publications 
  153 
Own Publications 
Herold, Maximilian; Said, Oussama; Winner, Hermann: Simulative Assessment of 
Differential Braking for Steering Redundancy in Automated Driven Trucks, in: Verein 
Deutscher Ingenieure (Ed.): SIMVEC, Baden Baden, 2018 
Herold, Maximilian; Winner, Hermann: Double Controlled Steering Valve for Hybrid 
Redundant Active Steering Systems with Driver Intervention, Hubei Henglong Automotive 
System Group Co., LTD, Patent Invention Disclosure 2018/55, Patent application number: 
-, 2018 
Herold, Maximilian; Winner, Hermann: Functional Safety of a Steering System for 
Commercial Vehicles for High Level Automated Driving, WKM Symposium, 
Braunschweig, 2017 
Herold, Maximilian; Winner, Hermann; Wende, Martin: Method to Control Redundant 
Automated Steering System with Driver Intervention, Hubei Henglong Automotive System 
Group Co., LTD, Patent Invention Disclosure 2019/06, Patent application number: -, 2019 
Herold, Maximilian; Winner, Hermann; Fu, Zaoqing: Redundant Active Steering 
System, Hubei Henglong Automotive System Group Co., LTD, Patent Invention 
Disclosure 2018/15, Patent application number: -, 2018 
Herold, Maximilian; Liebler, Maximilian; Winner, Hermann: Power Requirements for 
a Redundant Automated Steering System for Trucks, in: 26th International Technical 
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 2019 
 
Supervised Theses 
154 
Supervised Theses 
Glatzki, Felix: Scenarios Based Description of Use Cases for Urban Auto-mated Driving. 
Master-Thesis No. 741/19, 2019 
Huwe, Christian: Slipping Control for Tractors. Master-Thesis No. 734/19, 2019 
Keil, Marius: Analysis of Assessment of Existing Steering Systems for Commercial Vehi-
cles Regarding to the Requirements of Autonomous Driving. Bachelor-Thesis No. 1268/16, 
2016  
Khan, Utsho Rahman: Development of a Process for Testing Cargo Units on a Dynamic 
Acceleration Test Rig. Bachelor-Thesis No. 1307/17, 2018 
Liebler, Maximilian: Definition of the Safe State During Automated Driving Based on Na-
tional and International Road Construction Guide Lines. Bachelor-Thesis No. 1316/18, 2018  
Müller, Matthias: Experimental Analysis of the Effect of Vertical Stimulations on the Re-
sults of Horizontal Cargo Security Tests. Master-Thesis No. 719/18, 2018 
Peng, Di: Development of an Efficient Control Strategy for a Hybrid Steering System. 
Master-Thesis No. 665/17, 2018 
Said, Oussama: Simulative Analysis of the Potential of Steering by Braking as Fallback for 
an Automated Steering System for Trucks. Master-Thesis No. 677/18, 2018 
Schilling, Martin: Development of a Concept for Measuring Forces, Torques and Power 
Appearing at a Steering System of Commercial Vehicles. Bachelor-Thesis No. 1269/16, 
2016  
Schumacher, Max: Concept for the Securing of Cargo Units on a Three-Way Tipper for 
Cargo Security Tests. Bachelor-Thesis No. 1306/17, 2018 
Wei, Quan: Development of a Simulation Model of a Hybrid Steering System in 
MATLAB/Simulink and Implementation in the Software TruckMaker. Master-Thesis No. 
642/17, 2017 
Wende, Martin: Simulative Analysis of the Influence to the Driving Dynamics caused by 
Change of Operation Mode, Intervention by the Driver und System Failures of an Active 
Hybrid Truck Steering System. Master-Thesis No. 683/18, 2018 
Wolz, Christoph: Optimization of the Control of a High Dynamic Acceleration Test Bench 
for the Investigation of Cargo Security Concepts. Master-Thesis No. 645/17, 2017 
Zhang, Junwu: Design of the Electric Steering Subsystem of a Hybrid Steering System. 
International Research Experience Program IREP, 2017 
 
